Topic: Bitshares News--Bytemaster posted in bitsharestalk.org (Read 3411 times)
I just bought 6.8k of BTSX on POLONIEX but I can't find the main announcement thread where is it?.
i see a big advantage for the merchants here. they can hedge against marketvolatility without to trust some third party. In the past we all saw how this kind of trust is easily thrown away (by by Mt.Gox).
If bitUSD works as hoped as an asset in BitSharesX it will change the world (for the better!). Merchants will be able to accept bitUSD directly from customers without a payment processor intermediary and not have to worry about the extreme volatility now prevalent in the cryptocurrency world.
There is a coming EUREKA moment just ahead.
There is a coming EUREKA moment just ahead.
Quote
Quote from: bytemaster on August 01, 2014, 07:02:06 PM
Some may argue that as trx volume increase the cost per transaction decreases. IE: the 2nd CPU is cheaper than the 1st CPU yet the processing capability "doubles". The theory that things are cheaper in bulk.
Things are only cheaper in bulk when you can do things in parallel and there are no resource constraints. High end CPUs get more expensive per unit of computation for a reason, while ordering the same high-end CPU in bulk (parallel) can bring down costs by sharing the fixed development cost among more units... ie: approaching the incremental cost of production.
Blockchains are very SEQUENTIAL in nature. The order of operations is critical to the validation of transactions and thus it is very difficult to apply the parallel approach and bulk ordering to bring down costs. Instead costs go up.
Also, doing things in parallel almost never gives you 2x gain, you are lucky to get a 1.9x gain and 1.5 or less is more common because there is always synchronization overhead.
Therefore my assumption that transaction cost grows linearly with the number of transactions is a fair assumption because it could quite possibly grow non-linearlly, ie: it costs 4x as much to process 2x the transactions after a certain point in the price/performance curve of modern CPUs.
It is true that as technology advances all costs fall and networks can become increasingly decentralized with Moores Law. But Moores Law applies to all technologies and thus at any point in time Nxt, Peercoin, and DPOS can only support a certain amount of decentralization. My argument is that at all points in time DPOS supports more decentralization than the alternatives and that at all points in time DPOS enfranchise more small shareholders.
There is then the argument that at some point the marginal value of an extra node approaches 0 and thus in the end all systems will converge on the same level of decentralization. However.... there is one counter-point to decentralization:
1) Capital concentration is critically important to growing society. At some point extra decentralization of nodes inhibits the benefits of managed centralization. Ie: paying a million people $1 will get less done than paying 10 people $100,000. At the end of the day it will come down to who can find the balance and manage it the best and this is where DPOS really shines and the other systems have no ability to support managed centralization.
Some may argue that as trx volume increase the cost per transaction decreases. IE: the 2nd CPU is cheaper than the 1st CPU yet the processing capability "doubles". The theory that things are cheaper in bulk.
Things are only cheaper in bulk when you can do things in parallel and there are no resource constraints. High end CPUs get more expensive per unit of computation for a reason, while ordering the same high-end CPU in bulk (parallel) can bring down costs by sharing the fixed development cost among more units... ie: approaching the incremental cost of production.
Blockchains are very SEQUENTIAL in nature. The order of operations is critical to the validation of transactions and thus it is very difficult to apply the parallel approach and bulk ordering to bring down costs. Instead costs go up.
Also, doing things in parallel almost never gives you 2x gain, you are lucky to get a 1.9x gain and 1.5 or less is more common because there is always synchronization overhead.
Therefore my assumption that transaction cost grows linearly with the number of transactions is a fair assumption because it could quite possibly grow non-linearlly, ie: it costs 4x as much to process 2x the transactions after a certain point in the price/performance curve of modern CPUs.
It is true that as technology advances all costs fall and networks can become increasingly decentralized with Moores Law. But Moores Law applies to all technologies and thus at any point in time Nxt, Peercoin, and DPOS can only support a certain amount of decentralization. My argument is that at all points in time DPOS supports more decentralization than the alternatives and that at all points in time DPOS enfranchise more small shareholders.
