Attribution theory's fundamental distinction leads quite naturally to its fundamental rule: When a behavior occurs in the presence of a sufficiently strong, facilitative force, an observer should not infer that the actor is predisposed to perform that behavior. Just as one should not conclude that a balloon that rises on a windy day is filled with helium, one cannot make unequivocal inferences about the abilities of an athlete, the convictions of a politician, or the mental health of a student when poor lighting, a roomful of opinionated voters, or sudden bad news may have induced their behaviors. In other words, one should not explain with dispositions that which has already been explained by the situation. This logical rule was first formalized by Jones and Davis (1965) as the law of noncommon effects and later extended and codified by Kelley (1967) as the discounting principle, which warns observers not to attribute an effect to any one causal agent (e.g., a disposition) when another plausible causal agent (e.g., a situational force) is simultaneously present. In other words, when people do precisely what the physical environment or the social situation demands, dispositional inferences are logically unwarranted.
(Red colorization mine.)
“Merit” (“deepestfear,” 235) (i.e., “dispositional inferences” [Daniel T. Gilbert, & Patrick S. Malone, 215]) “[is] logically unwarranted” (Daniel T. Gilbert, & Patrick S. Malone, 215) as a criterion for admittance to an
unproductive institution to such a degree as a prospect “[does] precisely what [its] physical environment or [its] social situation demands” (Daniel T. Gilbert, & Patrick S. Malone, 215) and the institution is, indeed, unproductive.
, call it the chaos if it makes you feel securer... 