Thank you for those of you who provided constructive feedback. I was hoping for a calm discussion of how we can get BITBOND back on its feet and ensure that bondholders are receiving payouts. Unfortunately a majority of the posts were not helpful - a combination of rants, demands, threats. Despite this, I continue to be committed to providing options for bondholders to receive payouts.
I will contact current BITBOND bondholders directly via email with procedures for upgrading, payback/buyback options and related timelines.
Topic: BITBOND update and request for feedback (Read 3330 times)
Emphasis mine. The problem with you people, both wannabe investors and wannabe businessmen is that you have no experience whatsoever, no business training to speak of, in fact you're like Kramer. And to top it all off, you cnat raed and wouldn't know what to read if you could read in the first place.
Such is life in this weird space.
Yeah - that emboldened part is 100% applicable to mining. In fact the situation is even worse in mining - as the barrier to entry for new miners/mining companies is very low. And the fact that investors will happily let mining companies start where the manager is paid regardless of whether profit is made adds to the problem - as it means there's incentive for people to run mining companies even if they've noticed/calculated/guessed that no profit will be made on the venture as whole (their personal profit is, of course, assured).
The very last paragraph of your quote was also very relevant. There's some otherwise fairly smart people running mining companies well - the comapnies still, of course, make a loss. You'd think someone smart enough to run a business well would pick a profitable area to run one in.
ok, i got now the official answer, that my 5 bitbond bonds (about 2,2btc) are lost
shit happens
6 here.....shit happens
Little guys own the ASIC. Else pay the dividend!
If you cant make a profit with GPU mining what makes you think ASIC mining will be any different ? For the dickheads who dont get it, mining profitability will end up the same whether you have 160gh of GPU or 3tb of ASIC. The market should avoid mining companies like the plague because its now proven that large scale mining is just as barely profitable as small scale.
Unless you have all of the below -
1. Rent Free
2. Minimal Elecricity Cost
You will NEVER get your initial investment back, let alone make any profit. Show me one public listed mining company where this has happened.
You get a better return blowing your coins on satoshidice.
Unless you have all of the below -
1. Rent Free
2. Minimal Elecricity Cost
You will NEVER get your initial investment back, let alone make any profit. Show me one public listed mining company where this has happened.
You get a better return blowing your coins on satoshidice.
This Buffett quote covers it nicely:
Quote
The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)
Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.
But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company's capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes).
After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic. Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers. I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: "More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly."
For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13. Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington's basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company's capital decisions were quite rational.
Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34-on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.
This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson's horse: "A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse-not a remarkable mathematician." Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company-but not a remarkable business.
My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: "When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact." Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronicallyleaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.
Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.
But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company's capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes).
After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic. Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers. I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: "More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly."
For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13. Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington's basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company's capital decisions were quite rational.
Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34-on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.
This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson's horse: "A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse-not a remarkable mathematician." Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company-but not a remarkable business.
My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: "When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact." Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronicallyleaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.
Emphasis mine. The problem with you people, both wannabe investors and wannabe businessmen is that you have no experience whatsoever, no business training to speak of, in fact you're like Kramer. And to top it all off, you cnat raed and wouldn't know what to read if you could read in the first place.
Such is life in this weird space.
ok, i got now the official answer, that my 5 bitbond bonds (about 2,2btc) are lost
shit happens
shit happens
not lost. the buy order on cryptostocks would at least cover your 5 shares
theres a bid for 20 shares at 0.0010
ok, i got now the official answer, that my 5 bitbond bonds (about 2,2btc) are lost
shit happens
shit happens
Currently at 150000 mhash/s he should be getting about 15566.278945 USD per month without electricity.
He claims 4k USD per month for upkeep/rent/etc.
What that mean is he can currently pay about 100 000 mhash/s while still paying all expenses. Half what he has to pay.
He claims 4k USD per month for upkeep/rent/etc.
What that mean is he can currently pay about 100 000 mhash/s while still paying all expenses. Half what he has to pay.
