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Discouraging "Selfish" mining Development & Technical Discussion
I know that there has traditionally been reluctance to assume accurate clocks (s…
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n/a | adam3us | November 13, 2013, 03:42:53 AM |
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chaum cut-and-choose and physical cards (plastic card coins like bit-card.de) Development & Technical Discussion
So people are aware of physical coins with user chosen password security (agains…
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n/a | adam3us | November 11, 2013, 08:17:53 AM |
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Discouraging "Selfish" mining Development & Technical Discussion
I was very pleased to read a recent paper by Eyal and Sirer which put on a rigor…
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n/a | adam3us | November 07, 2013, 05:47:40 PM |
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Pay to contract with forgability (using a chameleon hash) Development & Technical Discussion
Need to update this - found a problem a week back, but lost part edited tab:[ECD…
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n/a | adam3us | November 03, 2013, 06:51:59 PM |
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partially non-transferable coins (w. applications for physical coins?) Development & Technical Discussion
Yes, such a method was proposed in the Bitcoin Banknote scheme by Sergio. I like…
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n/a | adam3us | November 03, 2013, 05:02:42 PM |
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Is Armory vulnerable to USB-Stick viruses like BadBios? Armory
Just to be clear, the issue is not the maximum size of a single transaction. Th…
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n/a | adam3us | November 03, 2013, 03:19:24 PM |
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Is Armory vulnerable to USB-Stick viruses like BadBios? Armory
Personally, I think this is an ideal steady-state solution once the offline syst…
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n/a | adam3us | November 03, 2013, 06:40:48 AM |
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Is Armory vulnerable to USB-Stick viruses like BadBios? Armory
dacoinminster, if badbios does what people are claiming it does, you're fcked no…
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n/a | adam3us | November 02, 2013, 07:06:09 PM |
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O(2^80) theoretical attack on P2SH Development & Technical Discussion
The problem is hash output approach is only secure up to the birthday attack whi…
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n/a | adam3us | November 02, 2013, 11:58:52 AM |
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partially non-transferable coins (w. applications for physical coins?) Development & Technical Discussion
Towards reducing the manufacturer and hardware trust of physical coins it occurr…
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n/a | adam3us | November 02, 2013, 09:50:15 AM |
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O(2^80) theoretical attack on P2SH Development & Technical Discussion
Unless I am misunderstanding something about the seralization, with pay to scrip…
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n/a | adam3us | November 02, 2013, 08:27:54 AM |
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Off-chain anonymous transactions by secure transfer of private keys Development & Technical Discussion
Another alternative, if the device knows what the address of its private key is.…
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n/a | adam3us | October 31, 2013, 07:07:58 AM |
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Off-chain anonymous transactions by secure transfer of private keys Development & Technical Discussion
[EDIT: its long and full of crypto, but read 6.5.1 last para or two; and 6.5.4 s…
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n/a | adam3us | October 30, 2013, 04:33:34 AM |
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Off-chain anonymous transactions by secure transfer of private keys Development & Technical Discussion
I was also thinking of something similar (draft post sitting in another tab), no…
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n/a | adam3us | October 30, 2013, 04:10:45 AM |
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Pay to contract with forgability (using a chameleon hash) Development & Technical Discussion
simpler and use EC discrete log for more compact keys [...]:A=kG+mQ where recipi…
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n/a | adam3us | October 27, 2013, 07:43:09 PM |
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Pay to contract with forgability (using a chameleon hash) Development & Technical Discussion
some contracts people form are _too low value_ to effectively use the kinds of t…
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n/a | adam3us | October 27, 2013, 09:59:34 AM |
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Pay to contract with forgability (using a chameleon hash) Development & Technical Discussion
the point is the contracting parties should be free to contract without interfer…
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n/a | adam3us | October 27, 2013, 04:28:11 AM |
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Pay to contract with forgability (using a chameleon hash) Development & Technical Discussion
m message to sign) with t=h(m). Then make random c, chameleon hash a=c^t mod n.…
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n/a | adam3us | October 26, 2013, 05:43:48 PM |
