Topic: MPEx dedicated domains (Read 1063 times)
I'd like to point that utilities like pyMPEx will actually point out to you if the response from the site can't be trusted.
Starting immediately MPEx can be reached through the following dedicated domain names :
mpex.co,
mpex.ws,
mpex.bz.
Out of these, mpex.co is currently designated cannonical. About a dozen other domain names are already bought and kept in stand-by, and may be added to the pool on an as-needed basis.
In the event DNS fails MPEx can be always accessed directly via IP addressing, at
63.247.64.92/~polimedi/bitcoin/
With regards to phishing, it is worth mentioning that because of its design MPEx is completely immune. You may send your encrypted orders to absolutely any site, whether it pretends to pass itself for MPEx or not.
There’s no harm that may come your way as a result of you doing so, and the response you receive from that site will immediately make it plain whether it is or it is not MPEx itself : MPEx will always answer quoting relevant details of your order, such as prices, MPSICs etc, the whole encrypted with your key. While another site may unlikely respond with a message encrypted with your key, it would never be able to quote any relevant details of your order in its response.
The same design makes MPEx communication in fact safer than https (or ssh) : you do not need to trust a third party to behave itself.
On a final note, let me point out that these measures don’t come in response to any particular threat. They had been planned since late last year, they were never implemented up until this point because they were not seen as a priority. They still aren’t in any practical sense a priority, but continued insistence on the part of BTC community members has prevailed.
Original article.
mpex.co,
mpex.ws,
mpex.bz.
Out of these, mpex.co is currently designated cannonical. About a dozen other domain names are already bought and kept in stand-by, and may be added to the pool on an as-needed basis.
In the event DNS fails MPEx can be always accessed directly via IP addressing, at
63.247.64.92/~polimedi/bitcoin/
With regards to phishing, it is worth mentioning that because of its design MPEx is completely immune. You may send your encrypted orders to absolutely any site, whether it pretends to pass itself for MPEx or not.
There’s no harm that may come your way as a result of you doing so, and the response you receive from that site will immediately make it plain whether it is or it is not MPEx itself : MPEx will always answer quoting relevant details of your order, such as prices, MPSICs etc, the whole encrypted with your key. While another site may unlikely respond with a message encrypted with your key, it would never be able to quote any relevant details of your order in its response.
The same design makes MPEx communication in fact safer than https (or ssh) : you do not need to trust a third party to behave itself.
On a final note, let me point out that these measures don’t come in response to any particular threat. They had been planned since late last year, they were never implemented up until this point because they were not seen as a priority. They still aren’t in any practical sense a priority, but continued insistence on the part of BTC community members has prevailed.
Original article.
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