Topic: Anonymous Bitcoins (Read 622 times)
This is not the place to be discussing altcoins.
If you care about privacy in terms of no link between where you received your coins from and where you send them to, yes.
That's what a mixer is for.
However, i would suggest to use a more reputable one.
Regarding the other cryptos mentioned here.. ZCASH, Dash, etc.. are not anynomous.
They claim to be.. but they aren't.
The only crypto which is private by design, is monereo. Everything else is just faking to be anonymous.
That's what a mixer is for.
However, i would suggest to use a more reputable one.
Regarding the other cryptos mentioned here.. ZCASH, Dash, etc.. are not anynomous.
They claim to be.. but they aren't.
The only crypto which is private by design, is monereo. Everything else is just faking to be anonymous.
Yay! Lets all advertise and use a 'chip' mixer that has its SSL / HTTPS certificate capped to a grade B ...
- https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=chipmixer.com&hideResults=on
SSL Labs Grade Change for TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 Protocols ...
- https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2018/11/19/grade-change-for-tls-1-0-and-tls-1-1-protocols
Has 'enabled' insecure cypher suites ...
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cipher_suite
Is therefore vulnerable to the BEAST attack ...
- https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2013/09/10/is-beast-still-a-threat
and still uses an RSA 2048 bits publickey certificate, despite using a free certificate authority (Lets Encrypt) that support RSA 4096 bits publickey certificates, out-of-the box ...
But hey! ... Your using it over Tor, right!? ... still one has to question the mixers 'privacy' on the above basis ...
...
I would add that privacy and anonymity are not the same thing.
Monero is perhaps to private / anonymous.
Sometimes people will require selective privacy / anonymity and that is Zcash. It is not fake privacy / anonymity.
[notice] Zcash can't help you if you use it wrong!
z-addr > z-addr is privacy / anonymity. See my post above.
...
A Cypherpunk's Manifesto
- https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html
Quotes:
"Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. Privacy is not secrecy. A private matter is something one doesn't want the whole world to know, but a secret matter is something one doesn't want anybody to know. Privacy is the power to selectively reveal oneself to the world..."
"... Since we desire privacy, we must ensure that each party to a transaction have knowledge only of that which is directly necessary for that transaction. Since any information can be spoken of, we must ensure that we reveal as little as possible. In most cases personal identity is not salient. When I purchase a magazine at a store and hand cash to the clerk, there is no need to know who I am. When I ask my electronic mail provider to send and receive messages, my provider need not know to whom I am speaking or what I am saying or what others are saying to me; my provider only need know how to get the message there and how much I owe them in fees. When my identity is revealed by the underlying mechanism of the transaction, I have no privacy. I cannot here selectively reveal myself; I must always reveal myself.
Therefore, privacy in an open society requires anonymous transaction systems. Until now, cash has been the primary such system. An anonymous transaction system is not a secret transaction system. An anonymous system empowers individuals to reveal their identity when desired and only when desired; this is the essence of privacy.
Privacy in an open society also requires cryptography. If I say something, I want it heard only by those for whom I intend it. If the content of my speech is available to the world, I have no privacy. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy, and to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Furthermore, to reveal one's identity with assurance when the default is anonymity requires the cryptographic signature...."
etc.,
...
Onward
If you care about privacy in terms of no link between where you received your coins from and where you send them to, yes.
That's what a mixer is for.
However, i would suggest to use a more reputable one.
Regarding the other cryptos mentioned here.. ZCASH, Dash, etc.. are not anynomous.
They claim to be.. but they aren't.
The only crypto which is private by design, is monereo. Everything else is just faking to be anonymous.
That's what a mixer is for.
However, i would suggest to use a more reputable one.
Regarding the other cryptos mentioned here.. ZCASH, Dash, etc.. are not anynomous.
They claim to be.. but they aren't.
The only crypto which is private by design, is monereo. Everything else is just faking to be anonymous.
...snip...
