Topic: 1SPLiTKEY is a solution to prevent creators from sweeping physical collectibles (Read 419 times)

Person A makes one part, Person B makes the other part. They don't know each other's data, make the collectible coins, and sell them. Everyone's happy!
8 years later, Person A meets Person B again and start talking. Person A just got divorced and lost his house. B has gambling debts. They start talking about "what if...." and it turns out both kept a backup. They join forces and empty all collectibles they ever created.
There is no way to avoid this other than trusting both A and B. Or better: you can avoid it, by not trusting any of them.

The answer to this question doesn't really matter: you can't verify it. A honest person would say "no", but so would a scammer.

Let's call it Schrödinger's key: it may be yours, but at the same time you may have nothing or someone else may have it too. You can't know for sure until you open the box.

Technically, if there’s only one private key that exists, and it sits under a hologram of a coin that you own, then the key is yours and yours alone - unlike an exchange that actually holds your btc for you.

Unfortunately there’s no way to know this with certainty, so the sentiment here is correct.

The tides are surely shifting in this space, and I’m interested in seeing how it all plays out.

I know, I know... not a personal attack
I would just hope that people take loaded collectibles with other maker's keys with a grain of salt at this point.
We have seen plenty of trusted and untrusted makers come to market....so just hoping people realize this is a serious matter when considering how much one can risk when "investing" in this hobby of physical crypto coins

I really can't argue with that either.
But you cant.
especially considering your holding something of mine
Arnt you also forum defacto forum escrow and treasurer, things like holding other people's coins are what your known for. why yell at me trying to help?
Practice what you preach.

Stop buying maker keyed collectibles-
This is the solution to prevent creators from sweeping physical collectibles......

NOT YOUR KEYS, NOT YOUR COINS!!!

Long story short yes but this is notated here in tos https://1splitkey.com/#tos

"Even if we get hacked all the hackers will have is Public Key,SPLiTKEY provided partialpriv and your email address."         
"If this case scenario happens, we are not responsible for random collisions via 3rd party bruteforcing, or email phishing attempts." - I have a typo on site here.

there is also a hall of fame, this could be modified to creator's advantage. a chain of command so to speak.
there's a lot of endpoints with the data (for example finished work is on rig, server and via output email)
BUT! we also have a browser hash system that's not fully implemented yet that this can be done and at least eliminates the need for email.
Currently my product isnt designed for a circulating system. its designed for one person and one person only. the endpoint user.

We can purge what we have but as long as the source code remains closed its irrelevant as stated in the tos
Even with all this data out in the open, if you do your due diligence, you should be fine unless your social engineered.
Keep in mind my service wasn't exactly designed with creators in mind, these where going to be offline batch jobs in the initial proposal.
"We are offering a maker vouch of batch splitkey wallets up to 7 digits(or less) & 100 wallets(or less)
this vouch is contingent an endorsement of our service and an agreement of difficulty/prefix.
We highly recommend maker submit 1 pub-key per wallet in this vouch offer."
a casual user has no reason for concern, but I understand the viewpoints a creator would have.
however, our tos states what our service really is a handler for vanitysearch and a modified bitaddress.org
anyone can do this without using my service. As stated though with input we can make it happen.

this won't prevent bad acting by any means.
but it will prevent full rug sweeps at a much better success rate.
if some creators utilize this on top of their already stellar reputation it shouldnt matter even if they got 20 of their original coins back in hand.
the originator having something they issued and seeing the key isn't a bad thing if they've destroyed the keys all along.
But should be viewed from the same current viewpoint as they possibly have the keys anyways.
*edit maybe a chain of command and if it ends up back in creators hands its flagged as possibly exposed.
keep in mind, my product isnt designed for a circulating system. its designed for one person and one person only. the endpoint user.
air gapping custom jobs solves data concerns on distributed coin models.

My coin from willi came unbuilt - he put the engraving on for an address I provided - I applied the key and holo myself.

My question is does your system keep/store any data? Being closed source, there is no way to validate what it does - so thst requires us to trust you and trust the creator.

I have no reason to distrust you or willi - in the end, if any makers allow for it, I always buy DIY

right, but even if your creators a bad actor, keeps everything and seeks out the mints theyve done
they couldn't pull the rug on everything. just whatever they've physically intercepted.
for example your vanity coin from willi, you trusted him with this process.
now add in a factor thats more in your hands (split key generation) and you have more doubt?
lets assume he did splitkey on the vanity coin.
he might could take your funds if you sent your coin to him with your partial on a coa style ticket.
question a why would willi want it back? it was custom made to you when you ordered it.
personally, I think your coin would be fine with willi,  
as it stands right now. willi could wipe you out with or without the partials.
this process(splitkey generation) requires more trust in yourself than others.
it does add a layer of security but isn't foolproof. It's a hell of a lot better than what I see going on now.
I'm sure any creator that knows how to make keys wouldn't struggle with this concept.

vanitypool used this concept for vanity wallet bounties. its tried and true.




 

But your process also requires the creators and buyers to also trust your process and to trust you do t keep the partials - right?

That would require destroying the hologram?
 
Or the designer keeping the partials.   

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vs


I hope they nuked these keys.

It's not the ultimate solution but it's enough to make the effort redundant in the long run.

It's yall's call. get compromised 100's of wallets at a time, or detect foul play 1 coin at a time from "potential" bad designers.

You're right. I didn't mention it because I thought it's obvious, and unavoidable. Funded collectibles are just not compatible with "verify, don't trust".

One more thing: you rely on A and B not keeping and later combining those private key parts. Back to the 'trusted person' issue that we have had with Coldkey et al. Many of those creators were highly trusted and yet still they rug pulled their customers.

