Peter Todd discusses here a scheme where miners may be bribed into rejecting txs that don't include identity information:
https://petertodd.org/2016/mit-chainanchor-bribing-miners-to-regulate-bitcoin
Topic: Attached Transactions - Alternative to Replace By Fee (RBF) - Anti Censorship (Read 2657 times)
April 21, 2016, 06:14:21 AM
March 01, 2016, 08:16:02 PM
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/48eg6y/alex_petrov_of_bitfury_highfee_spam/d0izum5
Quote
It's probably also possible to just identify this spammer's transactions and block them directly.
February 26, 2016, 08:15:20 PM
> You don't understand. This is a non problem and if it were a problem, your solution doesn't work.
It must be so simple you can't explain it.
It must be so simple you can't explain it.
February 26, 2016, 04:47:43 AM
> What exactly does the 'word' being spread about censorship actually accomplish? Since the majority of hashing power are colluding, they can do whatever they want, and no amount of social engineering will help that.
Without this they can cherry-pick individual transactions to not send, meaning the cost to censor a tx is what you are willing to pay in fees as one person. If you pay 0.1 BTC in fees the miner may have stronger interests than that amount to keep censoring the tx. If you can attach the txs together the cost of censoring one tx becomes amplified by each tx, so instead of losing 0.1 BTC over time miners would be choosing to lose the sum of all attached fees from txs that touch the chain of attachment.
You don't understand. This is a non problem and if it were a problem, your solution doesn't work.
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0125.mediawiki
The only thing to quibble with I saw was the lack of ability to use the sequenceid to encode information without enabling RBF as the entire bitspace (other than -2 and -1) activate RBF. But encoding stuff into sequenceid is probably a bad idea anyway.
I have no idea how this got turned into "anybody can cancel payments"
Anybody making such claims, can you explain how somebody can cancel a payment I send with sequenceid of 0xffffffff?
Or how anybody can undo a micropayment with a sequenceid and undo a payment?
James
February 26, 2016, 04:23:07 AM
> What exactly does the 'word' being spread about censorship actually accomplish? Since the majority of hashing power are colluding, they can do whatever they want, and no amount of social engineering will help that.
Without this they can cherry-pick individual transactions to not send, meaning the cost to censor a tx is what you are willing to pay in fees as one person. If you pay 0.1 BTC in fees the miner may have stronger interests than that amount to keep censoring the tx. If you can attach the txs together the cost of censoring one tx becomes amplified by each tx, so instead of losing 0.1 BTC over time miners would be choosing to lose the sum of all attached fees from txs that touch the chain of attachment.
You don't understand. This is a non problem and if it were a problem, your solution doesn't work.
February 25, 2016, 09:11:19 PM
> Op, the problem is that if people's transactions could be made dependent on another person, they are not acting to their own interests. Buy linking their transactions to the censored one, their own transactions will also not confirm and that is detrimental to their own interests.
If the tx is invalid or miners are unable to accept it then over time they will fall out of the mempool willingly.
EDIT: If your talking about a reverse attack of some kind then we are ultimately talking about *valid* transactions miners chose not to process, which is censorship.
If the tx is invalid or miners are unable to accept it then over time they will fall out of the mempool willingly.
EDIT: If your talking about a reverse attack of some kind then we are ultimately talking about *valid* transactions miners chose not to process, which is censorship.
February 25, 2016, 09:09:23 PM
> What exactly does the 'word' being spread about censorship actually accomplish? Since the majority of hashing power are colluding, they can do whatever they want, and no amount of social engineering will help that.
Without this they can cherry-pick individual transactions to not send, meaning the cost to censor a tx is what you are willing to pay in fees as one person. If you pay 0.1 BTC in fees the miner may have stronger interests than that amount to keep censoring the tx. If you can attach the txs together the cost of censoring one tx becomes amplified by each tx, so instead of losing 0.1 BTC over time miners would be choosing to lose the sum of all attached fees from txs that touch the chain of attachment.
February 25, 2016, 11:55:13 AM
The solution is an emergency hard fork to another mining algorithm which renders so all of the miners' equipment useless. This has been discussed before and it is a solution if miners were to be colluding to the detriment of bitcoin.
I view that as a total failure of the currency, IMO.
Selling? I'm buying.
February 25, 2016, 09:33:50 AM
The solution is an emergency hard fork to another mining algorithm which renders so all of the miners' equipment useless. This has been discussed before and it is a solution if miners were to be colluding to the detriment of bitcoin.
I view that as a total failure of the currency, IMO.
February 25, 2016, 09:30:02 AM
I suppose it is more of the threat of a hard fork which cuts out the miner's is what would persuade them to not abuse their power.
I've seen no evidence of miners "abusing their power" - if anything the miners (at least pools) have tried their hardest to not get involved with the politics and just support the future of Bitcoin (which makes sense for them economically).
February 25, 2016, 09:25:16 AM
I suppose it is more of the threat of a hard fork which cuts out the miner's is what would persuade them to not abuse their power.
I've seen no evidence of miners "abusing their power" - if anything the miners (at least pools) have tried their hardest to not get involved with the politics and just support the future of Bitcoin (which makes sense for them economically).
It is the exchanges (and mostly just American ones) and some of the devs (ex-core) that have been the cause of all the troubles so far (and in the case of devs that seems to be mostly about ego rather than anything else).
February 25, 2016, 09:23:47 AM
The solution is an emergency hard fork to another mining algorithm which renders so all of the miners' equipment useless. This has been discussed before and it is a solution if miners were to be colluding to the detriment of bitcoin.
I think that is not really going to be such an easy thing.
