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It is not as hard as you might think if you already understand how Bitcoin works. You can read this 3 part article https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/understanding-the-lightning-network-part-building-a-bidirectional-payment-channel-1464710791/ . You can easily learn about it in a day.

Thanks for the reply, I umm, think, maybe, that's a little more clear....

No, not really, I'm still confused.  Anyone want to point the resident crypto-idiot in the right direction to catch up and read on this fork?  I honestly have no idea how you guys with lives of your own actually manage to keep up with everything.

Not really, not in a any differently then the split already does on non-lightning transactions. It is just duplicates, that is all. Now the lack of replay protection means that you wouldn't be able to safely make those to chains different, but a duplication will happen and might persist afterwards to the big part of the network. What you are right about is that you can't use both chains at the same time securely, you will likely have to abandon one of them, that is the big issue with this fork. But this has nothing to do with the Lightning network, it will create same problems with the rest of standard transactions as well.

The Lightning Network is currently under development. It will become a decentralized network that enables instant off-chain transfer of the ownership of bitcoin, without the need of a trusted third party. Lightning is open source. Anyone can review the code (in the same way as the bitcoin code). If anything goes wrong, you simply broadcast the latest state of your channel as a normal on-chain bitcoin transaction. All your money will be returned to your address, and it will be recorded on the blockchain as normal.

Wouldn't that upset the whole ecology of the network?  When I read this again it sounds like a snake trying to eat it's own tail, as hypothetically, but not practically, it could just create endless widgets out of thin air, even leading to profit if someone decides the new widget has value? 

We need more brilliant solutions like Lightning to make the blockchain a real viable solution for world-wide adoption.

Blockchain forks effect lightning in the same way that transactions are effected. If you have an open payment channel before the fork, you will have the same open payment channel duplicated onto the other fork of the blockchain just like how you have your coins duplicated when a fork happens.

We know what happens when the bitcoin network splits.  How does that work in lightning?

One thing is sure: Nothing is safe online.
But to answer your question: "When you close the channel, you both sign a transaction with a final balance to each other. This removes the security of off-chain transactions."

The best test is for sure when it will go live, and we will see how it all works.

I'm very curious and will for sure put some BTC on it to try.

You are clearly ignoring the posts above where the opposite is explained. Security is established by a form of security deposits. Similar to the mining process itself, attack is possible, but it is costly and unprofitable.

There is no safety at the lightning at work it is completely up to the development team at the bag holders but if they choose to pay you or not. That is why nobody uses the lightning at work. Just giving up the confirmation system for a system that but all of the control at the original team.

There's a ton of FUD going on about lightning network in terms of how safe and decentralized it would be on practice. Now im not an expert, but so aren't all these big mouths talking about how it isn't safe. Notice how all these LN FUDders always present their big blocked shitcoin as their solution to get noobs buying it.

Here's a good article refuting LN FUD:

https://medium.com/the-litecoin-school-of-crypto/a-scale-free-and-private-lightning-network-e52a3c178d7d

Thanks for both your responses!

I indeed had to let it sink in a bit, but I think I got the idea. Oh the joys of mixing cryptography with game theory! I dimly remember a similar concept being discussed a couple years back, but iirc that one still required an escrow (instead of a time lock, as would now be the case). So far I was only aware of how LN is supposed to work regarding its network topology, but not about the lower level protocol details (ie. the technical details of maintaining a channel state).

I see there's some reading to be done.

Each time the participants create a new "state" of the LN channel, they will exchange signed transactions that allows either party to close the channel, however the party that broadcast the transaction will only be spend the funds after (it depends on the LN channel, but the LN white-paper used 1000 as an example) confirmations. This is done by using an intermediary transaction that can only be redeemed (by the person who broadcast the original transaction) after 1000 confirmations.


The above process will take place every time a new "state" of the LN channel. In addition to the above process, each party will exchange transactions that allows the party that did not broadcast the closing transaction if the closing transaction is from the previous "state" of the LN channel to spend the bitcoin that would normally belong to the party that broadcast the stale closing transaction.


When signed closing transactions are exchanged when there is a new "state" to the LN channel, the transaction sent to each party is slightly different (they have a different txid) so that it is possible to tell which party broadcast the closing transaction.


I think this is a little confusing, however I believe if you read it twice, it should make sense. If something doesn't make sense or if you have questions, let me know and I will explain further.

It isn't that any new information is leaked, it is just that if one party uses a stale settlement transaction he will be locking his funds with a time lock and they will be recoverable by the other party as well. This way they will race on who gets those funds, while the rest of the funds that the person who closed the channel didn't claim are instantly available to the other party and only to that other party.

You can read more in this 3 part article by Bitcoin magazine https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/understanding-the-lightning-network-part-building-a-bidirectional-payment-channel-1464710791/

That sounds quite interesting, got any more details on this? How is the attacked counterparty able to retaliate by receiving all the funds held in the channel? What information gets leaked by the attacking transaction that enables this defensive measure?

Using LN is marginally less secure than using Bitcoin. It is possible to attempt to broadcast a settlement transaction that is not the most recent and that results in you receiving more than the current state of your LN channel. However if you do this then the LN channel counterparty will be able to broadcast a transaction that results in them receiving all of the funds held in the channel.


The above will normally mean users will not try to broadcast stale transactions however there are specific situations in which this kind of attack may be profitable. It will however require a lot of capital/resources and is not guaranteed to work.

The funds you would be attempting to spend are actually in an on-chain transaction. They are locked up in a 2-of-2 multisig on a confirmed on-chain transaction. You cannot move those funds elsewhere on chain without the other party signing a transaction to move the funds. That signing is done with the commitment transactions (which update each person's balance) and at channel closing.

What stops you is that in order to open a channel on the LN, you need to lock those bitcoins in a 2-of-2 multisig on chain.
You can't spend them if the person you opened it with doesn't sign the transaction.

When you close the channel, you both sign a transaction with a final balance to each other. This removes the security of off-chain transactions.