That is not a good security concept.
Hello,
could you elaborate, where is the security hole and in which situation(motivation) is it present?
The arbitrator can still be a fool player.
The concept of the arbitrator is, that you just need him, when there is a problem, not that he can fuck up the whole transaction when ever he wants.
Correct, I had to mention that there are sharing secret algorithms used to share the secret within N people with the possibility of the secret to be reconstructed with K parties,
e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir's_Secret_Sharing
If that one is accomplished, would it be less secure than multisig?
Hmmm could be, in a very deep technical level...I was just thinking that sharing a secret could be easier in terms of technical implementation vs multisig...but there is another inherited problem - the center needs the whole secret in order to generate the private key and the bitcoin address, right?
https://brainwallet.github.io
the other parties needs to trust the center - that it will split the secret according to the publicly announce algorithm and will hold only it's part ....from security point of view the center would be motivated to do so....if you accept preliminary that the center is trusted )
Trusting a centralized party is exactly what most people on this forum will tell you not to do.
I would like to make it trustless, but the problem is that the creator of either the shared secret scheme or the multisig transaction would know all the relevant parts...
have a look at this multisig tool:
http://ms-brainwallet.org/
Ok it creates the 3 private keys in a 2 of 3 scheme but they are presented to 1 party at once right? How would you do it in a matter that all the 3 parties independently and securely receive the private keys? How do you hide the 2 keys from the creator of the multisig address?
Well, the tool above is actually using 3 public keys, generating a transaction to be broadcasted