Topic: [ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency - page 4832. (Read 9723768 times)

Quote from: luigi1111 on July 10, 2014, 11:18:35 AM

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

same way some guy satoshi decided 6 confirmations was good enough to prevent double spendings.
someone just needs to do some maths and makes an executive decision based on that.

But Satoshi doesn't get to determine that. Whoever is receiving the coins can determine any number of confirms they please to. Bitpay takes 0 confirms for example. (at least in my experience using them; not sure what they have going on behind the scenes)

stilgars

member

Activity: 97

Merit: 10

Quote from: stilgars on July 10, 2014, 11:23:01 AM

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

same way some guy satoshi decided 6 confirmations was good enough to prevent double spendings.
someone just needs to do some maths and makes an executive decision based on that.

fernando

hero member

Activity: 560

Merit: 500

Quote from: ?? on ??

I am Mr Ricardo big holder and a person prosperous in giving away. I am helping communities here and there to stand on their ground. My wealth carefully gathered and multiplied to do giveways for each person, who are the honest adopter of his intentions and making productive activity. I will bring to your community years of experience in various branches of science and technologies, i have a smooths collaboration with genuine and high-rated persons behind me. Soon i will disclose the main goal i am here for.

----
Mr Ricardo

This guy is spamming all forums and irc. Beware

Don't be so hard, he probably has a few million usd trapped in Nigeria and needs some help to get them out.

luigi1111

legendary

Activity: 1105

Merit: 1000

Quote from: luigi1111 on July 10, 2014, 11:18:35 AM

Quote from: illodin on July 10, 2014, 11:28:50 AM

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

so you basically infer that the main feature of darkcoin, darksend/darksend+, could not provide good enough anonymity at the core level to discourage a normal attacker (not the N*A) to identify the two parties if he really wants to?

That is not my intention, no.

Edit: I'm not trying to come at this from my "pedestal" as if I have all the answers; sorry if I'm coming off that way. Rather, I'm trying to pose valid ideas and questions.

Quote from: stilgars on July 10, 2014, 11:23:01 AM

so you basically infer that the main feature of darkcoin, darksend/darksend+, could not provide good enough anonymity at the core level to discourage a normal attacker (not the N*A) to identify the two parties if he really wants to?

Depends on what is good enough, and what the "core level" is ultimately decided to be.

This is really what it boils down to. I further submit the question: is it our responsibility to decide what is "good enough"? << not rhetorical

dark-sailor

sr. member

Activity: 275

Merit: 250

Hi all

I updated my masternode to 10.11.6 yesterday around 6 oclock and I was getting

2014-07-10 16:24:19 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:19 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.79.17.203:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:19 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:19 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:24 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:24 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:24 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:24 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:25 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:25 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:25 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:27 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:27 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:27 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:46 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:46 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry

So I thought I would leave it for 24 hours and Its still doing the same thing. I am showing all green on https://elbzo.net/masternodes.html my ip is 108.61.196.103 all looks fine. Is this normal Huh

georgem

legendary

Activity: 1484

Merit: 1007

spreadcoin.info

Thanks to uzer23 and camosoul for donating yesterday.

illodin

hero member

Activity: 966

Merit: 1003

Quote from: stilgars on July 10, 2014, 11:23:01 AM

so you basically infer that the main feature of darkcoin, darksend/darksend+, could not provide good enough anonymity at the core level to discourage a normal attacker (not the N*A) to identify the two parties if he really wants to?

Depends on what is good enough, and what the "core level" is ultimately decided to be.

stilgars

member

Activity: 97

Merit: 10

Quote from: luigi1111 on July 10, 2014, 11:18:35 AM

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

so you basically infer that the main feature of darkcoin, darksend/darksend+, could not provide good enough anonymity at the core level to discourage a normal attacker (not the N*A) to identify the two parties if he really wants to?

luigi1111

legendary

Activity: 1105

Merit: 1000

Quote from: crackfoo on July 08, 2014, 04:11:18 PM

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

crackfoo

legendary

Activity: 3570

Merit: 1126

Earn your own DRK coins by mining at the multipool. Not only that, you can earn DRK using your old ASIC hardware on SHA256 and SCRYPT coins!

