Isn't this similar to risk of leaving coins on an exchange since an exitscam or hack is always possible?
Yes, it is. And as much as I trust ChipMixer given they have mixed hundreds of thousands bitcoin without scamming anyone, leaving coins with any third party is always a risk. I would never recommend doing this with your entire bitcoin holdings - you should only do this kind of thing with a value of coins that you could lose without too many issues. I'm willing to risk a small amount of coins at a time for both the increase in privacy and also the convenience of having already mixed coins in a variety of sizes available at all times. 
Topic: chipmixer output easily identifiable as having been mixed? (Read 268 times)
legendary
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If I deposit 100 mBTC, and withdraw 4 mBTC today, and then 32 mBTC tomorrow, 16 mBTC next week, 20 mBTC the week after, then deposit another 50 mBTC and combine it with my remaining 28 mBTC... and so on, it becomes far more difficult, if not impossible, to link any of those transactions.
Isn't this similar to risk of leaving coins on an exchange since an exitscam or hack is always possible?
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If I deposit 100 mBTC, and withdraw 4 mBTC today, and then 32 mBTC tomorrow, 16 mBTC next week, 20 mBTC the week after, then deposit another 50 mBTC and combine it with my remaining 28 mBTC... and so on, it becomes far more difficult, if not impossible, to link any of those transactions.
Isn't this similar to risk of leaving coins on an exchange since an exitscam or hack is always possible?
could move some coins thru lightening network, use a desktop wallet running electrum, open lightening channel, having a dozen android phone bounces it back and fourth with Phoenix or Electrum (AMP enabled) for small < 1BTC payment/utxo.
This usually sufficient to break the AML/KYC creep on nearly all centralized exchanges.
More on this see bitcoin.it/privacy
Also it is advised that you don't put any significant amount BTC in centralized exchanges. more on this see noyourkeys.org
This usually sufficient to break the AML/KYC creep on nearly all centralized exchanges.
More on this see bitcoin.it/privacy
Also it is advised that you don't put any significant amount BTC in centralized exchanges. more on this see noyourkeys.org
^^ That's how I've always seen Chipmixer's usefulness -- that the trail stops once you send you BTC to get your chips. As long as you don't go and sweep it all at the same time and to the same place, there's absolutely no way to tell where it's gone. Or if it's ever going, if you spend those chips individually.
Never mind that the chronological trail is wiped too!
Never mind that the chronological trail is wiped too!
I also wonder, since it seems likely for users to sweep all their output chips into a wallet wouldn't this also be obvious?
In addition to ChipMixer's response above, not doing this is better for your privacy.If I deposit 100 mBTC and then immediately withdraw exactly 100 mBTC, then that is poor for my privacy.
If I deposit 100 mBTC, and withdraw 4 mBTC today, and then 32 mBTC tomorrow, 16 mBTC next week, 20 mBTC the week after, then deposit another 50 mBTC and combine it with my remaining 28 mBTC... and so on, it becomes far more difficult, if not impossible, to link any of those transactions.
If you are concerned about exchanges frowning upon mixed coins, then you either need to bounce those coins around yourself after withdrawing from ChipMixer, or stop using exchanges with such invasive policies.
it seems likely for users to sweep all their output chips into a wallet wouldn't this also be obvious?
This is why you do not sweep all output chips into another address. You have 100 mBTC and you want to pay 3 mBTC for coffee. You do not want other party to know how much you have.
You deposit 100 mBTC and split it into chips. You use 4 mBTC chip to pay for coffee and keep other chips ready to use.
The purpose of mixing is definitely to break the link between your unmixed and mixed coins, but different mixers go about this in different ways, some mixers will give outputs which will be more easily identifiable as being through a mixer than others.
Some mixers specifically go out of their way, trying to ensure that coins don't look like they've either gone to, have been through (processed internally) or have come from a Mixer.
Some mixers specifically go out of their way, trying to ensure that coins don't look like they've either gone to, have been through (processed internally) or have come from a Mixer.
Thank you for the extra information on this, I can definitely see how both approaches have value,
The purpose of mixing is definitely to break the link between your unmixed and mixed coins, but different mixers go about this in different ways, some mixers will give outputs which will be more easily identifiable as being through a mixer than others.
Some mixers specifically go out of their way, trying to ensure that coins don't look like they've either gone to, have been through (processed internally) or have come from a Mixer.
This includes trying very hard to ensure that outside observers are unable to build up a picture of wallets / clusters of UTXOs.
Some mixers specifically go out of their way, trying to ensure that coins don't look like they've either gone to, have been through (processed internally) or have come from a Mixer.
This includes trying very hard to ensure that outside observers are unable to build up a picture of wallets / clusters of UTXOs.
Thankyou - I had misunderstood that the point is the BTC that come out aren't linked to the ones that went in, and any associated identity could not be matched.
Maybe I'm missing something here...?
The purpose of mixing is to break the link between your unmixed and mixed coins and not so much to hide the fact that you received mixer output (which may or may not be your mixing... maybe someone paid you with mixed coins).
[EDIT] Reading around it seems that knowing BTC had previously been mixed doesn't matter, because fungibility, but wouldn't exchanges be more likely to freeze accounts where deposits had recently been mixed?
Centralized exchanges can freeze your account for any reason or no reason at all. Obscuring the source of coins won't help... if you obscure well enough it will look like a mixer anyway
I have been experimenting with chipmixer, the UI and theory seems nice but something that stands out is that the address which transferred chips out has also sent dozens of other transactions for the same amount, and is connected to many other addresses which all have exact chip amount transactions.
For example see: https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/1Hd23tNd8PYsueMMY5R8Y6H9rqrCsvReF1
Doesn't this make any bitcoins that have been mixed using this service super obvious?
Wouldn't a much better approach be to send random amounts between addresses over a period of time?
I also wonder, since it seems likely for users to sweep all their output chips into a wallet wouldn't this also be obvious?
Maybe I'm missing something here...?
[EDIT] Reading around it seems that knowing BTC had previously been mixed doesn't matter, because fungibility, but wouldn't exchanges be more likely to freeze accounts where deposits had recently been mixed?
For example see: https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/1Hd23tNd8PYsueMMY5R8Y6H9rqrCsvReF1
Doesn't this make any bitcoins that have been mixed using this service super obvious?
Wouldn't a much better approach be to send random amounts between addresses over a period of time?
I also wonder, since it seems likely for users to sweep all their output chips into a wallet wouldn't this also be obvious?
Maybe I'm missing something here...?
[EDIT] Reading around it seems that knowing BTC had previously been mixed doesn't matter, because fungibility, but wouldn't exchanges be more likely to freeze accounts where deposits had recently been mixed?
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