чем Tor не угодил?
https://www.google.com/search?q=TOR+vs+I2PBenefits of I2P over Tor
* Designed and optimized for hidden services, which are much faster than in Tor
* Fully distributed and self organizing
* Peers are selected by continuously profiling and ranking performance,
rather than trusting claimed capacity
* Floodfill peers ("directory servers") are varying and untrusted,
rather than hardcoded
* Small enough that it hasn't been blocked or DOSed much, or at all
* Peer-to-peer friendly
* Packet switched instead of circuit switched
* * implicit transparent load balancing of messages
across multiple peers, rather than a single path
* * resilience vs. failures by running multiple
tunnels in parallel, plus rotating tunnels
* * scale each client's connections at O(1) instead
of O(N) (Alice has e.g. 2 inbound tunnels that are
used by all of the peers Alice is talking with,
rather than a circuit for each)
* Unidirectional tunnels instead of bidirectional
circuits, doubling the number of nodes a peer has to
compromise to get the same information.
* Protection against detecting client activity, even
when an attacker is participating in the tunnel, as
tunnels are used for more than simply passing end
to end messages (e.g. netDb, tunnel management,
tunnel testing)
* Tunnels in I2P are short lived, decreasing the number
of samples that an attacker can use to mount an
active attack with, unlike circuits in Tor, which are
typically long lived.
* I2P APIs are designed specifically for anonymity and
security, while SOCKS is designed for functionality.
* Essentially all peers participate in routing for others
The bandwidth overhead of being a full peer is low,
while in Tor, while client nodes don't require much
bandwidth, they don't fully participate in the mixnet.
* Integrated automatic update mechanism
* Both TCP and UDP transports
* Java, not C
Смысл в том, что эта сеть сохраняет анонимность, даже если все узлы в ней враждебны. Главное, чтобы не было крайнего случая. Пример крайности:
