But I don't spend much time worrying about this. We do not support or claim to support any use cases where private keys are intentionally revealed. And if your wallet is unintentionally compromised, they will all be revealed anyway.
Yes, normally that's not an issue.
For me, however, this would turn out to be a problem:
I hold a small Bitcoin sum for a family member (that's what happens when you talk about Bitcoin all the time, eh?). I gave that person a paperwallet with the private key of where the funds are. I have a copy of that address to do things with the funds when asked.
I used an address in my regular wallet, with other funds inside too.
So, now I have the situation that I intentionally gave away a privatekey to a wallet with more funds than on that key. No matter if or if not I trust that family member, anyone able to obtail that paper wallet endangers my whole wallet.
I guess there's no way around that. I can't have both "independent addresses without a chaincode" and a "one seed backs up everything" at the same time. So I need to fall back to an individual wallet for that person, or stick with a single address. Both would make two backups necessary, one for my regular wallet, one for that person's funds.
Ente