Sounds fine, then. I guess I misunderstood it before. I sometimes think, I should just shut up and let you work
I could make more shiny pictures instead…
I'm not sure about the fixed amount of the bounty deposit. I think, letting the work author set it is fine? Otherwise, I'd go with a percentual amount of the bounty to be earned.
Naah!
Without all these productive discussions with you, we would still have the old flawed system.
Not even sure if the current one isn't flawed, so further discussions are appreciated.
I may have some experience coding, but my 2 eyes cannot see everything. That's why we need your 2 eyes (and any other spare eyes) as well.
Aww, you flatter me, sir
I think we have to come to terms with the fact, that there is no such thing as a system that isn't flawed. All we can do is to fix as much of the flaws up front as possible.
I like the approach I read in some Monero thread, about having mandatory hardforks at fixed points in time. I think the best we can do is keep the system as changeable as possible and roll with the punches. There is only so much you can find out on the testnet; in the end, you'll need guys with malicious intent to find abusive potential.
In the very, very, very worst case, job authors could either create or download a whitelist of approved miners (a blacklist wouldn't work for obvious reasons), or otherwise implement a reputation system, which prioritises approved miners or something like that. I'd call it plan z, but I think it would still be better than having no Elastic at all.
Don't take the following thoughts too serious, but I find them interesting nevertheless: If you spin the whitelist idea even further, you could create a licence for miners: to be able to mine jobs, you have to pay a rather hefty one time fee to register as a miner. You, as a miner, are known on the system and can be blocked, not by the system as a whole, but by job authors.
"plan Z" holds abusive potential of its own, since things like black- or whitelists run the risk of being effectively centralized due to their nature.
Another step further would be something like the DPoS system Lisk uses, where the network as a whole votes on delegates. This idea sounds interesting, actually, so let's go down this road for a second: instead of the 101 delegates, you'd have an open number of miners. To be allowed to mine on the network, you'd need votes by a considerable amount of XEL holders, let's say, for the sake of having a number, 1% of all tokens. To get people to vote for you, you can share earnings with them(this would happen anyway, so it could just be implemented from the beginning. That way, at least nobody gets screwed over.). Since the more computing power you have, the more you earn, more people will vote for you, so the more computing power, the more reliably you get voted in.
What this does on the other hand, is, that miners who try to abuse the network are either voted out by XEL holders, since they endanger the value of their holdings, or they need to buy enough XEL to vote themselves in, but the amount needed is probably multitudes bigger than what you'd need to make some fake deposits.
Another difference to Lisk would be that instead of checking your votes every block(or every few blocks, I don't remember), once you have 1%, you are good to go for at least a few days, maybe even a few weeks. Otherwise, you'd lose a lot of miners due to the insecurity.
Obviously, these ideas would mean, that regular joe can't easily rent out his idle computing power when he is not killing goblins or whatever.
Btw., there are too few people writing in here. If I am able to voice my shitty opinion, everybody else can, too. And where is Lannister, we need to talk about this horrific first post
I can wait, i am a patient person. But very curious about the date. 