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Pay to contract with forgability (using a chameleon hash) Development & Technical Discussion
How do you mean here? Normally, in most societies, its frowned upon presenting a…
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n/a | adam3us | October 27, 2013, 03:41:45 AM |
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Brainstorm the next generation of minikey Development & Technical Discussion
I am thinking of coming up with a new encrypted minikey spec for physical bitcoi…
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n/a | adam3us | October 26, 2013, 04:53:58 PM |
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ZEROCOIN Breakdown.. Development & Technical Discussion
Can some one explain in SIMPLE terms what the number you would add to the accumu…
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n/a | adam3us | October 26, 2013, 04:46:54 PM |
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Pay to contract with forgability (using a chameleon hash) Development & Technical Discussion
message hash in the above basic pay-to-contract protocol is replaced with a cham…
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n/a | adam3us | October 26, 2013, 04:20:25 PM |
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Vanitygen: Vanity bitcoin address generator/miner [v0.22] Development & Technical Discussion
Finally got it to work on 7970 using catalyst 13.04!Downloaded the amd-sdk 2.7. …
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n/a | adam3us | October 26, 2013, 12:15:11 PM |
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Cold / Brain wallet security question Development & Technical Discussion
The goal here is to make cold storage more secure.Then why not just use a passwo…
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n/a | adam3us | October 26, 2013, 03:26:13 AM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
Here's a way to repair the security of the process of the miner claiming the fee…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 05:25:44 PM |
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unlinkable public deterministic wallet addresses Development & Technical Discussion
It seems to me you could make public derivation unlinkable eg by creating a rand…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 09:50:46 AM |
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unlinkable public deterministic wallet addresses Development & Technical Discussion
So in BIP 32 private key is x, base public key Q=xG, then public derivation is Q…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 06:58:11 AM |
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unlinkable public deterministic wallet addresses Development & Technical Discussion
So in BIP 32 https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/BIP_0032 (simplifying) the base private…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 05:52:43 AM |
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Financial Privacy and Verifiable Transactions Development & Technical Discussion
With Benaloh it true that B can be smaller (than the order of the group of a sec…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 05:13:37 AM |
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Making Hot Wallets Impossible to Steal - Now with 5 BTC bounty Development & Technical Discussion
The "Tick" methodLet's say you have X BTC divided in N transaction outputs Txo(i…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 04:47:27 AM |
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Cold / Brain wallet security question Development & Technical Discussion
Well firstly the number of combinations of 2 transposed hex chars from a 256-bit…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 03:57:27 AM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
Here's a way to repair the security of the process of the miner claiming the fee…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 03:35:07 AM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
related idea, not for brain-wallets but for password encrypted random key wallet…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 01:19:08 AM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
"Q' = H2( (y=H(salt)), Q )" should be R = H2( (y=H(salt)), Q ), right?Yes I'll e…
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n/a | adam3us | October 25, 2013, 01:41:58 AM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
a limitation with key stretching is it incurs computational load on the client,…
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n/a | adam3us | October 24, 2013, 09:14:32 AM |
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A Non-Outsourceable Puzzle to Prevent Hosted Mining Development & Technical Discussion
Multiple rewards do not necessarily imply reducing the variance in an unfair way…
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n/a | adam3us | October 21, 2013, 05:20:52 PM |
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A Non-Outsourceable Puzzle to Prevent Hosted Mining Development & Technical Discussion
I think the best solution is to effectively build a 'mining pool' into the ordin…
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n/a | adam3us | October 21, 2013, 12:16:42 PM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
People who haven't worked on password cracking [...] Today the tools are signifi…
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n/a | adam3us | October 19, 2013, 03:01:57 AM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
I wonder if it makes sense to imagine some key-stretching function f, which for…
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n/a | adam3us | October 16, 2013, 12:47:34 PM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