Through several sleepless nights, we have managed to pull together enough funds and to purchase 10 x Avalon ASIC units in batch 2. This will provide about 660 GH/s. It is far from the 1.5 TH/s we hoped to have with the BFL mini rig, but the Avalon ASICs have been proven to exist and work. We should also receive them much sooner than putting in a BFL order now.
I am suggesting creating a new security on Cryptostocks called BITBOND ASIC. All current BITBOND bonds will be exchanged 1:2 for BITBOND ASIC. The new bonds will be 2.25 Mh/s each, payable at 100% PPS. Thus, if you have 10 BITBOND, which provides 20 Mh/s at 105% PPS, through the exchange you will receive 50 Mh/s at 100% PPS.
BITBOND will no longer be perpetual. Instead it will continue through 2014.
I am suggesting creating a new security on Cryptostocks called BITBOND ASIC. All current BITBOND bonds will be exchanged 1:2 for BITBOND ASIC. The new bonds will be 2.25 Mh/s each, payable at 100% PPS. Thus, if you have 10 BITBOND, which provides 20 Mh/s at 105% PPS, through the exchange you will receive 50 Mh/s at 100% PPS.
BITBOND will no longer be perpetual. Instead it will continue through 2014.
Your math is wrong:
666 GH/s = 666,000 MH/s
666,000 MH/s / 15,000 BITBONDs that haven't been paid = 44.4 MH/s per BITBOND that has not been paid.
The ASICs belong to the little guys because WE PAID FOR THEM!
didn't you know he needs 90% of the hashrate to pay electricity? and that the 90% of the hashrate won't be able to pay electric past 2014
message sent to theymos with links to this thread along with the two in the scams subforum
if he somehow has not seen all this going on till this point he will now.
if the scam tag is not given it will show what is really going on here
if he somehow has not seen all this going on till this point he will now.
if the scam tag is not given it will show what is really going on here
Through several sleepless nights, we have managed to pull together enough funds and to purchase 10 x Avalon ASIC units in batch 2. This will provide about 660 GH/s. It is far from the 1.5 TH/s we hoped to have with the BFL mini rig, but the Avalon ASICs have been proven to exist and work. We should also receive them much sooner than putting in a BFL order now.
I am suggesting creating a new security on Cryptostocks called BITBOND ASIC. All current BITBOND bonds will be exchanged 1:2 for BITBOND ASIC. The new bonds will be 2.25 Mh/s each, payable at 100% PPS. Thus, if you have 10 BITBOND, which provides 20 Mh/s at 105% PPS, through the exchange you will receive 50 Mh/s at 100% PPS.
BITBOND will no longer be perpetual. Instead it will continue through 2014.
I am suggesting creating a new security on Cryptostocks called BITBOND ASIC. All current BITBOND bonds will be exchanged 1:2 for BITBOND ASIC. The new bonds will be 2.25 Mh/s each, payable at 100% PPS. Thus, if you have 10 BITBOND, which provides 20 Mh/s at 105% PPS, through the exchange you will receive 50 Mh/s at 100% PPS.
BITBOND will no longer be perpetual. Instead it will continue through 2014.
Your math is wrong:
666 GH/s = 666,000 MH/s
666,000 MH/s / 15,000 BITBONDs that haven't been paid = 44.4 MH/s per BITBOND that has not been paid.
The ASICs belong to the little guys because WE PAID FOR THEM!
Since the 15% paid for the ASIC it seems fair they get all the dividend. If the 85% get a free ride thats fucking sad.
Through several sleepless nights, we have managed to pull together enough funds and to purchase 10 x Avalon ASIC units in batch 2. This will provide about 660 GH/s. It is far from the 1.5 TH/s we hoped to have with the BFL mini rig, but the Avalon ASICs have been proven to exist and work. We should also receive them much sooner than putting in a BFL order now.
I am suggesting creating a new security on Cryptostocks called BITBOND ASIC. All current BITBOND bonds will be exchanged 1:2 for BITBOND ASIC. The new bonds will be 2.25 Mh/s each, payable at 100% PPS. Thus, if you have 10 BITBOND, which provides 20 Mh/s at 105% PPS, through the exchange you will receive 50 Mh/s at 100% PPS.
BITBOND will no longer be perpetual. Instead it will continue through 2014.