To be sincere, I'm lost here because chain analysis said something and you provided another proof which make the whole thing skeptical and complex for me to understand. However, chain analysis claim about Zcash was something that just happen Satoshi statement and the proof you provided are long ago statement, I'm not the one person to believe Zcash was not privacy coin as people thoughts and i guess we are in a stage where people decide by themselves either to use zcash as privacy coin or not.
To be sincere, I'm lost here because chain analysis said something and you provided another proof which make the whole thing skeptical and complex for me to understand. However, chain analysis claim about Zcash was something that just happen Satoshi statement and the proof you provided are long ago statement, I'm not the one person to believe Zcash was not privacy coin as people thoughts and i guess we are in a stage where people decide by themselves either to use zcash as privacy coin or not.
Quite frankly this probably isn't the correct thread or the right place to explain how privacy / anonymity works in Zcash, but I will ...
First read ...
Zero-knowledge proof
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_proof
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-interactive_zero-knowledge_proof
- https://z.cash/technology/
- https://electriccoin.co/blog/anatomy-of-zcash/
...
The Bitcoin ledger is public. It is an open book. All transactions are publicly viewable and are stored on the blockchain forever. Just look at any block explorer.
Zcash utilizes two address types t-addr and z-addr. t-addr are public just like in Bitcoin and are therefore publicly viewable.
z-addr are basically the equivalent of a black box, on-chain. It is impossible to view the transactions within the black box.
However, as a Zcash user ... let's say you buy one ZEC from an exchange service (who knows who you are through KYC etc.,)
You receive your ZEC to a t-addr (public). You then proceed to send one ZEC less the fees to your own z-addr (private) and in the next few blocks you send out the one (ZEC) less the fees to a t-addr (public) to buy something online.
It is relatively straight forward for a strong adversary doing chain analysis to match these likely inputs and outputs on chain and to perhaps identify you personally by contacting the exchange service, retrospectively.
The chain analysis article states that less than 1% of Zcash transactions (to date) are even utilizing z-addr > z-addr transactions i.e. within the black box.
Quite simply if the opposite were true and 99% of Zcash transactions were as z-addr > z-addr transactions it would become impossible to do chain analysis of these transactions.
An old internet adage states "You cannot be anonymous by yourself!".
Splitting inputs and outputs over time also makes chain analysis much harder ... i.e.
You receive your one ZEC to a t-addr (public). You then proceed to send one ZEC less the fees to your own z-addr (private), you then cold store your coins for x duration. Before spending anything outside of the black box you occasionally move your own coins from your own z-addr to another z-addr, perhaps to a different wallet. When you send out x number of (ZEC) less the fees to a t-addr (public) to buy something online, say months or even years later, it becomes much much harder to identify the origin of the coins.
It becomes even more impossible if your purchase is made to a z-addr, for example.
...
Connecting your wallet via Tor and only making transactions through onion routing can also help to prevent other types of surveillance and analysis.
...
I once wrote a piece on the Zcash community forum where I described DASH coin mixing vs Zcash shielded privacy as follows;
DASH - If you imagine a theatre stage with say eight piles of money on the floor (masternodes), the curtain rolls up and the troop of dancers enters the stage with money in hand and each of them proceeds to move from pile to pile swapping money around then it might seem difficult for the audience to work out what is going one. However, imagine that the entire show is recorded by an audience member (on the blockchain) it is actually very easy in deed to replay exactly what happened (via a block explorer).
Zcash - Imagine the same stage, except this time the piles of money are behind a screen (entirely shielded from the audiences view), if the majority of the dancers only swap money behind the screen, it becomes impossible for the audience to easily work out exactly what happened, even retrospectively.
...
Financial Privacy is not a crime!
IHMO any company doing chain analysis of other peoples private transactions (for profit), should be considered criminals themselves. Its not a dissimilar practice to say upskirting or revenge porn. Privacy is a human right.
...
Full disclosure, I currently host numerous Tor servers for the Zcash project, originally under a different guise, with funds from a first round Zcash (ZEC) Foundation grant. However, the price decline meant that I've mainly continued to do this under my own steam, with limitations. Something I hope to resolve with the Foundation in time. I'm otherwise not affiliated with any company. The project nodes can be found via this thread soon (Bitcoin BTC and Litecoin nodes as well) ...
