Let me explain my 'matrix' and 'path' valuations. Say there are 10 verifying transfer nodes (a-j). Say that prior to being mined, a transaction needs to be verified three times before being mined. Say you want to monetarily reward good distribution. What you do is statistically prefer the least noted verification paths:
Here's an example of three different paths:
a->b->c-> mine
f->a->j-> mine
d->e->j-> mine
If a particular verification path (e.g., f->a->j-> mine) is continually repeated for many transactions, that path loses weighting. A miner will likely see the same transaction come in through various paths and can choose the one to insert into the block they are mining.
In my vision of things, a fair fraction of the block reward is distributed to each node who participated in transferring the transactions to the eventual miners thereby producing an economic incentive both to transfer transactions, and to be 'weird' (e.g., not one of 10,000 nodes operating within Amazon's cloud which offers no real value to the network.)
That would be an incentive that the miner would have to give? Then what happens when the miner keeps the rewards? Or is that cryptographically solved somehow?
I would envision weightings when deciding how to do re-orgs. Thus, a miner would have incentive to produce as 'valuable' a block as possible where on factor of value is how much 'diversity' it has.
As I mentioned in my last post, if the coinbase and transaction fees went onto a sidechain for collection by all block formation participants, the miner really would not have the opportunity to keep the entire reward. Probably 'old style' blocks would be allowed under certain conditions (e.g., no blocks for an hour.) This would provide a backup should there be a reward system failure.
And... that is a reward only. It might make it rewarding to run a node but it would be a problem to still run amazon cloud nodes. Next thing is that the reward can't be very high to make it worth to run a node. Plus, if it would be rewarding then it would get saturated to the point where it is not rewarding anymore. It would be like miners who run 100 miners or more. All owned by the same person. It might even happen that someone owns a huge part of it and holds back certain transactions. It would not be a free service anymore so misuse might happen more easy.
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On the topic of mock-distribution (e.g., 1000 VM's in Amazon's datacenter) it drives me nuts...
Kaminsky's 'nooter' program measures timings to attempt to analyze whether a packet is from a node behind a proxy or is being deceitful in certain ways. I mentioned it as one potential way to try to discover if a well funded attacker had tried to amass an army of verifying nodes, but there are certainly others and I would anticipate using multiple of them. When I said 'compare notes', I mean that if (a) analyzed it's connection with (b) and (c) analyzed it's connection with (b) then (a) and (c) compared notes on (b), they might be able to pick out issues. If they found problems and warned the network of a possible cheater, it could help keep such problems weeded down and discourage people from trying to cheat (in this way) since their nodes (many) would probably end up blacklisted.
If many nodes have the same 'fingerprint' (e.g., they are all VM's in the same Amazon datacenter) they all lose value as desirable 'neurons'. A relatively valuable node would be one which is sitting in someone's basement (which may be partially verified as the IP being part of a netblock used by and ISP for customer service for example.) A super desirable 'neuron' would be one accessed over a radio link and situated in Outer Mongolia. It's beyond the scope of this note to further describe some of the ways 'synapses' form and are valued, but suffice it to say, I look to the biological world as a model...in my musings about this stuff.
Switching to a discussion of mining, that never bothered me much. Corp/gov could mine for all I care as long as they are not the only one's doing it. A hash is a hash. The ideas about weighting 'valuable' blocks based on the verification path metrics might provide some framework to deal with mining consolidation and abuse problems if/when they occur.
Though such a notification system for possible cheater nodes could again be misused by someone holding a big part of nodes and wanting to weed out competition for rewards.
And i still don't see why the fake nodes should be a problem. They can't really do anything.
You worked on neural networks? I had some experiments coded some years back. I believed that you really can get surprising results but had to find out that all they can do is doing what you say them exactly to do. Only difference to a normal sourcecode is that they can find out similar things. That's all.