Topic: Today's Man-In-The-Middle (Read 4563 times)

I have a SHA1 thumbprint for a 7/7/2014 certificate verified by Rapid SSL of the following:
7b:cf:43:ce:3b:6a:9e:78:62:81:76:6f:9a:71:7a:da:e2:7c:37:c6

Is this correct? I see references to a different cert in this thread. Sorry for the necro, I just thought it might be good to reference why I was posting rather than doing a new thread about it.

Does the thumbprint change if cert is renewed??

I have a SHA1 thumbprint for a 7/7/2014 certificate verified by Rapid SSL of the following:
7b:cf:43:ce:3b:6a:9e:78:62:81:76:6f:9a:71:7a:da:e2:7c:37:c6

Is this correct? I see references to a different cert in this thread. Sorry for the necro, I just thought it might be good to reference why I was posting rather than doing a new thread about it.

The little lock in the address bar indicating it uses https (SSL)

Click on the padlock, then try to find it

All letters in my SHA1 fingerprint are full Caps.
29 0E CC 82 2B 3C CE 0A 73 94 35 A0 26 15 EC D3
EB 1F 46 6B

Caps is not relevant for the hash value when it's displayed as hex (i.e. it can be shown using either upper or lower case letters but is still the same hash value regardless).

All letters in my SHA1 fingerprint are full Caps.

Yeah. You can double-check the SSL certificate if you want. SHA1 fingerprint should be 29 0e cc 82 2b 3c ce 0a 73 94 35 a0 26 15 ec d3 eb 1f 46 6b

Yeah. You can double-check the SSL certificate if you want. SHA1 fingerprint should be 29 0e cc 82 2b 3c ce 0a 73 94 35 a0 26 15 ec d3 eb 1f 46 6b

I logged on just now via the ip 109.201.133.195 then everything should be peachy right?

There was only one report of that, and I think that he was probably thinking of JavaScript. CloudFlare has an error page that asks you to enable JS so it can more accurately fingerprint you.

Was this attack only a MitM to steal passwords or was malicious content served? I've read reports of suspicious Java applets.

it seems to be in the future. Or is that a precaution regarding DNS propagation?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Here's what we think happened:

8-14 hours ago, an attacker used a flaw in the forum's AnonymousSpeech registrar to change the forum's DNS to point to 108.162.197.161 (exact details unknown). Sirius noticed this 8 hours ago and immediately transferred bitcointalk.org to a different registrar. However, such changes take about 24 hours to propagate.

Because the HTTPS protocol is pretty terrible, this alone could have allowed the attacker to intercept and modify encrypted forum transmissions, allowing them to see passwords sent during login, authentication cookies, PMs, etc. Your password only could have been intercepted if you actually entered it while the forum was affected. I invalidated all security codes, so you're not at risk of having your account stolen if you logged in using the "remember me" feature without actually entering your password.

For the next ~20 hours, you should only log into the forum if you're quite sure that you're talking to the correct server. This can be done by adding '109.201.133.195 bitcointalk.org' to your hosts file (remember to remove it later!), or by using some browser plugin to ensure that you're talking to the server with TLS certificate SHA1 fingerprint of:
29:0E:CC:82:2B:3C:CE:0A:73:94:35:A0:26:15:EC:D3:EB:1F:46:6B

Simultaniously, the forum has been the target of a massive DDoS attack. These two events are probably related, though I'm not yet sure why an attacker would do both of these things at once.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iF4EAREIAAYFAlKb2nkACgkQxlVWk9q1kefhTwD+Ni5k7CUrHjvzG29wO3Gx4Am+
MV5tdw8zE1AAWvbstt8BAIrndOXCYmawoXN+VeSZkLXHnCyQbR8IOftQnpl2aXYs
=465T
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----