Author

Topic: New coin ideia - reveal the private key - Democracycoin? (Read 36 times)

legendary
Activity: 3906
Merit: 6249
Decentralization Maximalist
This does already exist, in many variants. It's called a "permissioned blockchain". One example is the Bitcoin "sidechain" Liquid. As all nodes are known, if one node misbehaves, he can be excluded from the list.

A slightly more decentralized variant is DPoS or delegated Proof of Stake, where stakers (coin owners) vote a subset of validators.

However, 50% for a "vote" has been proven too low for these algorithms. Most use two thirds (66%), which is also the threshold for PBFT, the technical base of Ethereum since the Merge.

Double spending is also not fixed by "revealing a private key". Normally in double spends two subsets of nodes are tricked, one (with the victim(s) amoung them) into believing that a transaction is valid, the other that it never existed or that it was invalid.

In a permissioned blockchain however this is normally not possible. But all nodes have to trust each other. So I see no advantage of your "reveal private key" approach to the traditional Bitcoin transaction format, where you don't reveal a private key but sign a transaction.
member
Activity: 233
Merit: 14
I think maybe you are oversimplifying this a little too much.  The system you described seems to have some big holes that could make it pretty easy to hack.  For instance, having a set list of nodes that everything runs through leaves a pretty obvious weak spot.  If someone managed to mess with enough of those nodes, they could maybe bring the whole system down and  or make fake nodes to rig the voting system.

Whats to stop someone from creating hundreds or thousands of fake nodes even on a single computer?


the urls/nodes will be written in the source code. more nodes, more decentralized.

legendary
Activity: 1526
Merit: 1359
I think maybe you are oversimplifying this a little too much.  The system you described seems to have some big holes that could make it pretty easy to hack.  For instance, having a set list of nodes that everything runs through leaves a pretty obvious weak spot.  If someone managed to mess with enough of those nodes, they could maybe bring the whole system down and  or make fake nodes to rig the voting system.

Whats to stop someone from creating hundreds or thousands of fake nodes even on a single computer?
member
Activity: 233
Merit: 14
Suppose:

a huge (100? 1000? 10k?) list of urls/nodes in the source code

many coins, each coin with a different id and owner (public key).

the owner of the coin (public key) wants to send it to someone else.

it signs a transaction with the coin id and the public key of the new owner and notifies all the urls in the list.

then it counts the 'ok' answers.

If it gets 50% + 1 'oks', it sends the private key to the nodes.

Transaction complete. That coin has a new owner.

Since the private key has been revealed, there is no way to double spend.

If the transaction/coin does not receive 50% + 1 of the votes, in pratice it will be "burned" (nobody will not be able to spend it).

While the majority of the nodes/ips are honest, the coin is safe.

"The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision
making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone
able to allocate many IPs.
Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority
decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested
in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the
fastest and outpace any competing chains." - Satoshi Nakamoto

We just need a FIXED long list of nodes/urls.

If we choose 300 nodes, we already has a propaganda for the coin  Grin

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