The best way to be as wrong as possible is to be anti-innovative.
Was thinking most about SHA and other hashing algorithms, which is inherently reversibility unfriendly by the fact that hashing is intended to map a large input space into a much smaller output space.
No. Cryptographic hash functions are not reversibility unfriendly. When computing a hash, do you always delete the data being hashed? If not, then you are performing the procedure x->(x,H(x)) rather than the procedure x->H(x). The mapping x->(x,H(x)) is invertible. I have already made an case why the properties of hash functions including collision resistance make the notion of a cryptographic hash function inherently reversibility friendly. But even though cryptographic hash functions are inherently reversibility friendly, cryptographers really should have designed these hash functions with reversibility in mind, but since they did not, it is costing us.
As you previously mentioned, "There is no reason to believe that reversible friendliness will make encryption significantly less efficient or secure. But then again, this is something that needs to be tested." - Well, are you doing this testing? Most cryptographers don't care about computational reversibility since that's not the computational paradigm we currently live in, so it is up to you, as a proponent of reversible computing to do this analysis.
-I am doing the testing that I need to do with the resources that I have (I have been developing algorithms that work well for block ciphers with a very simple round function, a small message size, and a very small round key size or if the block cipher has the kind of structure by which I can apply the tests; AES has such structure, so I can evaluate AES and assign the AES specific numbers and probability distributions of real numbers that are measures of the cryptographic security). Cryptographers are not interested in developing reversible hardware friendly hash functions and reversible friendly encryption functions because they are wrong. There is no way to justify this behavior. They are just wrong.
We will eventually need to fit cryptographic hash functions, CSPRNGs, and symmetric encryption functions so that they work well with reversible hardware. The NIST has only standardized one symmetric encryption function for everyone to use. Why couldn't the NIST standardize the AES along with the RES, the reversible encryption standard. Why couldn't they standardize SHA-2 along with SHAR-2 (Secure hashing algorithm reversible)? It will take time for cryptographers to completely analyze reversible block ciphers, so it is a good idea to analyze these reversible block ciphers well before we have the reversible hardware to
The NIST has made a horrendous mistake by failing to design SHA-256 for reversibility and by failing to standardize a reversible alternative to SHA-256. Please think about this. I hope you will be able figure out why, but I know that it is not reasonable for me to have high expectations from the entities on this site, so you probably cannot figure out why a non-reversible friendly SHA-256 is a disaster. Hmm. SHA-256 was standardized in 2002, and the irreversibility of SHA-256 is disasterous. This means that NIST should have been focusing on reversibility friendly cryptography as early as 2002 and well before that because it takes time to study the effect of reversibility friendliness. The worst thing that NIST can do is wait until we actually have energy efficient reversible computers to produce reversible cryptography. In 1989, Charles Bennett published some computational complexity results from which one should conclude that the computational complexity overhead incurred from reversible computation is low enough that reversible computation and especially partially reversible computation will eventually replace irreversible computation. This means that in the 1990's,cryptographers should have began investigating reversibility friendly cryptography. And this also means that in 2002, the NIST should have standardized a reversible cryptographic hash function like SHA-256 and a fully reversible symmetric encryption function like AES so that one can encrypt without any computational overhead incurred from reversibility.
But your ideas of reversible computation seems to be that it can completely replace irreversible computation. Yes, the energy and transistor density limit in classical computers is a real issue, but the actual data erasure energy is still magnitudes smaller than the full energy used in an operation, so the energy savings can be more easily gained elsewhere.
-This really depends on what one is trying to compute. If one is mining Bitcoin on a CPU, then one will gain much more energy savings and a performance upgrade by using an ASIC than if one used a reversible CPU. Right now, since the amount of storage space on a hard drive in bits is far below Avogadro's number, and because hard drives do not use up to Avogadro's number of read/writes, it does not make sense to make reversible hard drives at the moment. But since transistors are almost the size of atoms,
I never said quantum computing was easy. I excluded it specifically because it is much harder.
-It is good that you notice this. There is absolutely no reason for there to be so much hype behind quantum computation while few people care about reversible computation. Either both of these areas should be ignored at least for now or both of them should attract an equal amount of attention.
You have to understand that your hate for NIST is irrational. NIST doesn't hate you, they don't even know about you, because the architecture you're pushing doesn't physically exist.
-NIST does not know much about anything since it standardized AES without also standardizing a fully reversible alternative. Unfortunately, other agencies refused to pick of the slack and standardize reversible cryptographic functions of their own. I have explained (with some details for you to fill in if you are intelligent enough to do so) why NIST should have standardized a reversibility friendly AES and a reversibility friendly SHA-256. Since energy efficient reversible computers currently do not exist, the solution to this problem is to INNOVATE so that these energy efficient reversible computers come before the world ends. This is why cryptographers should have looked into reversibility friendly encryption and hashing as early as the 1990's. Damage has already been done since the NIST has refused to standardize a reversibility friendly hash function. Now, the only reversibility friendliness of SHA-256 and AES is there by pure accident.
To make things worse, it looks like NIST has given into the entire quantum hype by having its little contest where they standardize quantum resistant public key encryption algorithms and other algorithms. And as usual, the NIST is completely ignoring reversible computation by failing to standardize a reversibility friendly encryption function and hash function that they should have standardized back in 2002.
-Joseph Van Name Ph.D. (Mathematics/not engineering/not physics)
P.S. In addition to standardizing AES,SHA-256, and a few other cryptographic functions, the NIST should also have standardized other reversibility friendly functions including
encryption where the round function is as small and simple as possible (32 bit message size, 1 bit round key size, simple round function), and encryption with 1,000,000+ bits of security so that people can authenticate long messages from God. After all, one never knows when one may need reversibility friendliness, so it is essential to have the reversibility friendly functions preemptively standardized before they become useful. And the best way to advance the field of cryptography would be to make and break cryptographic functions that satisfy these unusual properties. The way one analyzes a 32 bit message size,1 bit round key block cipher round function will be much different than the way one analyzes SHA-256, and this difference is needed for better cryptography research.