- https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/ann-bitcoin-btc-on-tor-addnodes-project-5177001
...
"The sculptor's marble sends regards" ...
- https://youtu.be/fczPlmz-Vug
...snip...
"Anonymous Bitcoins" is a complete contradiction in terms ...
Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Using a mixer for transactions only provides plausible deniability and/or obfuscation at best.
Monero provides reasonable anonymity and Zcash (z-addr) transactions have strong privacy.
Monero provided good anonymity and privacy but Zcash transaction dont have strong privacy as people thought and chain analysis have proof that Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Using a mixer for transactions only provides plausible deniability and/or obfuscation at best.
Monero provides reasonable anonymity and Zcash (z-addr) transactions have strong privacy.
Quote
Zcash’s shielded pools can provide stronger privacy than mixing transactions but shielding is not bulletproof
Zcash has much stronger privacy than people think, as always people don't read the manual ... perhaps Zcash should carry a similar warning to the Tor software itself ...
"[notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning"
z-addr > z-addr = private.
Don't allow your t-addr > z-addr inputs to 'match' with your z-addr > t-addr outputs.
Where possible insist on z-addr > z-addr transactions.
Do keep your Zcash in a cold storage z-addr.
You can think of t-addr as HTTP and z-addr as HTTPS.
Analysis of the chain is now much, much harder.
Bitcoin is currently only HTTP in this regard.
Zooko and company are some of the very best folks in crypto. Even the real satoshi told us that zero-knowledge-proofs were hard to implement ...
This is a very interesting topic. If a solution was found, a much better, easier, more convenient implementation of Bitcoin would be possible.
Originally, a coin can be just a chain of signatures. With a timestamp service, the old ones could be dropped eventually before there's too much backtrace fan-out, or coins could be kept individually or in denominations. It's the need to check for the absence of double-spends that requires global knowledge of all transactions.
The challenge is, how do you prove that no other spends exist? It seems a node must know about all transactions to be able to verify that. If it only knows the hash of the in/outpoints, it can't check the signatures to see if an outpoint has been spent before. Do you have any ideas on this?
It's hard to think of how to apply zero-knowledge-proofs in this case.
We're trying to prove the absence of something, which seems to require knowing about all and checking that the something isn't included.
Originally, a coin can be just a chain of signatures. With a timestamp service, the old ones could be dropped eventually before there's too much backtrace fan-out, or coins could be kept individually or in denominations. It's the need to check for the absence of double-spends that requires global knowledge of all transactions.
The challenge is, how do you prove that no other spends exist? It seems a node must know about all transactions to be able to verify that. If it only knows the hash of the in/outpoints, it can't check the signatures to see if an outpoint has been spent before. Do you have any ideas on this?
It's hard to think of how to apply zero-knowledge-proofs in this case.
We're trying to prove the absence of something, which seems to require knowing about all and checking that the something isn't included.
...
DASH is just a glorified on-chain mixer, its also more akin to money laundering through intentional obfuscation.
It might actually be more anonymous to use Coinjoin (Wasabi) and a Bitcoin Mixer ... than DASH.
...
Monero and Zcash are currently the best privacy coins.
...snip...
"Anonymous Bitcoins" is a complete contradiction in terms ...
Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Using a mixer for transactions only provides plausible deniability and/or obfuscation at best.
Monero provides reasonable anonymity and Zcash (z-addr) transactions have strong privacy.
Monero provided good anonymity and privacy but Zcash transaction dont have strong privacy as people thought and chain analysis have proof that Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Using a mixer for transactions only provides plausible deniability and/or obfuscation at best.
Monero provides reasonable anonymity and Zcash (z-addr) transactions have strong privacy.
Quote
Zcash’s shielded pools can provide stronger privacy than mixing transactions but shielding is not bulletproof
Zcash has much stronger privacy than people think, as always people don't read the manual ... perhaps Zcash should carry a similar warning to the Tor software itself ...
