Its not like replay attacks are kinda destroying btc. Neither its a danger which comes hidden.
"Replay attack" basically is just to rebroadcast your transaction on the other chain. If you start splitting your coins you start with sending
your more valuable coins (btc in this case) to an address you (and only you) have control of. From now on your BTC are safe. And only this TX can be
rebroadcasted (which is kind of senseless for an attacker to send your bch to an address you own). AFterwards you can start importing your private keys into an BCH wallet.
To not get confused by an "attacker", who is aming for chaos, you then send your BCH to a new address.
Afterwards there is no more risk to an "replay attack".
It isn't just a simple case of "send to yourself", it is a LOT more complicated than that... you need to start generating transactions that use inputs which don't exist on the other chain to make it impossible for that transaction to be valid on the other chain. The "easiest" way to achieve that is to get hold of coins that come from a "coinbase" transaction (ie. the block reward, NOT the exchange with the same name)
I think you got to explain this a little more.
If i have my coins (after a fork) sitting on the address A1 , considering there is no replay protection, if i do the following:
1) Send more valuable coins from A1 to A2.
2) Send "forked" coins from A1 to A3.
At this point there are no inputs, which are also available on the other chain. Therefore if i send some coins from A2 to the potential thief,
he can't just rebroadcast this transaction simply because there are no inputs to spend on the other chain.
Am i missing something here?