Well, don't take offence, just read:
None taken! Thanks for the references.
The paper is actually quite outdated and is only applicable in very specific scenarios:
1) For some reason, every single hidden service peer gets attacked and is unable to establish any connection to the target node. That is very, very resource intensive considering the fact that the number of nodes running on Tor outnumbers the ones on the clearnet.
2) The user uses an outdated version of Bitcoin Core, which is roughly around 7 years ago by my estimates. We have improved a lot to counter topological analysis since then and they work pretty well.
3) Section 3 basically talks about a sybil attack, which fails to deanonymize a user with sufficient accuracy if any of the peers other than those controlled by the attacker is connected to the target.
This is independent of the usage of Bitcoin Core. It has to do with the user's privacy habits which essentially means that you have to tell everyone that you're the owner of this specific address in your hidden service. Definitely not something that anyone with privacy in mind would do.
This doesn't demonstrate anything that is related to Bitcoin Core and Tor.
Portscanners would only work if your Bitcoin Core accepts incoming connections, and it also practically doesn't serve any use or deanonymize the user.
This doesn't really do anything.
However, it seems to me that you have missed the main reason why I against TOR for my node - I don't want to be blacklisted.
As mentioned above, Tor bridges can be used as well.
Haven't seen this for a while but generally whatever is said there can be easily debunk with a little research. Tons of affiliate links to VPNs on the site as well, go figure
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https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-stinks-nsa-presentation-documentYeah, it is designed to be censorship resistant, but its packets have some recognizable patterns that allow to mark the relevant network traffic as to be originated from TOR app.
VPN connections are fairly recognizable as well, even with daisy-chaining. Arguably, VPNs are even easily identified and flagged with DPI, GFW has done this on numerous occasions.
Tor via VPN, yeah, it might be solution, but I'm not sure if they have power to strip off VPN packets (even XORed) that enveloped the relevant TOR ones and thus blacklist me.
If they can, then I believe VPN wouldn't be the best option either.