"[notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning"
z-addr > z-addr = private.
Don't allow your t-addr > z-addr inputs to 'match' with your z-addr > t-addr outputs.
Where possible insist on z-addr > z-addr transactions.
Do keep your Zcash in a cold storage z-addr.
You can think of t-addr as HTTP and z-addr as HTTPS.
Analysis of the chain is now much, much harder.
Bitcoin is currently only HTTP in this regard.
Zooko and company are some of the very best folks in crypto. Even the real satoshi told us that zero-knowledge-proofs were hard to implement ...
This is a very interesting topic. If a solution was found, a much better, easier, more convenient implementation of Bitcoin would be possible.
Originally, a coin can be just a chain of signatures. With a timestamp service, the old ones could be dropped eventually before there's too much backtrace fan-out, or coins could be kept individually or in denominations. It's the need to check for the absence of double-spends that requires global knowledge of all transactions.
The challenge is, how do you prove that no other spends exist? It seems a node must know about all transactions to be able to verify that. If it only knows the hash of the in/outpoints, it can't check the signatures to see if an outpoint has been spent before. Do you have any ideas on this?
It's hard to think of how to apply zero-knowledge-proofs in this case.
We're trying to prove the absence of something, which seems to require knowing about all and checking that the something isn't included.
Originally, a coin can be just a chain of signatures. With a timestamp service, the old ones could be dropped eventually before there's too much backtrace fan-out, or coins could be kept individually or in denominations. It's the need to check for the absence of double-spends that requires global knowledge of all transactions.
The challenge is, how do you prove that no other spends exist? It seems a node must know about all transactions to be able to verify that. If it only knows the hash of the in/outpoints, it can't check the signatures to see if an outpoint has been spent before. Do you have any ideas on this?
It's hard to think of how to apply zero-knowledge-proofs in this case.
We're trying to prove the absence of something, which seems to require knowing about all and checking that the something isn't included.
...
DASH is just a glorified on-chain mixer, its also more akin to money laundering through intentional obfuscation.
It might actually be more anonymous to use Coinjoin (Wasabi) and a Bitcoin Mixer ... than DASH.
...
Monero and Zcash are currently the best privacy coins.
Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Under the ideal usage of Bitcoin (with Tor, mixed coins etc), you could basically say that you own an "anonymous BTC". The ledger may be public, but if you've been under an anonymous identity the entire time then it's useless really. But a very little mistake could cost your entire effort of protecting your identity revealing everything, of course. 
It's not really anonymous, chain analysis know it's originated from mixer service and they usually call it "tainted BTC". If you use privacy-orianted cryptocurrency such as Monero, chain analysis can't even know the origin of the coin.
Is there a better way?
Thanks in advance
The better way of making anonymous transactions through Bitcoin making use of CoinJoin support wallet with the inclusion of Bitcoin tumbler site like Chipmixer using there Tor browser.Thanks in advance
Hope this have nothing to do with the Bitfinex 2016 stolen BTC which was moved recently though.
https://whale-alert.io/transaction/bitcoin/800905d2b5e38b6fe40fb1ec928e9ab104732ac832660483f7e1511e0c41385c/1
https://whale-alert.io/transaction/bitcoin/800905d2b5e38b6fe40fb1ec928e9ab104732ac832660483f7e1511e0c41385c/15
"Anonymous Bitcoins" is a complete contradiction in terms ...
Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Using a mixer for transactions only provides plausible deniability and/or obfuscation at best.
Monero provides reasonable anonymity and Zcash (z-addr) transactions have strong privacy.
Monero provided good anonymity and privacy but Zcash transaction dont have strong privacy as people thought and chain analysis have proof that Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Using a mixer for transactions only provides plausible deniability and/or obfuscation at best.
Monero provides reasonable anonymity and Zcash (z-addr) transactions have strong privacy.
