Why would N-S-A develop something in 2000 and then collaborate with the open source community for an inclusion of this software into the linux kernel in 2003 ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux#Overview ) if it would make nosing into individuals' systems more difficult:
From NSA Security-enhanced Linux Team:
"NSA Security-enhanced Linux is a set of patches to the Linux kernel and some utilities to incorporate a strong, flexible mandatory access control (MAC) architecture into the major subsystems of the kernel. It provides an enhanced mechanism to enforce the separation of information based on confidentiality and integrity requirements, which allows threats of tampering and bypassing of application security mechanisms to be addressed and enables the confinement of damage that can be caused by malicious or flawed applications. It includes a set of sample security policy configuration files designed to meet common, general-purpose security goals."
(SELinux has been integrated into version 2.6 series of the Linux kernel, and separate patches are now unnecessary; the above is a historical quote.)
It is in stark contrast to the Magic Lantern attempt just a few years earlier down the timeline in 2001?: http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/11/48648 and http://www.uhuh.com/control/list-pat.htm
"Other security mavens pointed to free software projects such as openvirus.org as more trustworthy alternatives to Network Associates' McAfee anti-virus products, and GPG as a replacement for Network Associates' PGP encryption software.
The criticism raised a well-known point in security circles: Security software, including PGP and anti-virus products ware, is either looking out for your interests or those of the government. It can't do both.
.
.
.
In his 1982 book The Puzzle Palace, author James Bamford recounted how the National Security Agency's predecessor coerced Western Union, RCA, and ITT Communications to turn over telegraph traffic to the feds in 1945."