3. No one can steal your wallet signature in this method. It is TIED to your karmawallet. For example if you use MY WALLET SIGNATURE and send some coin it does not affect anything. Because the WALLET and the SIGNATURE should prove one and the other.
Of course it is tied to the Karma wallet... But it is not tied in any way to the Bitcoin address!
Lets say that an attacker got access to the signature tied to a given Karma address of someone that sent coins to Karmashares LLC.
As you probably know emails are not that hard to snoop... And the form sends an email to someone from Karmashares LLC right?
An attacker could copy a signature he got from snooping the emails sent to Karmashares LLC, put it in the form (
http://karmacoin.me/contact? ) with the correspondent Karma address of the shares holder (not the atacker Karmacoin address!) and request a change of the bitcoin address associated with the shares (that are nos his) to one of his own bitcoin addresses.
This way the atacker/hacker would be paid the dividends of Karmashares LLC insted of the legit owner of the shares.
The signature of a blank message is in itself proof that it was signed by the owner of the wallet.
But if the message it was generated with does not contain the BTC address of the owner then I see a big security flaw.
MY SOLUTION:So I suggest that you ask the shareholders to sign the message, character by character (just do copy-paste), that they put on the form (
http://karmacoin.me/contact?).
With the signature pasted in a different text box; because it is obviously not possible to sign a message containing the signature itself.
I'm just trying to help.
A security flaw like the one I pointed could discredit Karmashares LLC if taken advantage off... And be sure it will if it is not solved.