Thaddeus Dryja's "proof of idle" idea hasn't been getting enough attention. See
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QN2TPeQ9mnAThe idea is to get paid NOT to mine, because it is economically rational for everybody to keep the difficulty lower rather than higher (everybody saves money on electricity if everybody can somehow agree to keep their equipment idle). Thaddeus figured out a way of solving the coordination problem so nobody can lie about how much mining power they have or profit from cheating and running miners that they promised to keep idle.
Having lots of idle mining capacity is appealing for at least two reasons -- it is more energy efficient, and if an attack of some kind is detected it could be brought online instead of kept idle to help fight the attack.
However... I suspect that taking that idle mining power, pointing it to a big mining pool, and then performing a winning-share-withholding-attack (if you find a share that satisfies full network difficulty, don't submit it to the pool -- just throw it away and pretend it never happened) could be a way of doubling your profits, because you drive down difficulty, get paid for "idle" capacity, AND get a share of the profits from the mining pool you're attacking.
Thanks for posting this Gavin; definitely an overlooked idea right now.
I'd wish he would post his graphs and models as well, but I guess we have to wait for the paper.
Regarding the actual proposal, it's quite interesting. However, he's making some very strong
assumptions in the beginning which won't be true in bitcoin for quite some time I think.
However, I think Gavin is right: you can participate in any pool, withholding blocks from it and
thereby not violating the Proof-of-idle agreement. Not sure if existing methods of detecting miners
that withhold blocks from a pool work if said miners do not publish the block on their own.