There is then the argument that at some point the marginal value of an extra node approaches 0 and thus in the end all systems will converge on the same level of decentralization. However.... there is one counter-point to decentralization:
1) Capital concentration is critically important to growing society. At some point extra decentralization of nodes inhibits the benefits of managed centralization. Ie: paying a million people $1 will get less done than paying 10 people $100,000. At the end of the day it will come down to who can find the balance and manage it the best and this is where DPOS really shines and the other systems have no ability to support managed centralization.
DPOS+TITAN
fly
fly
cool
BTSX 
You can go to playing games
coin-ga.me
You can go to playing games
coin-ga.me
BitAsset Market Manipulation Security
« on: Today at 08:34:39 PM »
Quote
BitAssets are a challenge to bootstrap because it only takes a single bogus trade for someone to print up a billion BitUSD backed by no collateral. To execute this trade all that is necessary is for someone to gain control of both sides of the order book long enough to execute a trade against themselves at a price they pick. This attack depends upon two factors:
1) The attacker having financial interest in destroying the network
2) The attacker having a large pot of cash that they can burn to bring it down.
3) The attacker being able to execute his attack in a timely manner.
Most of these problems go away once the network is as big as Bitcoin, but when we are young it is much harder to "secure" the market peg. I have just finished implementing everything I think is necessary to launch BitAssets and having the system be secure:
1) There is a minimum market depth required before any shorts or covers are executed (1% XTS)
2) There is a maximum short price that is 50% higher than the current median price feed.. maximum_bid = median_price * 3 / 2
3) Only active delegates may publish a price feed and they must update it every 24 hours.
4) At least 25% of the delegates must be producing a feed
What these limits mean is that once trading begins the only time there can be a margin call is when delegates raise the median price feed. It also means the delegates are circuit breakers in the system. They can limit the price movements during rapid change giving players time to adjust their positions.
Someone speculating in this market now knows that the value of BTSX in terms of BitUSD cannot fall by more than 33% without the delegates updating the price feed.
So what does this give us?
1) A system where the there are up to 101 price feeds for USD / BTSX price, with at least 25
2) By using the median feeds that are way out of line are ignored.
3) Delegates don't set the price and thus the feed does not need to be very accurate and can get by with just one update per day.
4) The price feed is just used as a guardrail that makes attacks "impossible" while not actually being used to execute orders
5) Users only need to trust that delegates can produce a feed that is "close enough" and don't have to trust any individual delegate.
6) Even if the delegates posted BOGUS feeds all they could do is stop new shorts from being executed.
a) delegates have this power anyway by controlling what transactions get included.
b) if the attacker controls over 50% of the price feeds they must control at least 12% of the delegates and that is already bad.
c) everyone knows who the attacker is based upon their price feeds.
In the long-run, we can remove the need for the price feeds once the depth of the market is measured in billions of dollars... or perhaps loosen the price range a bit. With this in place I believe we can launch a test network for BitUSD tomorrow. All trading will occur just like it does with user issued assets with the addition that shorts can add bids (selling USD for BTSX) and margin positions can result in asks.
« on: Today at 08:34:39 PM »
Quote
BitAssets are a challenge to bootstrap because it only takes a single bogus trade for someone to print up a billion BitUSD backed by no collateral. To execute this trade all that is necessary is for someone to gain control of both sides of the order book long enough to execute a trade against themselves at a price they pick. This attack depends upon two factors:
1) The attacker having financial interest in destroying the network
2) The attacker having a large pot of cash that they can burn to bring it down.
3) The attacker being able to execute his attack in a timely manner.
Most of these problems go away once the network is as big as Bitcoin, but when we are young it is much harder to "secure" the market peg. I have just finished implementing everything I think is necessary to launch BitAssets and having the system be secure:
1) There is a minimum market depth required before any shorts or covers are executed (1% XTS)
2) There is a maximum short price that is 50% higher than the current median price feed.. maximum_bid = median_price * 3 / 2
3) Only active delegates may publish a price feed and they must update it every 24 hours.
