Can someone please explain to me what
Its called "malleability" and its an attack currently run on the network. Reset the blockchain[1], your TX has probably changed which might have resulted in issues with the site you gambled with.
They do not disappear they just changed their ID, it confuses wallets and services.
[1] electrum has a function for in under tool IIRC.
I see, so it's another attack, I had to google it to understand what it is and apparently attackers can mess with the transactions, this was in the news 2 days back but I missed it:
The change does not affect the source, destination, or amounts of the funds, so it isn’t obvious when it happens.
But one of my transaction did disappear, I made 2 txs last night, one got it's ID changed and was later broadcasted with different ID but the event was over by then and the 2nd one it was broadcasted and confirmed when I went to bed and now there's no trace of it in my wallet or on any block explorer, as if I didn't made that tx, which is really weird and if that hadn't happened, I would have won a little something.
I am guessing here, but its might be possible that your 2nd TX used the change from your first. Not sure if you are familiar with change, but your bitcoin balance consist of inputs you can use. These are transactions you have received in the past. Similar to bills you have to use them entirely. E.g. if you received 1 BTC in a single transaction in the past and want to spend 0.4 BTC now. You (or your wallet) would create a TX that uses the 1 BTC as input and create two outputs. One output for 0.4 to the address you selected as recipient and one output for 0.6 to an address that belongs to your wallet. Electrum even shows a list of change addresses IIRC. It is possible for you to use the 0.6 send back to yourself in another transaction before the 1st TX is confirmed. If however the 1st TX gets modified and is confirmed with a different ID the 2nd TX links to an input that does no longer exist. This is because the inputs are identified by the transaction id. Usually TX IDs do not change so its not an issue. While the attacker is modifing random transactions this is a problem and would result in what you describe. The 2nd TX essentially vanished from the network as it became invalid the second the modified 1st transaction was confirmed.
There is a possible solution, at least for bitcoin core, but I dont know how good it is or if its even ready. I will need to read up on that myself. Its called BIP62[1]. This attack can only be done on unconfirmed transactions as long as you wait for a single confirmation on any transactions you receive or send and do not require the transaction ID to be exact you should be fine.
You should definitly check with the betting service, you are probably not the only person that had this problem. They should require 1 confirmation for now. These chains can also happen with withdrawals from services, but way longer. E.g. they take a big BTC input and issue a payout with it, use the change for another and repeat that once every few seconds. This could result in a long change of transaction that suddently become invalid once the 1st modified TX gets confirmed.
You are welcome
[1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0062.mediawiki
Yes, I do understand the change and I think you're bang on right, that's exactly what happened, I made the 2nd transaction right after the first one and it did had a warning on blockchain.info that "This transaction spends an input which is unconfirmed." and I have had that warning before but it ususally goes away as soon as the previous transaction gets confirmed but this time since the attackers manipulated the Tx, the first transaction didn't confirm with the same ID and that's why the 2nd one was removed and was not broadcasted at all. It makes perfect sense now.
I did checked the DB page and others are reporting somewhat similar problems of transactions missing and/or not confirmed.
I think I have a solution for now, make the bets a much before the event is suppose to start and try to use the confirmed funds so even if the attackers mess with the IDs the transaction will get ultimately broadcasted and confirmed before the event starts.