Miners need to turn BTC into fiat in order to do their business (i.e. pay for their electricity and other costs) - but exchanges need the miners to have a steady source of people wanting to exchange.
If devs wanted to "cut out the miners" then exchanges would be screwed for income in the short-term at least (as many of them are partnered with mining pools) so I can't see the exchanges actually likely to agree with such a change.
February 25, 2016, 09:19:08 AM
The solution is an emergency hard fork to another mining algorithm which renders so all of the miners' equipment useless. This has been discussed before and it is a solution if miners were to be colluding to the detriment of bitcoin.
I think that is not really going to be such an easy thing.
Miners need to turn BTC into fiat in order to do their business (i.e. pay for their electricity and other costs) - but exchanges need the miners to have a steady source of people wanting to exchange.
If devs wanted to "cut out the miners" then exchanges would be screwed for income in the short-term at least (as many of them are partnered with mining pools) so I can't see the exchanges actually likely to agree with such a change.
Remember it is the mining pools that actually control the consensus (as those who dislike China are finding out much to their chagrin).
February 25, 2016, 09:14:01 AM
Miners en-masse currently can decide to block transactions. With something like an attachment process this would become impossible as the word was spread about a tx being censored.
I'll just keep bumping this thread every week or so.
I'll just keep bumping this thread every week or so.
They can but they don't en-mass, because if they did this means that bitcoin itself has failed, since we then have a collusion of majority hashing power.
For the sake of argument, let's say you're right and that is occurring now. What exactly does the 'word' being spread about censorship actually accomplish? Since the majority of hashing power are colluding, they can do whatever they want, and no amount of social engineering will help that.
Op, the problem is that if people's transactions could be made dependent on another person, they are not acting to their own interests. Buy linking their transactions to the censored one, their own transactions will also not confirm and that is detrimental to their own interests.
February 25, 2016, 09:03:36 AM
Miners en-masse currently can decide to block transactions. With something like an attachment process this would become impossible as the word was spread about a tx being censored.
I'll just keep bumping this thread every week or so.
I'll just keep bumping this thread every week or so.
They can but they don't en-mass, because if they did this means that bitcoin itself has failed, since we then have a collusion of majority hashing power.
For the sake of argument, let's say you're right and that is occurring now. What exactly does the 'word' being spread about censorship actually accomplish? Since the majority of hashing power are colluding, they can do whatever they want, and no amount of social engineering will help that.
February 25, 2016, 06:54:47 AM
> For censorship to be a real concern, such a transaction would never make it into the blockchain
I believe non-miners run mempools, is this correct?
> just because a minority of hashing power decides to censor your transaction doesn't mean the entire network will
Miners en-masse currently can decide to block transactions. With something like an attachment process this would become impossible as the word was spread about a tx being censored.
I'll just keep bumping this thread every week or so.
I believe non-miners run mempools, is this correct?
> just because a minority of hashing power decides to censor your transaction doesn't mean the entire network will
Miners en-masse currently can decide to block transactions. With something like an attachment process this would become impossible as the word was spread about a tx being censored.
I'll just keep bumping this thread every week or so.
February 22, 2016, 05:48:23 AM
> Choosing to publish zero transactions is not rational behaviour
Currently happens multiple times per day. Check the blockchain an empty block is published every once in a while (Although they do this because they have poor internet)
> because a miner doing so loses out on collected fees to the next miner, the same is true of cherry picking individual transactions; even if one miner does this, the next guy has no reason to do so.
Except the cost is low. My $0.04 tx fee as a single user cannot compete with various interests of censorship. However, if my $0.04 was pooled together with other users who didnt want me to be censored it would balloon into a larger amount that would be very hard to convince all miners not to process.
Currently happens multiple times per day. Check the blockchain an empty block is published every once in a while (Although they do this because they have poor internet)
> because a miner doing so loses out on collected fees to the next miner, the same is true of cherry picking individual transactions; even if one miner does this, the next guy has no reason to do so.
Except the cost is low. My $0.04 tx fee as a single user cannot compete with various interests of censorship. However, if my $0.04 was pooled together with other users who didnt want me to be censored it would balloon into a larger amount that would be very hard to convince all miners not to process.
For censorship to be a real concern, such a transaction would never make it into the blockchain - just because a minority of hashing power decides to censor your transaction doesn't mean the entire network will; like I say, overall this is not rational behaviour for miners.
February 21, 2016, 10:57:11 PM
> This already exists. It's called CPFP (Child Pays For Parent).
This requires coordination before the txs are made.
This requires coordination before the txs are made.
The wallet can also be designed to handle it, so that the coordination is done at least in part by the wallet, based on settings which can be altered by the user. See, for example, the project referred to in my signature for some ideas there.
February 21, 2016, 09:25:33 PM
> This already exists. It's called CPFP (Child Pays For Parent).
This requires coordination before the txs are made.
This requires coordination before the txs are made.
February 21, 2016, 07:48:38 PM
If there was a system in place where you could "attach" a transaction to another in this way it could solve the problems RBF originally was supposed to solve, which is allowing you to send more to "bump" a transaction. This would be done by making another transaction with a miner fee to incentivize it to be placed into a block.
This already exists. It's called CPFP (Child Pays For Parent).
If I've received an output from an unconfirmed transaction, I can use that output as an input in a new transaction. I can then pay a much larger fee in the new transaction. The new transaction cannot be confirmed unless the previous transaction is also confirmed in the same or earlier block. As such, the new transaction can provide a larger incentive for the older transaction to be confirmed.
Then, by using CoinJoin techniques, it would be possible for many people to all get involved in the same new transaction. As such, all the fees from multiple payments could all be combined into a single transaction that depends on the earlier transaction being confirmed.
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