@LoyceV I re-read your post.

creator could have all data provided by the customer. pubkey

creator then generates wallet, now they have wallet address and the half the 1/2 privkey under holo.

but that one key half that the client keeps is your chain of logistics. A COA if you will.

If you want to auth, you have to destroy it the coin's holo. 

There would be no point in keeping a key as it would be a stalemate like multi-sig escrow situations.

The "paper" key half and the intact coin with the wallet visible and the other half the key under the holo from OEM.

The only way bad acting can occur is if OEM/issuer got coin in hands again with a COA original purchaser issued and resold it.

(They have seen the "COA" now and have the other half of the key or possibility of having them stashed away)

Then an intercept scenario could occur so a situation such as this should just be treated as a zero day of the right off the rip,

 just like it should be now and isnt. So with that being said, this creates a new layer of security at least from OEM issuer fraud in bulk scenarios.


This isn't a new or foreign concept at all, it's called the "Idea Attribution Effect" or "Sender-Receiver Effect".

40mm x 3mm 30g Bitcoin Coin (loadable and customizable coin)
Truth is @Willi9974 is the only one that's done anything like it.

 When I saw Willi doing this, I immediately reached out to him to offer our services as we were already doing them since 2019.

The only reason we can see people not wanting to use a service like this is simply to maintain control/responsibility of the coins,
or they dont know about our service or splitkey generation in general.  
Dont even use our platform, hell use your own/vs direct.
I still think split-key generation is the only way creators should proceed.
It's been proposed, there really isn't a argument about its security. Its up to you guys to be proactive about it.

Not your keys, Not your coin.

Any further debate about the service itself at least read the website first. And contribute to the ann post about the service.

 “If you don’t believe it or don’t get it, I don’t have the time to try to convince you, sorry.” ~ (Satoshi Nakamoto).

Ballet is closed source: https://walletscrutiny.com/android/com.balletcrypto/ and plenty of people use them.
There is going to have to be an adjustment period here, where things are hashed out and tried and discussed and tested and weak points are found and tried again.

WhyFhy has a good product, for reasons if you agree with them or not his product for now is a is a black box.
How far would he have to open it for everyone to be happy? That is going to have to be part of the discussion.

Fully open? Code reviewed by some trusted people under NDA? Something else? Everything is going to have to be on the table here.

Going to the 'use some form of hardware tag' that I was talking about over the weekend, how far do we go with that in terms of how it's made, who can make it and so on.

These are things that are going to have to be worked on.

Full disclosure I have used WhyFly's service and have some funds on addresses that were generated there. I have bought equipment from him and I sent the funds 1st.
He has had plenty of times he could have ripped me off and did not.

-Dave

A chain of logistics utilizing only the BTC ecosphere has been something I've been thinking on for a long time.
I've thought signature binding a funding wallet to a serialized item on a PoB wallet would be a neat one for chain of logistics but provides nothing in regards to downstream protection.
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This splitkey proposal doesn't stop second hand bad actors, just 1st party and creation.*
The only person you can play with this system is yourself*
My proposal is for creators/vendors to implement this trustless system. At least protecting firsthand buyers from OEM Fraud.
People are skeptical about a service that genuinely cares and takes action in the most proactive way possible aside from diy.
I'd say you guys should question why your vendors are not offering this always has been available solution for a while now.
Here the backbone of our service. the rest is just handlers.
https://github.com/JeanLucPons/VanitySearch#generate-a-vanity-address-for-a-third-party-using-split-key
Our capacity lies within this programs own. We just made using it easier.

Answering this based on my description above: no. Just like any other collectible: you have to trust the creator. The main difference: this time the trust is shared by 2 creators.

No. Just like the first buyer can't verify it, the second buyer can't verify it either. All he can do is ensure the hologram wasn't tampered with. Isn't that the same with any Casascius Coin?

The second buyer doesn't need any information from the first buyer.

When using this sort of solution, is it possible to verify that the information needed to redeem the funds held on the collectible is legitimate without compromising the collectible?  My question is with regards to resales by the original buyer.  Can a second party verify that whatever information will be needed from the original buyer will work?  When I looked into this sort of solution, I determined that resales would be too dependent on the original buyer holding accurate information and transferring it to a potential new buyer, and this was an issue because people lose things and blame others.  How would a secondary buyer know that the information they have been given from the original purchaser is correct and will work?  I should probably know this but it has been about 11 years since I researched all this before making a decision how to move forward with my coins but my assumption is there is still no way to verify this information without compromising the collectible.

That's a problem, but using the splitkey principle could work to make sure no single person knows all data to create the private key.

Quoting from my vanity address thread:

Let's say 2 highly trusted people want to make a collectible pre-funded coin. Person A does Steps 1-3, and (the red part) gives the public key to Person B.
Person B creates a split-key vanity address, let's say starting with 1Safer. That creates a partial private key, which he doesn't share.

Now back to the coin: Person A adds the private key, under a hologram. Person B adds the partial private key, also under a hologram. Person B also knows the address to fund/publish.

The buyer, when he wants to redeem the coin, has to do Steps 5-6.

The benefit: not a single person in the world knows the private key.

I see 2 risks:
1. Mistakes. Since nobody should access the private key, nobody knows if a mistake has been made. If so, it will be impossible to create the private key that belongs to the address.
2. You can't check if Person B gave the correct address, unless you redeem the coin. Once in a while someone would have to peel a coin to verify they're not unfunded.

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Disclaimer: I typed this by heart, don't just trust it, verify everything!

You the customer, have no need for it.  
We provide all the computing.
Client can be given to other companies.

Gullibility is a liability. We keep it closed source.