Quote
Zcash’s shielded pools can provide stronger privacy than mixing transactions but shielding is not bulletproof
You cannot simply hope to maintain or preserve 'true' anonymity with a publicly accessible ledger, forever.
it is not about the ledger itself being public, it is instead about what is being written in the ledger and what cryptography algorithms are being used in constructing it. in bitcoin, what you said is true but in a privacy oriented cryptocurrency like monero for example that also has a "public ledger" it is less true.
...snip...
Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Under the ideal usage of Bitcoin (with Tor, mixed coins etc), you could basically say that you own an "anonymous BTC". The ledger may be public, but if you've been under an anonymous identity the entire time then it's useless really. But a very little mistake could cost your entire effort of protecting your identity revealing everything, of course. - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anonymity#Pseudonymity
As I said, pseudonymous not anonymous.
Encryption only affords you more time.
It is easier to match inputs and outputs to a sub-set of users identities and/or transactions than you imagine.
You cannot simply hope to maintain or preserve 'true' anonymity with a publicly accessible ledger, forever.
Under the ideal usage of Bitcoin (with Tor, mixed coins etc), you could basically say that you own an "anonymous BTC". The ledger may be public, but if you've been under an anonymous identity the entire time then it's useless really. But a very little mistake could cost your entire effort of protecting your identity revealing everything, of course.
It's a matter of terms usage. After all, pseudonymous != anonymous. It's not really a problem as I think most people get what OP really wanna do.
OP, there's a guide by theymos if you need more alternative & info: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/guide-decent-mixing-methods-5146241.
1. Use Tor to access their website
As an additional tip, go to Tor Browser settings and change to "Safest" protection level before visiting ChipMixer or any other website. With JavaScript enabled, you could have a website with a script that tracks your real IP down. Fortunately, ChipMixer has taken care of this by having a no JS requirement Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Under the ideal usage of Bitcoin (with Tor, mixed coins etc), you could basically say that you own an "anonymous BTC". The ledger may be public, but if you've been under an anonymous identity the entire time then it's useless really. But a very little mistake could cost your entire effort of protecting your identity revealing everything, of course.
"Anonymous Bitcoins" is a complete contradiction in terms ...
Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Using a mixer for transactions only provides plausible deniability and/or obfuscation at best.
Monero provides reasonable anonymity and Zcash (z-addr) transactions have strong privacy.
Bitcoins are pseudonymous only. The entire bitcoin ledger is public.
Using a mixer for transactions only provides plausible deniability and/or obfuscation at best.
Monero provides reasonable anonymity and Zcash (z-addr) transactions have strong privacy.
Other tips aside choosing mixer service,
1. Use Tor to access their website
2. If you use lightweight/SPV wallet, it's time to create new wallet and make sure it always uses Tor
3. Don't use Windows OS, it's one big privacy nightmare
1. Use Tor to access their website
2. If you use lightweight/SPV wallet, it's time to create new wallet and make sure it always uses Tor
3. Don't use Windows OS, it's one big privacy nightmare
it's fee free (other than transaction fees) for increments of 0.001
Technically it's a "donation" service... in that you pay what you think is a fair amount for the use of their service, with there being no minimum. So, while you can pay "zero" I'm sure they'd appreciate a fair rate of compensation for the service provided 
It looks to still be active based on their thread: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5052876.100
They also have a pretty good trust summary.
If you need another mixer to join the chain you could try ChipMixer, it's fee free (other than transaction fees) for increments of 0.001 but ajy remainder beyond 0.001 is donated to the mixer (so 0.0045 would yield 0.004)..
They also have a pretty good trust summary.
If you need another mixer to join the chain you could try ChipMixer, it's fee free (other than transaction fees) for increments of 0.001 but ajy remainder beyond 0.001 is donated to the mixer (so 0.0045 would yield 0.004)..
In these times full of fake reviews and misleading information, I am searching for help in anonymising my bitcoins.
Can I still use Bitcoin mixer as https://blender.io/ ?
Sadly I am too poor for the coinJoining of Wasabi wallet.
Is there a better way?
Thanks in advance
Can I still use Bitcoin mixer as https://blender.io/ ?
Sadly I am too poor for the coinJoining of Wasabi wallet.
Is there a better way?
Thanks in advance
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