L'idea di Gavin è utile solo in contesti molto limitati e non elimina la possibilità di un attacco al 51%, uno dei commenti spiega il perché:
Hi Gavin,
This is a nice solution, but if the goal of the attacker is to simply reduce confidence in the reliability of bitcoin transactions this could still be done.
For example: Let's say a 51% attacker creates a hidden chain and includes only 99% of the transactions in the main public chain. Then after 2 weeks the attacker releases the hidden chain, which now becomes the longest chain.
This chain would still be accepted by the above logic, but it would destroy confidence in bitcion. Here 1% of tranactions would be rolled back, people that received payments or bought bitcoins would suddenly "lose" them. Even worse, current miners and tranactions would build on this new chain right away, making the ability to manually roll back to the older chain messy at best and probably impossible.
Even with ASIC hash rates, a motivated agency could still implement this attack in just 1 Utah data center.
Again, all you have to do is disrupt a small number of bitcoin transactions, to seriously attack people's confidence in the currency.