This is a common post pattern people make to trick people into running malware.
Step 1. Have trouble getting things working (perhaps pretending).
Step 2. claim to have some magic attack that works and can recover private keys, explained with a bunch of opaque jargon.
Step 3. When people ask for copies of the tools, send them malware. Usually the people at step 3 are coin thieves themselves, but not always.
Often these threads will use real terms so simple googling will "confirm" them, but they're misapplied. A "twist attack" isn't an attack on secp256k1 but a related insecure curve. You cannot engage in a twist attack except by getting the victim to produce an invalid pubkey or signature using faulty software. Of course, if you could do that you could likely just have the backdoored code send you the key directly.
The only case I'm aware of where it's perhaps more interesting is when you have a signing or key-generating device that you can potentially glitch with some kind of fault attack, getting it to temporarily produce a point on the faulty related curve rather than the real one. Though this is why all such devices ought to verify keys and signatures after generating them, making it harder to ever get a corrupted point out of the device.
Step 1. Have trouble getting things working (perhaps pretending).
Step 2. claim to have some magic attack that works and can recover private keys, explained with a bunch of opaque jargon.
Step 3. When people ask for copies of the tools, send them malware. Usually the people at step 3 are coin thieves themselves, but not always.
Often these threads will use real terms so simple googling will "confirm" them, but they're misapplied. A "twist attack" isn't an attack on secp256k1 but a related insecure curve. You cannot engage in a twist attack except by getting the victim to produce an invalid pubkey or signature using faulty software. Of course, if you could do that you could likely just have the backdoored code send you the key directly.
The only case I'm aware of where it's perhaps more interesting is when you have a signing or key-generating device that you can potentially glitch with some kind of fault attack, getting it to temporarily produce a point on the faulty related curve rather than the real one. Though this is why all such devices ought to verify keys and signatures after generating them, making it harder to ever get a corrupted point out of the device.
Step 1: Libellious.
Step 2: its no magic. its just maths. its not opaque. it has already been explain here. https://github.com/secp8x32/blog/blob/master/2020_05_26_secp256k1_twist_attacks/secp256k1_twist_attacks.md .. Its a good read but dont follow every steps.
Step 3: Then you obviously is not as good as you think. You still got more to learn. Coz your awareness seems to be begging for a reboot.
Step 4: I will be uploading the codes on Github soon. and i think you might need to re-read what i wrote. i never said its an attack on secp256k1. but thanks for explaining anyways but a simple job like googling would have help anyone here explain better, weak. 20+ years of experience, then it will be my first time hearing a hacker using sagemath to send malware.
When the main moderator had to come out to dispute me when he had never done this before, no matter what kind of attacks i had put up in this forum, we know i am right. he had never dispute or give any kind of advice before this. so this is quite surprising.
if you want me to share my code, just say so. stop whining and stomping your feet.
Update: I had so many of you messaging me. When you run the code from my Github, Not all public key is on some of the twisted curve. remove the twisted curve and add other/more b twist.
To ensure your twist attack works, you need to ensure 3 basic rules for your public key on the twisted curve: its co-primeness, endomorph, validation. I will be updating the code again to help you do this 3 basic checks before you can use the program. cheers.
