You won't get too far insulting the protocol that is too holy around here.
If you're interested in something different, this is the latest thread on encoin: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/encoin-scrutiny-76750
I was actually looking into one-time signatures (or the hash tree based ones that have many but limited sigs) as well as NTRUsign/encrypt to obtain a QC-proof protocol. It appears that you have designed something that is fast and has both small public keys and signatures, a combination of which is not really possible with hash tree sigs and NTRU. I'm not a cryptographer though so it is hard for me to grasp everything just based on a whitepaper.
tps is not bottlenecked by hashing, it is bottlenecked by ECDSA. They operate very differently and openCL/APUs will not help this.
MAVE , like ECDSA, needs to prove itself.
After 10 years, if it works, Bitcoin should switch to it.
Btw, is it opensource & free ?
ECDSA doesn't need to prove itself, it needs to stay resistant to cryptanalysis finding a direct vulnerability. Bitcoin won't do anything to change the odds of this happening as it is a tiny, tiny percentage of ECDSA use at large.
In the same vein, MAVE is simply using one-way hashing functions, so any vulnerability in MAVE would be either based on the fact that it uses truncated hashes, or a vulnerability in SHA2 itself. I'm not a cryptographer, but they should be able to figure out whether or not MAVE is vulnerable because of truncated hashes just based on the whitepaper. SHA2 is in the same boat as ECDSA.