If the address where the $80m is stashed, or some of them are identifiable, they…
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n/a | adam3us | October 16, 2013, 07:48:33 AM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
Quote(2) you're going to be rather disappointed when you realize how complete c…
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n/a | adam3us | October 16, 2013, 04:52:18 AM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
Clarification: The "no EC multiply part" of BIP 38 is not a brain wallet. In BI…
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n/a | adam3us | October 15, 2013, 04:53:05 PM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
However a limitation with key stretching is it incurs computational load on the…
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n/a | adam3us | October 15, 2013, 08:48:20 AM |
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hardening brain-wallets with a useful blind proof of work Development & Technical Discussion
The risk with brain-wallets (eg BIP 038 with no EC multiply, or even with EC mul…
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n/a | adam3us | October 15, 2013, 08:00:38 AM |
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blind-hashcash, potential bitcoin applications using blind brands certs/ecash Development & Technical Discussion
[RSA based offloadable blindable function]public params:n= RSA modulus (prime fa…
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n/a | adam3us | October 12, 2013, 09:28:47 AM |
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blind-hashcash, potential bitcoin applications using blind brands certs/ecash Development & Technical Discussion
signed-hashcash variant with an indistinguishable short-cut [...] based on RSA:…
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n/a | adam3us | October 10, 2013, 11:30:18 AM |
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blind-hashcash, potential bitcoin applications using blind brands certs/ecash Development & Technical Discussion
I can't figure out what you're saying you have in mind for the application of th…
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n/a | adam3us | October 10, 2013, 03:32:54 PM |
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blind-hashcash, potential bitcoin applications using blind brands certs/ecash Development & Technical Discussion
We may need a different form of proof of work where the work is blindable / offl…
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n/a | adam3us | October 09, 2013, 11:41:24 AM |
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blind-hashcash, potential bitcoin applications using blind brands certs/ecash Development & Technical Discussion
A blind-schnorr signature actually hides the hash and message from the issuerThe…
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n/a | adam3us | October 09, 2013, 05:07:14 AM |
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blind-hashcash, potential bitcoin applications using blind brands certs/ecash Development & Technical Discussion
s=random, r=randomcompute a=h^r*h0^-sfind i such that 0=?H(s,i,a,m) mod 2^wand t…
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n/a | adam3us | October 09, 2013, 04:40:08 AM |
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blind-hashcash, potential bitcoin applications using blind brands certs/ecash Development & Technical Discussion
You notice the core work function is slightly incompatible maybe enough to break…
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n/a | adam3us | October 08, 2013, 05:40:40 PM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
And that led to a new idea... the topic of a new thread, which might offer final…
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n/a | adam3us | October 08, 2013, 04:32:35 PM |
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blind-hashcash, potential bitcoin applications using blind brands certs/ecash Development & Technical Discussion
I had been musing on and off for a while now there ought to be a way to create a…
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n/a | adam3us | October 08, 2013, 04:25:10 PM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
For off-chain purposes it is interesting to note that the morphcoins (hidden hom…
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n/a | adam3us | October 08, 2013, 02:17:17 PM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
Recap at this point the proof message is { a,H(a'),r } or {a,a',r} the other 3 v…
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n/a | adam3us | October 08, 2013, 03:47:25 AM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
Correct me if I am wrong here, please.You are wrong. But you're asking in the wr…
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n/a | adam3us | October 07, 2013, 08:07:45 AM |
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synthetic USD & distributed auditable exchanges without a banking interface Development & Technical Discussion
ie once you had a bootstrapped exchange market in BTC with synthetic USD (itself…
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n/a | adam3us | October 02, 2013, 09:07:52 AM |
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synthetic USD & distributed auditable exchanges without a banking interface Development & Technical Discussion
If vanilla options are needed to create a synthetic USD... I'm pretty sure these…
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n/a | adam3us | October 02, 2013, 09:03:11 AM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
I don't think anyone knows how to do an efficient ZK proof for things like less-…
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n/a | adam3us | October 01, 2013, 01:42:12 PM |
