Topic: A legitimately novel idea for a new crypto. - page 2. (Read 3807 times)

Seems like instead of people spending electricity on mining, they would be spending it on making as many transactions as possible to mine the coins. If there is a 1% chance of earning a block reward by making 100 transactions, and the block reward is more than the cost of 100 transactions, then the users will make those transactions to earn money.

In the end, the sum of the transaction fees will be close to the price of a transaction block.

If a transaction block reward is $50, and you look back at the past day, someone could pay for the majority of the days transactions and 51% attack. Much more feasible than paying for 51% of the hardware used to mine.

this argument i made is i think correct, but it is rather abstract, i fear that it would be lost on most people. Due to strategic considerations, for the first crypto ever, perhaps satoshi made the right choice. like you said it was the finite supply that got you into it.

Thats right. You could think of it like miners are minting empty containers and only the lottery winner can fill that container with transactions. If entries into that lottery could consist of every person who ever made a transaction than it would be HUGELY decentralized and you could literally trust a 2 confirmation transaction since it would be so unlikely that the winning miners and lottery winners could all be colluding with each other for any length of time. additionally since miners are not the ones authoring transactions a high orphan rate would very marginally reduce the security of the network meaning that you could have blocks coming in MUCH faster. it would be the holy grail of a decentralized crypto with trustworthy confirmations in seconds.

unfortunately like i said idk how to handle the problem of transaction block creators entering in a huge list of their own public keys instead of processing real transactions. im just going to have to keep thinking about it and in the mean time im going to work on learning how to actually make a crypto staring out with something much simpler. Im just going to work on trying to make my own hashcash implementation for now.

I'm late to this thread, but I wanted to comment that this is a good insight.  It's funny the thing that originally attracted me to Bitcoin was the finite supply.  Now I don't see that as being as big of an issue due to the phenomenon you are describing here.  It's analogous to slowly increasing the gold supply (through mining, nuclear transmutation, space exploration and mining, etc.) - not enough to destabilize the currency.

I was reviewing part of the original Bitcoin whitepaper this morning and noticed that Satoshi actually referred to each block as generating "a coin."  That would've been an interesting way for things to run: 1 BTC generated every 10 minutes, indefinitely.

I see... #nods

As I understood, if a miner have to endorse a transaction block, people have to wait for miners blocks to trust the transaction block?

yea that would be a problem, but there is no need to have "network police". The problem that was intended to solve could be solved by having miners hash transaction blocks as well as transaction blocks hashing mining blocks. then changes to the blockchain would require the re computation of the proof of work chain.

the problem that causes this idea to be broken is that transaction block creators could include only their own keys in the block inorder to increase their chances of winning the right to mint new blocks in the future.

i have an idea about how to deal with this, but it starts to lose its elegance at that point. it might be a good idea but i dont think anyone would understand my explanation a that point.

What if someone decides to spam everybody sending a lot of tx blocks? Miners would have to include hundreds of proof of deception? Or only two?

hmm you are right. thats a really clever idea. Instead of having a network where its (basically) imposable to break the rules (like bitcoin) you could have a network with "police" who are rewarded if they catch that sort of activity and can prove it in an easily verifiable way by just recording the use of two signatures from the same public key.


that is definitely something to think about. partially it would be helped by the fact that this currency wouldn't have a steady rate of issuance forever. Perhaps this could be pushed further by having the reverse of how bitcoin issues currency. i.e. 50 early on, then 75 later, and finally 100 after a few years and it would stay at 100 forever.

though i dont think its a bad idea to idea allow transactions without fees to compete for transaction block authoring privilege because that would never happen. people would bid that space up to requiring a fee from day 1. Literally less than 24 hours after release free transactions would be a distant memory.

anyway thanks again etlase2. you have really been such a big help here. time to go meditate some more.

It's still a valid starting point for an idea. And on the contrary to AnonyMint's arguments, I agree it is a significant step forward in block chain decentralization. However, if the initial distribution of currency is top-heavy, big holders could leverage themselves into a position that might be hard to dethrone, especially if they keep receiving their own tx fees back. But with a well-distributed currency, I think your point that the benefits will not outweigh the costs definitely holds water. Definitely no free tx allowed though, or at least free tx are not included in the lottery.


This is actually an easy problem to solve. Miners would only be including a hash of a tx block and a signature anyway, all they would have to do is include the second hash and signature as proof of deception.

Huh?

The more BTC you have, the more you can split it into different addresses.


Perhaps I misunderstand your design, but I thought the person with the address closest to the hash, is chosen to select which transactions go in the next block?

If so, then there is an incentive to fill up the prior blocks with transactions which fund the maximum possible quantity of addresses with small balances.

No matter what threshold you set by the tx fee, the person with the most BTC can create the most such transactions and thus addresses.



You are still employing proof-of-work, you have not eliminated ASICs.


I don't see that result from your design.


How so? Think it out. You are requiring every address holder to run a full client. Think out how you will verify account balances.

The separate proof-chain already exists in a very well developed design you can search "mini-block chain".


How so, I didn't see that in your design.


Huh? Where is the coin support adjusting to the M x V = P x Q theory of money?

