Topic: I had an idea to drastically increase the security of Bitcoin (Read 924 times)
This is what multisig transactions are for.
Brainstorming day. In theory, it could be a useful idea, I just need to know if its possible.
It's everyone's worst nightmare to go check their wallet and see an empty balance: coins transferred out in an unauthorized withdrawal, impossible to recover. Cold offline storage is one option, but is it the only option? These too can be lost, destroyed, or stolen, what if there were a similar layer of security at the digital level.
Imagine that you have digital coins sitting at a particular wallet address, but their next destination address is "locked in" somehow by a service or command. The coins cannot be spent or sent to any other address without first passing through one that you specify (and preferably one you control)
In theory you could set up a whole chain of forwarding addresses so that the task of hacking a particular address becomes the task of hacking many. The downside is that if any private key is lost in the "chain" the coins may become stuck in a dead-end line. The only recompense would be to try to hack the system that locked coins in the first place.
I was intrigued by the scandal with Ozcoin recently, in which a hacker stole funds but eventually some of them were "seized" when they transferred them to a Strongcoin wallet. In their case, their coins ended up on an island separated by from the blockchain because he/she did not know the private key and any request to send the coins elsewhere was denied. I began wondering if such a system could be set up to the average bitcoiner's advantage, effectively locking coins out of the blockchain at their choosing, possibly even to the point where the private key cannot be imported.
In a less than ideal scenario, locking the coins to a specific forwarding address might be accomplished by a trusted entity. In a more than ideal scenario it would be trustless, something you could set up and use yourself without having to rely on anyone else. And importantly it would be completely voluntary, an extra security measure for those who choose it.
How could this be implemented? There are a couple strategies, some more viable than others:
1.) Flagging coins at an address somehow so that their forwarding address is specified, and no miner can process/confirm them.
2.) Obfuscate the "send" function of a client somehow so that attempting to transfer the coins to any other address except one you know results in an invalid address and returned coins. (hard, but cool!)
3.) Trusting a bank or wallet service to not release coins to any other address except one you specify (not ideal, since it involves trust)
4.) Running a program that specifies a time frame until the coins can be spent again (forwarded to an address of your choosing) Attempting to spend the coins in the meantime will be impossible.
Anyone else have thoughts on this?
It's everyone's worst nightmare to go check their wallet and see an empty balance: coins transferred out in an unauthorized withdrawal, impossible to recover. Cold offline storage is one option, but is it the only option? These too can be lost, destroyed, or stolen, what if there were a similar layer of security at the digital level.
Imagine that you have digital coins sitting at a particular wallet address, but their next destination address is "locked in" somehow by a service or command. The coins cannot be spent or sent to any other address without first passing through one that you specify (and preferably one you control)
In theory you could set up a whole chain of forwarding addresses so that the task of hacking a particular address becomes the task of hacking many. The downside is that if any private key is lost in the "chain" the coins may become stuck in a dead-end line. The only recompense would be to try to hack the system that locked coins in the first place.
I was intrigued by the scandal with Ozcoin recently, in which a hacker stole funds but eventually some of them were "seized" when they transferred them to a Strongcoin wallet. In their case, their coins ended up on an island separated by from the blockchain because he/she did not know the private key and any request to send the coins elsewhere was denied. I began wondering if such a system could be set up to the average bitcoiner's advantage, effectively locking coins out of the blockchain at their choosing, possibly even to the point where the private key cannot be imported.
In a less than ideal scenario, locking the coins to a specific forwarding address might be accomplished by a trusted entity. In a more than ideal scenario it would be trustless, something you could set up and use yourself without having to rely on anyone else. And importantly it would be completely voluntary, an extra security measure for those who choose it.
How could this be implemented? There are a couple strategies, some more viable than others:
1.) Flagging coins at an address somehow so that their forwarding address is specified, and no miner can process/confirm them.
2.) Obfuscate the "send" function of a client somehow so that attempting to transfer the coins to any other address except one you know results in an invalid address and returned coins. (hard, but cool!)
3.) Trusting a bank or wallet service to not release coins to any other address except one you specify (not ideal, since it involves trust)
4.) Running a program that specifies a time frame until the coins can be spent again (forwarded to an address of your choosing) Attempting to spend the coins in the meantime will be impossible.
Anyone else have thoughts on this?
Jump to: