Does that mean I should create a new electrum wallet?
are you in some sort of situation you're not mentioning? It's hard for people to give you advice to such a vague question.
Topic: Does revealing one private key compromise an entire deterministic wallet? (Read 893 times)
November 25, 2013, 01:55:09 AM
are you in some sort of situation you're not mentioning? It's hard for people to give you advice to such a vague question.
November 25, 2013, 01:41:35 AM
If it is using the 'type-2' public derivation, e.g. as is the case for all keys in a current armory wallet (IIRC), and the attacker knows the extended public key (e.g. attacker has a watching wallet) then yes.
This is why in BIP32 the recommended top level uses the 'type-1' private derivation which doesn't have this surprising property (but also lacks the nifty ability for a untrusted party to generate addresses for the wallet).
That's why I think implementations should add an extra level of structure such that you create a different xpub for every entity from whom you receive funds.This is why in BIP32 the recommended top level uses the 'type-1' private derivation which doesn't have this surprising property (but also lacks the nifty ability for a untrusted party to generate addresses for the wallet).
I know, quadratic scaling, but it's worth it for the added safety.
November 24, 2013, 11:58:08 PM
Does that mean I should create a new electrum wallet?
November 24, 2013, 09:18:22 PM
If it is using the 'type-2' public derivation, e.g. as is the case for all keys in a current armory wallet (IIRC), and the attacker knows the extended public key (e.g. attacker has a watching wallet) then yes.
This is why in BIP32 the recommended top level uses the 'type-1' private derivation which doesn't have this surprising property (but also lacks the nifty ability for a untrusted party to generate addresses for the wallet).
This is why in BIP32 the recommended top level uses the 'type-1' private derivation which doesn't have this surprising property (but also lacks the nifty ability for a untrusted party to generate addresses for the wallet).
November 24, 2013, 08:29:47 PM
Sometimes
November 24, 2013, 08:28:06 PM
Does revealing one private key compromise an entire deterministic wallet?
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