Topic: [2014-11-21] CW: Dutch national police already had a copy of Silk Road 2 in May (Read 1384 times)
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November 23, 2014, 02:37:03 AM
You get a server that isn't tied to your own name. Even petty criminals in comparison who run illegal sites know not to do this. Even DPR bought fake IDs to rent them.
legendary
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November 23, 2014, 02:21:52 AM
Apparently, the suspect rented the servers under his own name:
http://webwereld.nl/beveiliging/84411-silk-road-2-baas-draaide-server-op-eigen-naam (Dutch)
http://webwereld.nl/beveiliging/84411-silk-road-2-baas-draaide-server-op-eigen-naam (Dutch)
What an idiot
. It baffles me how these people can be so smart and yet so stupid. It also looks like setting anything up in Holland is now a no go too.Well I guess if they went for the servers
Pretty much busted already although I'm not sure if they could have used a fake ID there
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November 22, 2014, 02:39:06 PM
Apparently, the suspect rented the servers under his own name:
http://webwereld.nl/beveiliging/84411-silk-road-2-baas-draaide-server-op-eigen-naam (Dutch)
http://webwereld.nl/beveiliging/84411-silk-road-2-baas-draaide-server-op-eigen-naam (Dutch)
What an idiot
. It baffles me how these people can be so smart and yet so stupid. It also looks like setting anything up in Holland is now a no go too. 
November 22, 2014, 08:17:55 AM
http://computerworld.nl/beveiliging/84556-klpd-had-silk-road-2-0-server-in-mei-al-in-handen (Dutch)
Summary:
The FBI and Europol already knew the locations of the Silk Road 2 servers for a while. In May, the website was hosted at a Dutch hosting provider, and the website was temporarily taken offline to make an image of it. Among other things, the image contains the private key of the TOR hidden service, allowing the police to set up a fake website at the same address. After taking the image, the website was put back online.
The police does not want to say which hosting provider was hosting the services. Apparently, the hosting provider was not only forced to remain silent, but also to lie to the SR2 operator about the cause of the down-time.
The exact timing of the down-time has been used as evidence by the FBI that this was the Silk Road 2 server.
Apparently, the suspect rented the servers under his own name:
http://webwereld.nl/beveiliging/84411-silk-road-2-baas-draaide-server-op-eigen-naam (Dutch)
A total of 9 dark markets were taken offline, including SR2, Alpaca Market and Cannabis Road. This was done at 5 physical locations in North Holland and Utrecht (apparently all in the Netherlands). Ten exit nodes (belonging to the German non-profit "TorServers") were taken offline, four of them were running on a single server in the Netherlands. That server was hosted by hosting provider "NForce".
Summary:
The FBI and Europol already knew the locations of the Silk Road 2 servers for a while. In May, the website was hosted at a Dutch hosting provider, and the website was temporarily taken offline to make an image of it. Among other things, the image contains the private key of the TOR hidden service, allowing the police to set up a fake website at the same address. After taking the image, the website was put back online.
The police does not want to say which hosting provider was hosting the services. Apparently, the hosting provider was not only forced to remain silent, but also to lie to the SR2 operator about the cause of the down-time.
The exact timing of the down-time has been used as evidence by the FBI that this was the Silk Road 2 server.
Apparently, the suspect rented the servers under his own name:
http://webwereld.nl/beveiliging/84411-silk-road-2-baas-draaide-server-op-eigen-naam (Dutch)
A total of 9 dark markets were taken offline, including SR2, Alpaca Market and Cannabis Road. This was done at 5 physical locations in North Holland and Utrecht (apparently all in the Netherlands). Ten exit nodes (belonging to the German non-profit "TorServers") were taken offline, four of them were running on a single server in the Netherlands. That server was hosted by hosting provider "NForce".
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