Kudos on the innovative concept of BitAsset (#5 below), as this is the first time I've seen that idea. The P2P exchange in #4 was already proposed by others, yet this is the first time I've seen it proposed as a way to decentralized the same protocol for an altcoin (obvious, but that point didn't register in my mind until now).
1. I have a superior name for your coin (and the domain names too). Forget "Bit" that is so copycat and lost in a sea of similar name permutations. I've demonstrated marketing skills in the past with 335,000 web sites published with my
Cool Page as verified by AltaVista circa 2001. Brandable names express meaning and are dissimilar from everything already in use, e.g. when I "Google", I am "goggling". When I "Yahoo!", I am "hurrah! I found it on the web".
2. Why C++ yuk!? If you used Scala (3 times less verbose than Java), and stub in C for performance only where needed (through the JNI), then I
might contribute coding (maybe even for free) instead of creating my own altcoin. No way I am going back to 1990s with C++. Been there, done that. Hey that was 15 years ago when I wrote Cool Page in C++!
3. The coindesk article claims, "BitShares aren’t designed to be spent with merchants in the same way that bitcoins are". Where in the whitepaper does it say that BitShares can't be sent to another keyname? Even if that was the intention, it is trivial to create a new BitAsset named BitSharesAsset which is the value of 1 BitShares. Thus BitShares is a new currency unit, so this is an altcoin.
4. Your whitepaper says that BitShares may have multiple chains. Thus BitShares from different chains would have different values and are only fungible by using the cross-chain transaction, i.e. P2P exchange. Thus I think they should also have different names, e.g. BitShare-Chain___.
5. BitAsset isn't concisely summarized in the whitepaper. Let me take a stab at it, while simultaneously improving the design of it. A BitAsset is designated to mirror the percentage price moves (not the exact same price) of some real world asset. The designation of which asset is made by the creator of a BitAsset, who also names it if it hadn't already been created by others. More copies of a named BitAsset, e.g. BitUSD, can be created in this same way, and the same name is reused. The creator either wants to take a long position on the BitAsset so makes a bid offer, or wants to take a short position on the BidAsset so makes an ask offer. The offer is made in units of BitShares. When a counter party makes a matching ask or bid respectively, the BitAsset is created and the BitShares from both parties are deposited into the blockchain, thus the collateral is initially 2x the market value of the BitAsset. As new copies of that named BitAsset are created, the market value fluctuates according the settlement of bid/ask by miners as described in the whitepaper. If the market value increases 50% above the short position's deposited collateral, the miner issues a margin call against the short. Whereas, if the market value decreases 50% below the long position's deposited collateral, the miner issues a margin call against the long. The BitAsset is retired at the cost of
abs(market value - collateral) and the excess collateral is returned to the short or long respectively. These threshold's appear to be an arbitrary design decision? The short and long owners can independently (or each other) deposit extra collateral at any time to avoid a margin call.
6. I assume that long and short owners can sell their position at any time thus transferring it to another keyname (i.e. anonymous entity)?
7. Can the short and long enter an algorithmic contract to exit the position at a preset expiration date?
8. What is the redeemable concept? Do you mean to say the long or short can close their position at any time without permission of the counter-party? How can that be fair?
9. In the margin call, the BitAsset is destroyed, so what happens to the collateral of the counter-party which did not receive a margin call? If it goes to them, why are they forced to redeem their BitAsset prematurely? Wouldn't a better design be let the BitAsset remain for the counter-party? Also why does the redeemed money go to the dividend pool (for that BitAsset or all BitShares?) and not to counter-party, so that the counter-party gets some leverage?
10. There is the risk that the market value moves to more than 100% of one-side of the collateral before than the miner can issue the margin call. There is no default here, it is just the redeemed money is not as great as it should be. If the redeemed money was going to the counter-party instead of the dividend pool, then the counter-party would lose some real-time time-preference, but this isn't designed to a be a real-time trading system any way.
11. It is presumed that the market will try to maintain the market value of the BitAsset proportional to the price changes in its designated asset. I have some doubt in this concept. Has it ever been tested before? Economics 101 says price is determined where the
marginal supply and demand curves meet. Ignoring the proposed dividends relative to interest or leasing rates of designated assets, and relative value of holding an asset proxy in a decentralized digital store versus holding the real asset, the supply is the distribution of people who think the price will go down, relative to the premium and time-preference offered. The demand is the distribution of people who think the price will go up, relative to the premium and time-preference offered. Thus if you want the BitAsset to track the designated asset, then the expiration period should be relatively short, so that the secular price trend of that asset is not biasing the supply and demand and instead you have fairly balanced expectations for relative exchange (BitShares <-> designated asset) price moves in either direction over the short-term. I am not confident that I have captured all the math that would apply. Should we be looking at models of options, e.g.
Black-Scholes?
12. Kudos on determining market price from the bid/ask that don't settle (due to positive bid/ask spread), i.e. the marginal supply and demand, as that is correct economic theory of price. And also because as you say the transactions that do settle (due to zero or negative bid/ask spread) could be transactions to self if also control the miner with winning PoW block (although they incur a transaction fee, and probably also capital gains tax if the system isn't perfectly anonymous).
But couldn't a miner also exclude bid and asks, thus manipulating the market price? This appears to be a major flaw in the design.. I don't have idea for a solution yet.
13. Why canceling bid/ask takes 24 hours when blockchain becomes secure after roughly 6 blocks, e.g. 60 minutes?
14. Dividends allow idle capital to not invest in mining, we want to maximally secure the blockchain.
...to be continued, I have more analysis and thoughts to share on this...
P.S.
I am age 48, math, engineering, computer science, entrepreneur, and
deep conceptual thinker.