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synthetic USD & distributed auditable exchanges without a banking interface Development & Technical Discussion
I am interested more in whether you can do it without a banking interface, but f…
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n/a | adam3us | October 01, 2013, 12:18:27 PM |
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synthetic USD & distributed auditable exchanges without a banking interface Development & Technical Discussion
If you're trying to build a cryptocurrency representation of fiat that does not…
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n/a | adam3us | October 01, 2013, 11:55:00 AM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
How do you intend to do a proof that the upper two bits are zero?I believe there…
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n/a | adam3us | October 01, 2013, 10:59:49 AM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
How do you intend to do a proof that the upper two bits are zero?I don't think a…
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n/a | adam3us | October 01, 2013, 10:45:01 AM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
How do validating nodes sum input and output values to determine a fee? This is…
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n/a | adam3us | October 01, 2013, 10:22:36 AM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
Will post more crypto level details [...] presently.So if you assume the existen…
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n/a | adam3us | October 01, 2013, 10:20:56 AM |
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bitcoins with homomorphic value (validatable but encrypted) Development & Technical Discussion
I have been researching this for a few months on and off, because it seems like…
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n/a | adam3us | October 01, 2013, 09:19:53 AM |
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synthetic USD & distributed auditable exchanges without a banking interface Development & Technical Discussion
HiIt occurred to me that one should be able to bootstrap a synthetic USD (or EUR…
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n/a | adam3us | October 01, 2013, 07:12:50 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
But that sounds fragile per my comment above: what if the user is using determin…
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n/a | adam3us | September 24, 2013, 05:20:33 PM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
Quote from: iddo8. Alice asks Bob to signs a "refund_reveal" transaction which s…
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n/a | adam3us | September 24, 2013, 01:45:00 PM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
I'll attempt to fully describe Adam's protocol here. Please see if the language…
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n/a | adam3us | September 24, 2013, 01:34:21 PM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
[EDIT: ignore this message it is assuming the old locktime semantics and so is i…
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n/a | adam3us | September 24, 2013, 04:59:20 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
Please remember that our current form of nLockTime is a broken and crippled vers…
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n/a | adam3us | September 24, 2013, 08:37:05 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
Bob writes a transaction that pays into some kind of escrow (TxA). Before announ…
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n/a | adam3us | September 24, 2013, 05:44:21 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
Oh, hey, I just noticed your sig, Adam. You never know who you're talking to. Do…
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n/a | adam3us | September 23, 2013, 06:47:15 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
You don't need to use this protocol unless you want money to be at stake. Nice t…
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n/a | adam3us | September 23, 2013, 06:44:04 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
You don't need to use this protocol unless you want money to be at stake. Nice t…
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n/a | adam3us | September 23, 2013, 05:35:48 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
Nice! In step (3) it should be "v (LOCK(time) ^ SIG(A))" Oops, fixed.What script…
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n/a | adam3us | September 23, 2013, 05:14:46 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
1. A broadcast msg: INPUT(v),h(a), require-script(INPUT(2v),b,SIG(b),TEST(a+b mo…
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n/a | adam3us | September 22, 2013, 09:30:07 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
Quote from: adam3us1. A broadcast msg: INPUT(v),h(a), require-script(INPUT(2v),b…
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n/a | adam3us | September 21, 2013, 06:47:56 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
Alright how about this for another tack.1. A broadcast msg: INPUT(v),h(a), requi…
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n/a | adam3us | September 20, 2013, 08:34:35 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
1. A->B: w=H(a), SIG(A,w) for random a2. B->A: c=H(b,w,SIG(A,w)),SIG(B,c) for ra…
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n/a | adam3us | September 20, 2013, 07:51:25 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
If we don't care for these two properties, then I think that we can have a much…
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n/a | adam3us | September 20, 2013, 06:04:25 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
