http://pastebin.com/YhUj6fztthe 12 word probability is one in 341,543,870,028,173,427,817,970,975,906,360,000,000
I rounded to the nearest 10 million because my calculator is old.
Edit: but to be honest, as long as you disconnect and reboot your system after downloading and installing Electrum, then after rebooting disconnected, you create your new wallet and never connect again, no one is gonna be waiting to send malware to a newly installed Linux system, and then what is it gonna do if it can't communicate with the network?
My link above is pretty complicated, but if you want to do it, go ahead.
The download > disconnect > create wallet method is good enough, I think.
good link... but how about the security for using btcs offline using the sign method?
because what i know when u put the usb to the offline and sign.. and back to the online computer.. wont my private keys or seed be compromise? how to make sure that no viruses are in my usb while signing them?
1. Always format the USB before saving the unsigned transaction on it.
2. Linux does not allow auto-running scripts on USB memory by default. (You would have to enable this by yourself... which would be dumb)
3. Your seed on your offline computer is encrypted (or at least SHOULD be encrypted.) so even IF you went into ubuntu and enabled auto-run for USB memory... you would still be safe if you had a good password.
4. The information you bring from your offline computer to your online computer is a tamper proof signed transaction. So once you sign the transaction on your offline computer, any alteration to the contents of the transaction will make it invalid.
tl;dr version. format the USB you're using to transfer the files before every transfer and don't enable auto-running of scripts on USB. (If you don't know what I am talking about, then you are safe. You would have to know about it and WANT to enable it in order to enable it.)
Edit: Also, when you use "Load Transaction" on your online computer and load the SIGNED transaction. Be sure to look at the transaction confirmation window and make sure all the outputs are correct. You should have the address you are sending to and then maybe another output sending to one of your "Change" addresses in there. One way the attacker could possible attack you is to change the transaction on your online computer before you save it to USB... But this attack is 100% preventable by checking the signed transaction on your online computer before clicking "broadcast".
Note: Checking the transaction on the offline computer will not work, because sometimes it doesn't recognize balance correctly / doesn't show your change addresses correctly because it doesn't have access to the blockchain. Offline computer is only for signing.