4) At least 25% of the delegates must be producing a feed
What these limits mean is that once trading begins the only time there can be a margin call is when delegates raise the median price feed. It also means the delegates are circuit breakers in the system. They can limit the price movements during rapid change giving players time to adjust their positions.
Someone speculating in this market now knows that the value of BTSX in terms of BitUSD cannot fall by more than 33% without the delegates updating the price feed.
So what does this give us?
1) A system where the there are up to 101 price feeds for USD / BTSX price, with at least 25
2) By using the median feeds that are way out of line are ignored.
3) Delegates don't set the price and thus the feed does not need to be very accurate and can get by with just one update per day.
4) The price feed is just used as a guardrail that makes attacks "impossible" while not actually being used to execute orders
5) Users only need to trust that delegates can produce a feed that is "close enough" and don't have to trust any individual delegate.
6) Even if the delegates posted BOGUS feeds all they could do is stop new shorts from being executed.
a) delegates have this power anyway by controlling what transactions get included.
b) if the attacker controls over 50% of the price feeds they must control at least 12% of the delegates and that is already bad.
c) everyone knows who the attacker is based upon their price feeds.
In the long-run, we can remove the need for the price feeds once the depth of the market is measured in billions of dollars... or perhaps loosen the price range a bit. With this in place I believe we can launch a test network for BitUSD tomorrow. All trading will occur just like it does with user issued assets with the addition that shorts can add bids (selling USD for BTSX) and margin positions can result in asks.
What's wrong with the old way? It was easy as well.
Quote
Topic: RDPOS - Recommended Delegated Proof of Stake(Bytemaster)
One of our major challenges is making voting easy for the average person who doesn't have time to follow 101 different delegates. For this reason we are going to make voting even easier: you can delegate your selection of delegates to a single delegate. How it works is this:
1) Every delegate may optionally specify a slate ID as part of their public data. This slate ID identifies up to 101 delegates supported by that delegate.
2) Every user can select one or more delegates to approve of
3) The wallet will automatically combine the public slates of the delegates that user approves of to produce their votes.
Benefits:
1) More people voting with the same slate ID increases privacy
2) The default wallet can hard-code the developers own account as the default recommendation
3) Delegates are now competing not just on pay-rate, but also on how well balanced their selected slates are.
4) Users still have to transact to update their votes so they don't give up control of their votes, they merely have auto-recomendation.
5) More similar slates reduce block chain bloat.
6) Lobbying to become a delegate can now be focused toward existing delegates for endorsement.
7) We can enable "down votes" that simply remove delegates from the "recommended set"
This is no more centralized than the current system and in-fact, encourages decentralization because delegates compete on making solid recommendations that include other delegates.
With this in place there is no need to charge extra for not voting.
One of our major challenges is making voting easy for the average person who doesn't have time to follow 101 different delegates. For this reason we are going to make voting even easier: you can delegate your selection of delegates to a single delegate. How it works is this:
1) Every delegate may optionally specify a slate ID as part of their public data. This slate ID identifies up to 101 delegates supported by that delegate.
2) Every user can select one or more delegates to approve of
3) The wallet will automatically combine the public slates of the delegates that user approves of to produce their votes.
Benefits:
1) More people voting with the same slate ID increases privacy
2) The default wallet can hard-code the developers own account as the default recommendation
3) Delegates are now competing not just on pay-rate, but also on how well balanced their selected slates are.
4) Users still have to transact to update their votes so they don't give up control of their votes, they merely have auto-recomendation.
5) More similar slates reduce block chain bloat.
6) Lobbying to become a delegate can now be focused toward existing delegates for endorsement.
7) We can enable "down votes" that simply remove delegates from the "recommended set"
This is no more centralized than the current system and in-fact, encourages decentralization because delegates compete on making solid recommendations that include other delegates.
With this in place there is no need to charge extra for not voting.
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