DarkCoin by xpool - DRK Multipool

http://www.xpool.ca

PROP reward system

DRK Payouts

Scrypt & SHA256 & X11 Algo's

DDoS Protected

High Performance Backend

Simple setup and usage

0% Fees while in BETA

To mine:

http://www.xpool.ca/get_started

How does it work?

xpool offers 3 different sets of coins to mine. SHA256, Scrypt and X11. Each algorithm runs on a shift. Currently there is no set interval as there needs to be enough found and confirmed blocks to make trading worthwhile on the exchanges. We don't want to finish a shift only to find out, the exchanges are going to eat up the payout in fees or limit the withdraw with a large minimum. The confirmed coins are traded throughout the duration of the shift automatically to maximize the profits from exchanging them into DRK. Once enough confirmed blocked are accumulated, the shift is moved into "Trading" status while all the exchanged coins are calculated into DRK and then queued for payment. Once all the coins are confirmed as successfully traded and exchanged, the DRK payments are sent.

As the pool picks up more hashing speed and sufficient DRK can be picked up from the exchanges, the shifts will be set to a schedule and payouts more frequent and less worry about the exchanges. This is a growing phase so the more hash support the better.
If a DRK block is found, there's no exchanging or loss of fees as it can simply be moved into the X11 payout queue.

The advantage of the pool is that you can utilize your older ASIC equipment to earn you the more desired DarkCoin.

Cheers and Happy Hashing!

Donations welcome!

!

8.5011 DRK sent out for the last scrypt shift!

Cheers!

ddink7

legendary

Activity: 1120

Merit: 1000

Quote

{SNIP}
A medium of exchange. I think we all know how easy is to copy code when it is open source and most would agree that this project won't be successful if it the DrakSend(+) source code doesn't become availble. In this case it could be copied and the lack of anonymity fees being touted as a feature of another coin.

No offense intended, but the "clone coin" argument is the most spurious one out there. No clone has ever, ever, EVER come even remotely close to rivaling the "original" with the possible exception of some of the Cryptonote copies. Network effects are simply too strong to overcome without actual innovation. Just look at all the NXT clones!

In that case why does Darksend source need to be closed for the moment? Because we don't want a competitor reverse engineering it and stealing our features before we've gained an insurmountable lead.

GhostPlayer

legendary

Activity: 1092

Merit: 1000

Quote from: thunderdrum on July 10, 2014, 10:41:47 AM

Quote from: GhostPlayer on July 10, 2014, 07:12:08 AM

Quote from: salmion on July 10, 2014, 07:10:04 AM

Quote from: cryptworld on July 10, 2014, 07:01:09 AM

Holding some darks,so sad price is still low, I think it is undervalued

It's totally undervalued.

Need RC4 to come out without the 10 dark limit so we can start hitting real world applications.

+1

Bingo!

Guys, would you please just let me get more cheap DRK? Grin

I would, if I had more to invest !! Grin

Unfortunately I don't, so hoping for the price launch sooner than later.
In any case, community wise,

+1

stilgars

member

Activity: 97

Merit: 10

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

AlexGR

legendary

Activity: 1708

Merit: 1049

Quote from: novaboy2k on June 16, 2014, 07:10:34 AM

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

novaboy2k

sr. member

Activity: 294

Merit: 250

Bitcoin Report #3 | Darkcoin, Anonymity and fungibility

DefunctEconomics Darkcoin

Edit: New URL

New Url

luigi1111

legendary

Activity: 1105

Merit: 1000

Quote from: eltito on July 10, 2014, 10:28:27 AM

Two things to take away from that exchange:

Extra fees for better features is a bad idea. It's not going to happen.

Should it become necessary for the safety of the network, we could look at ways to discourage malicious, intentional bloating of the blockchain by making it costly to do so.

Everything else was just people thinking out loud.

I don't really see it this way.

If we were literally talking about charging XX for doing extra mixing, that's silly, and I'm 100% against it. It doesn't even make sense.

To me, normal TX fees is what makes sense. You want extra anonymity:
Extra anonymity/privacy/security/whatever = extra mixing = extra transactions = extra fees (20% of which would go to MN)

Edit: to clarify, mixing is *free*. You can't then charge for multiple mixings when one is free. Doing multiple rounds of mixing absolutely improves anonymity, as more people coins get involved and the probabilities go down.

stilgars

member

Activity: 97

Merit: 10