let the committing party win by default, the loser if he loses has nothing to do…
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n/a | adam3us | September 20, 2013, 05:51:15 AM |
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fair coin toss with no extortion and no need to trust a third party Development & Technical Discussion
The basic problem of a fair coin toss seems relatively straight-forward. The ha…
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n/a | adam3us | September 20, 2013, 04:09:28 AM |
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Zerocoin: Anonymous Distributed E-Cash from Bitcoin Development & Technical Discussion
Anyway other than the question of whether soft forks make sense or not: what abo…
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n/a | adam3us | July 05, 2013, 07:54:57 AM |
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Vanitygen: Vanity bitcoin address generator/miner [v0.22] Development & Technical Discussion
I tried that one and it has the same CPU hash GPU hash not matching issue (with…
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n/a | adam3us | June 28, 2013, 03:30:02 PM |
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Vanitygen: Vanity bitcoin address generator/miner [v0.22] Development & Technical Discussion
btw I am finding vanity addresses aiming for with lower case are much harder to…
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n/a | adam3us | June 28, 2013, 02:44:38 PM |
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Vanitygen: Vanity bitcoin address generator/miner [v0.22] Development & Technical Discussion
anyone know how I might go about disabling BFI_INT?If you can change source and…
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n/a | adam3us | June 28, 2013, 12:45:08 PM |
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Vanitygen: Vanity bitcoin address generator/miner [v0.22] Development & Technical Discussion
Also seeing the CPU hash / GPU hash error message on AMD 7870.Running with -V ha…
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n/a | adam3us | June 27, 2013, 06:27:32 AM |
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fixed public key coin transfer (for zero-trust physical coin transfer) Development & Technical Discussion
Also in a firmcoin there are two methods to reload coins:1. You send the the pub…
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n/a | adam3us | June 13, 2013, 09:32:41 AM |
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fixed public key coin transfer (for zero-trust physical coin transfer) Development & Technical Discussion
btw As you have a funded state on the coin, and passive accumulated stray RF pow…
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n/a | adam3us | June 13, 2013, 09:25:32 AM |
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fixed public key coin transfer (for zero-trust physical coin transfer) Development & Technical Discussion
Maybe to the limited extent of the tamper resistance, tamper evidence, an hologr…
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n/a | adam3us | June 13, 2013, 09:00:02 AM |
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fixed public key coin transfer (for zero-trust physical coin transfer) Development & Technical Discussion
what's the point of having the physical coin at all?The answer is already in th…
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n/a | adam3us | June 13, 2013, 07:29:58 AM |
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fixed public key coin transfer (for zero-trust physical coin transfer) Development & Technical Discussion
Yes but you cant prove the key was generated in a way not computable by the hard…
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n/a | adam3us | June 12, 2013, 06:45:33 PM |
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fixed public key coin transfer (for zero-trust physical coin transfer) Development & Technical Discussion
You want the info on the outside of the coin to be unchanging and yet easily ver…
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n/a | adam3us | June 12, 2013, 06:34:19 PM |
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fixed public key coin transfer (for zero-trust physical coin transfer) Development & Technical Discussion
Now all we need is a kick starter for someone with a bit of hardware expertise t…
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n/a | adam3us | June 12, 2013, 03:41:36 PM |
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fixed public key coin transfer (for zero-trust physical coin transfer) Development & Technical Discussion
Anyway, you proposal has no advantage at all, because it is equivalent to transf…
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n/a | adam3us | June 12, 2013, 02:25:55 PM |
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fixed public key coin transfer (for zero-trust physical coin transfer) Development & Technical Discussion
I have been musing about how to improve physical coin security, because well phy…
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n/a | adam3us | June 12, 2013, 12:11:56 PM |
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Zerocoin: Anonymous Distributed E-Cash from Bitcoin Development & Technical Discussion
[auditability limits of off-chain chaumcoin server..] Unless they somehow all c…
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n/a | adam3us | June 09, 2013, 09:36:58 AM |
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Zerocoin: Anonymous Distributed E-Cash from Bitcoin Development & Technical Discussion
The chaum bank can be required to maintain a signed audit log of every chaum tok…
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n/a | adam3us | June 06, 2013, 06:44:21 PM |
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