Great, I switched branches and used the coin control dialog once without issue. It is
slick, nice job.
In case anyone else created transferred their savings to Armory in one massive transaction like I did, and now are bothered that their savings is all tainted (if you spend 1 BTC to someone, they can pretty easily see how much you have in your savings), here's the script I used. It asks how much you want to anonymize, and the min and max amount you would want in each address. It creates addresses in your selected wallet, uses blockchain.info's API to create an anonymous forwarding address, and selects a random amount between the min and max. It builds a transaction with as many outputs as needed to hit the total, and then saves it to a file. This can then be imported into Armory, inspected, signed, and broadcast.
http://pastebin.com/XLT5FgdBCool script. I wasn't aware of blockchain.info's service. How does it work exactly? You give them an address you want the money to end up at, and they give you an address to which you can send coins and they will eventually be forwarded there? How long does it take?
For anyone wondering, I just went through the script and it looks like a variant/mod of the extras/cli_sign_script.py that I added to the project recently. It uses the Armory libraries exactly as they are installed/compiled, to access your wallets, find your coins, get forwarding/anonymizer addresses from blockchain.info, and then constructs an unsigned transaction for it. I can't vouch for whether it works, but it very much looks like how I would've written it
(but I didn't write it)
So in talking with some users about the new wallet format, an idea came up: what about encrypting the watching-only wallets? And giving the option to encrypt even the public data in an encrypted wallet? Perhaps the wallet is on a laptop and the laptop gets stolen. The person can't get your $100k in BTC savings, but they now have your identity and know you have $100k in BTC savings...
I'm thinking that it could be implemented by encrypting, basically all the fields of the wallet, the same way as the private keys are encrypted. When Armory opens, it will request the passphrase for the outer encryption, and give that key a lock-timeout of inf. So the wallet will be accessible as long as Armory is open, but if it is closed (rebooted), the wallet will be inaccessible. I'd prefer the outer encryption be a different key/passphrase than the one protecting the private keys, but I don't know if that would just be a P.I.T.A for the users (they can decide for themselves, I guess). Really what this does it makes sure your unencrypted wallet information is only ever stored in RAM... it's only ever written to disk encrypted.
I think I like the idea, I just don't know how I want it implemented... perhaps a single password for all your wallets, rather than per-wallet? That way, if you have 10 different wallets, you won't have to type in 10 passwords everytime you start Armory...
Glad you like the coin-control
I'm quite happy with the way it turned out! K1773R: have you tried it yet? Does it satisfy your use case? Or are the other features you were looking for in "coin control"?