I could tell you which salt I'm using, but the fact is that it still wouldn't matter. The point of the bounty is to get people to think about the sheer magnitude of attempts that would be required to brute force it.
Not really possible to estimate that until we see what the salt was.
To give you an idea, if I had used just two words out of the dictionary, there would be 29,404,018,576 different combinations to go through.
Very few people pick two random words out of the entire 171,476 word dictionary. An adult native English speaker with average vocabulary probably knows only 10% of those words. If they actually picked them at random (with dice or a computerized random number generator) as you suggest, out of 100 times (on average), in 81 instance they would not know either word, in 18 instance they would only know one word, and only in one instance would they know both. Tools for picking random words tend to have a list of only around 2,000 words, with the exception of diceware which has nearly 8,000 but is often criticized for having too many obscure words.
Crackers know this, and they will optimize by trying more likely (less complicated) things first.
Of course, it's still possible for it to be cracked, but you would have to be willing to spend an unreasonable amount of money, have a massive amount of CPU power available to you, or be incredibly lucky.
Probably true, see my previous comment.
To some people, it's obvious that this is impractical, and they think it's pointless. To some people, they think it's a malicious way to trick people into wasting their time and money attempting to brute force it. And to some people it's a learning experience, allowing them to understand the purpose and effect of having multiple salt options to chose from. The latter is what I'm after.
The thing is, if your tool became popular, it'd be unlikely for any
particular person's wallet to be drained by thieves. What a thief will do is pre-build tables of salt and password/passphrase combinations and watch the network for transactions to the matching addresses. If they suspect someone in particular of having used brainwallet.io (which is different from classic brainwallets which are egregiously insecure - brainwallet.io is only kinda risky in comparsion) they'll gather as much information as they can about that person and spend some time running a targeted attack based on what they know about them.
If you choose to use this tool, and do not generate a passphrase randomly, you are gambling against unknown odds. There will be an unknown number of attackers with an unknown amount of computing power at their disposal, and they'd love to take your money.