Or you mean the coin supply M is constant? So is Bitcoin effectively constant after 2040. But that has nothing to do with inflation and deflation. You can read all the posts on my name if you want to come up speed. I don't have time repeat all that again.


I can't see any of that in your design. As far as I can see, you have no specified a design in sufficient detail to justify such claims.


Hand waving. See what I wrote above.

Apologies if I forget to come back here again. You can PM me if you have something important for me to read. Good luck.

This idea was not part of the original specs so i have to admit i haven't really thought through everything here. I suppose what would happen is the runner up would go ahead and prepare the block just incase and if enough time passed that the network became suspicious of whether the first place winner was active, then they would become receptive to the block published by the runner up. If the runner up tried to publish their block right away it would not propagate because no one would be interested in it.

i see your point

yes this is probably right and it makes me sad. though if there was an elegant solution than this than this idea could offer great advantages. I'm going to keep thinking on it.

Unfortunately this would be REALLY hard to get distributed consensus on since their failed blocks would not be part of the blockchain.

Thankyou for this thoughtful post. its impressive how well you understand what im proposing. if i was in your position i dont think i would understand me as well as you understand me.

hmmm... im still pondering this whole thing.. but... umm hmmmm.,.. ill get back to you.

This can't really work, though. When do the runners-up decide to create a tx block? A lot of timing would be involved in a notoriously, unreliably timed system. Bandwidth isn't free, and sending tx hashes still requires a not insignificant amount of it as well as searching for the transactions in memory or on disk. So you can't just have everybody sending a boatload of tx blocks. I don't think there is an elegant solution to avoiding the delays of people not creating tx blocks. Perhaps being selected for the lottery is an option that can be set to true/false with each tx, that way those on low-bandwidth or rarely connected connections can opt out.

Also, you shouldn't refer to creating tx blocks as minting. Minting implies creating new currency when this is receiving tx fees as payment only.


I don't follow what you're saying here. You do need to provide protection against the winner creating multiple blocks though to eliminate the DoS attack of data overhead described above as well as easy double spend opportunities. Require 100 blocks or whatever before they get their tx fees, and if a miner catches another tx block from the same person, those tx fees should be destroyed or distributed to other tx blocks.

I've been thinking and thinking and thinking and the ONLY solution i can come up with is something like this.

If the winner of the randomly chosen key is not available than the runner up mints an insurance block, if the runner up is not available than 3rd place mints an insurance block ect... The next person in line must chose a block to build ontop of. If he publishes multiple transaction blocks the one that will be accepted as valid is the one thats key is furthest from matching its corresponding mining block. Inorder to incent him not to pick the one with the key that is closest to its hash, he would receive a bonus of newly issued currency. the closer the key of the block that he builds ontop of is to the hash of its corresponding mining block, the higher his bonus reward.

I know that was confusing as all hell. Now that i figured it out i think the next step is to figure out how to explain it better. It should be noted that this creates a situation where its possible to do what is functionally a 51% attack with less than 51% of the keys because the author of the block could always chose to sacrifice his bonus in exchange for deciding to mint ontop of one of his own keys. If my mathematical intuition is not wrong, an attacker would need 26% of the network to do what we think of traditionally as a 51% attack.

Still with that digression out of the way, since mining blocks would be SO tiny, block times could be REALLY like potentially <30 seconds per block fast, and the network would still tend towards unprecedented levels of decentralization so it may not be a devastating blow against the crypto. Then again maybe it is.

anyway lots more thinking to do. thanks for bringing up a really good point.

i wish i knew how to describe an idea for a new crypto succinctly.

As a note i should mention that the proposal may be broken. Im not sure yet but there may be a fatal flaw.

yes but only for the poor. there would be pressure against dust as well since block space would be limited and would need to be bid for and dusty transactions would be more expensive to process.

Kind of. The extra space that was left over and not used for legitimate transactions would all be consumed by prospectors only so long as the supply of space in the blockchain exceeded the demand for legitimate transactions. If that demand ever exceeded the supply than the prospectors would not find it profitable.


no. goods in a market economy tend not to go to the person with the greatest means, but rather they tend to go to the person who values them most. A rich person who wanted to flood with transactions just to mint more blocks would be outbid by a poor person who wanted to use that space for a legitimate transaction in addition to the advantage of potentially being able to mint a block. This would create unprecedented levels of decentralization.

Granted a rich person could do it just to be a jerk. but if he was self interested and profit seeking than he would not find it worth while to outbid people who wanted to use that space for legitimate transactions.

Wouldn't there be an incentive to generate more dust, so you have more addresses?

Thus it would degenerate into a Tragedy of the Commons with a race to who can generate more 1 satoshi addresses (or whatever BTC threshold you set).

How do you motivate the address holder to respond timely?

What real problems does it solve? I can't think of any.

I had this idea (of selecting based on nearest address) and dismissed it several months ago for the reason that we can't limit the number of addresses generated. If you require a threshold balance, then this is proof-of-stake combined with proof-of-work to select order. Those with more stake will be chosen more frequently, i.e. those with the most money gain the most rewards. That might be an interesting way to combine the two, but you need to work out the incentives so that the address chosen will respond and not withhold.

But again, what problem does it solve?

Reserved

done. it still need more work and reorganization but i have to think really hard about sangamans comments first.