Topic: Question about Privacy. (Read 187 times)

And you could use tool such as curl if you want to avoid giving away your browser fingerprint. Few member share how to do it at these thread,
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.57186698
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.11245971


You don't need to reveal your IP/Tor exit node's IP if you connect to Electrum server which use .onion/onion hidden service as it's address.

I knew this part about Tails. Live OS with no persistence  
What I don't know is how exactly is Tor working, and this makes me unsure of some details.


That's correct. But I don't know if Electrum's way to pick servers is that random and you may end up picking the exact same server from your next session, minutes later. What then? (Of course, it's a rhetorical question, we have answers already.)
That's why I suggested forcing different server on each new session, just to be on the safes side (not 100% safe, since you can also end up using 2 different gov-owned servers one after another).


Bitcoin Core, on the other hand, needs modifications for this to check/centralize/log what is coming from where, and even then they cannot be 100% sure because (I think that) what they receive may be an original broadcast or a forwarding (but I may be wrong in my assumptions).

Tor definitely was not funded and supported by US authorities for they liked the idea of random citizens going undercover and underground.  I am convinced they can do much more than we imagine with our devices, the question remaining only Is it worth the effort and costs of tracing this person down? which is ultimately just a variable, depending on how high profile the suspect is.

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Tails is an amnesic system so unless I set up persistent storage it should be all good.  Basically, every time you shut down the system everything you have done gets erased and every time you boot back up you are straight from the start.  Like you had to initialize Windows 11 every time you booted up your computer.  The beauty of Tails.

In consequence, importing a single Private Key and broadcasting a single transaction from it prior to shutting down the system means once you reboot, it is like you never even used Electrum.  From a third perspective, it most likely looks as if every reboot is another user.

Here is where I get Dave's note.  If you keep connecting to the same Electrum node and broadcast a TX from the same address every time, the node will know a single address has broadcasted from multiple IP's.  Tracking the owner down now gets much easier.

But some Electrum servers could be owned by authorities, which means chances are even if you take care to never re use nodes you will use two nodes owned by authorities at some point to broadcast from the same address, so they still get to link two IP's.  This is why I am asking myself and others around, is it a better idea to have my node and rebroadcast from it or use single Tails sessions instead.

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You know what, never did I think about using a public Wi-Fi for this purpose before.  Might in fact be an even better idea than what I thought of.

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Regards,
PrivacyG

The other option is to not use any wallet at all and just create the transaction offline, copy it to an online PC and broadcast it.
There are enough services and places that you could do it fairly easily and remain anonymous.

I don't know where you are but in most locations there is enough free Wi-Fi around that you can just connect, go to a site like https://live.blockcypher.com/btc/pushtx/ paste in your transaction and leave in under a minute.

There are even some tor sites that have that ability.

-Dave

From the outside, that should look exactly as if you were just using the Bitcoin node with coin control, though. In both cases, your transactions are broadcast from your node; whether through Electrum server and Electrum client, or from the Core node directly.
I personally don't think it's an issue to reuse a 'broadcasting node'; and much better than using other people's nodes.

Imo, if you want addresses to never be linked to each other, do not ever import both in the same wallet.

One mistake is definitive. You cannot go back in the blockchain.

You might spend a change from a previous transaction with the other address you wouldn't want to mix , for example. Or you could spend both change addresses together. If you want them to be separated, keep them separated.

If you're connecting bitcoin core via tor and shuffling your onion addresses, that might be about the same privacy as electrum doing the same thing (I'm assuming it's possible to change your onion address on both - I haven't tried it).

You'd have to remain vigilant about coin control on core though to not merge any change with funds you want to not be traced as coming from the same source (you could mitigate this by having multiple wallets, but you'd have to do a rescan for each iirc).

I am not 100% that my ideas are 100% valid, but I'll still write them down. At least if I'm wrong, I'll learn something useful.
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I have the same problem. And the path I took was to install an Electrum server locally, using my local Bitcoin node. And I'm using Electrum with my node.


I think that if an agency has a lot of bitcoin core nodes in the network and you broadcast one after another transactions from those various addresses or wallets, there may be a small theoretical chance (I may be wrong with this though).
But you can disconnect now and then, hence getting different peers, and then I think that you should be fine.


I think that the tracking via Electrum servers can be done much easier than through Bitcoin core.
But if you go with completely different wallets and sessions I think that this is also an OK option. You may want though to also force Electrum connect to different server at each run (I don't know how to do that from Tails).

The default answer is going to be no it cannot be traced.
The real answer that people do not want to hear is 'it depends'. Just some random person on the internet probably could not find you.
But a government trying to figure it out well within possibility. Remember, they have shown that they can with a little effort track down any person hosting an .onion site.
You having a node online all the time that occasionally broadcasts transactions. Yes, they can find you.

The amnesic Tor sessions would be better, so long as you do keep a note of what electrum nodes you connect to and verify that you don't keep using the same ones by some random chance.


-Dave

I am still trying to wrap my head around the way Bitcoin Core functions because I am way too used to Electrum.  So bear with me, I am trying to learn and improve.

I have been running a Bitcoin Core Full Node through Tor 24 out of 7 for a while to support the network and thought why not use it as well since I have it anyway.  If I import multiple watch only addresses and private keys into the same Core wallet, is there any way they can be tied to the same owner with Coin Control used properly?  Can they be tied if transactions are broadcasted from the same Tor identity?

Logically I would say no to both questions.  As far as I know, all information about the addresses I import are processed locally unlike SPV Electrum and a transaction is distributed first among multiple peers and a random peer will ultimately broadcast it publicly, making it extremely difficult to find out who was the initiator.  If that is the case, it means I do not have to worry about anything.

Or, do you think amnesic Tor sessions (Tails) where I open up Electrum, import just a single private key, broadcast the transaction, dispose of the session and redo it later with the next private key is a better overall behavior than the above?

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Regards,
PrivacyG