I am suggesting creating a new security on Cryptostocks called BITBOND ASIC. All current BITBOND bonds will be exchanged 1:2 for BITBOND ASIC. The new bonds will be 2.25 Mh/s each, payable at 100% PPS. Thus, if you have 10 BITBOND, which provides 20 Mh/s at 105% PPS, through the exchange you will receive 50 Mh/s at 100% PPS.
BITBOND will no longer be perpetual. Instead it will continue through 2014.
Your math is wrong:
666 GH/s = 666,000 MH/s
666,000 MH/s / 15,000 BITBONDs that haven't been paid = 44.4 MH/s per BITBOND that has not been paid.
The ASICs belong to the little guys because WE PAID FOR THEM!
Scammer tag time.
Btw, BTC-MINING.
Btw, BTC-MINING.
If you cant make a profit with GPU mining what makes you think ASIC mining will be any different ? For the dickheads who dont get it, mining profitability will end up the same whether you have 160gh of GPU or 3tb of ASIC. The market should avoid mining companies like the plague because its now proven that large scale mining is just as barely profitable as small scale.
Unless you have all of the below -
1. Rent Free
2. Minimal Elecricity Cost
You will NEVER get your initial investment back, let alone make any profit. Show me one public listed mining company where this has happened.
You get a better return blowing your coins on satoshidice.
Unless you have all of the below -
1. Rent Free
2. Minimal Elecricity Cost
You will NEVER get your initial investment back, let alone make any profit. Show me one public listed mining company where this has happened.
You get a better return blowing your coins on satoshidice.
Most of them will never understand it.
The simple truth with mining is that all the time it's profitable more people will keep buying mining gear - until it's no longer profitable (unless you have lower than average overheads).
Take something marginally profitable (mining) then take a hefty cut from turnover (NOT PROFIT) for an operator and what's left for investors? If you said "a loss" - well done, that's the right answer. There WILL be a short period during which ASIC mining is very profitable - after that it'll be back to mining investments making a loss as usual : with those whose pre-orders were stuck in USD whilst BTC rose starting off with having lost 1/3 or more of their asset value before their hardware even arrived. The very profitable period could be over as soon as March - depending on BTC price and which ASIC manufacturers screw up (and just how badly).
$15,563.99
ok so get a job. pay what is owed and buy the needed hardware to guarantee the continued serving of what is owed (2mh / upgrade to 12.5 mh)
to the other poster. yeah we get it mining bonds were a bad idea. the worse idea was trusting members of the community. can't even collect what is owed on a losing investment because the person running it ran
ok so get a job. pay what is owed and buy the needed hardware to guarantee the continued serving of what is owed (2mh / upgrade to 12.5 mh)
to the other poster. yeah we get it mining bonds were a bad idea. the worse idea was trusting members of the community. can't even collect what is owed on a losing investment because the person running it ran
we already paid for lifetime hardware of 2mh/upgrade to 12.5mh asic
why our dividends need to go to further hardware that maybe might pay part of what we are owed (and half of the posted asic upgrade) does not add up
what you need to do to deliver makes no difference. if you have to go work at McDonald's and live in a box in their parking lot that is not our problem
deliver
What about the 2369 BTC that were loaned to you for upgrading your operation, and had a clause that it would be paid back in full?
You have not answered and I'm still waiting for you to accept me on skype as you requested.
Regards.
I explained the logic and believe the math is sound. Buying ASICs will produce the highest return for bondholders over the remainder of the bond term.
However, as I am soliciting feedback on the plan forward, let me ask a question. There are simply not enough money to repay the back payments plus future payments. In fact there is not enough for all back payments, but it is close. Through Feb 2, 2012 total back payments to the minority bondholders is 772.79 btc. At $20.14 that is $15,563.99. Would you, the minority shareholders, rather have the back payments and no future payments - essentially be bought out for the price of your back payments, or have the mining income I have outlined through 2014? I know that there are people who wanted an Avalon ASIC in batch 2 and would be willing to buy my orders.
However, as I am soliciting feedback on the plan forward, let me ask a question. There are simply not enough money to repay the back payments plus future payments. In fact there is not enough for all back payments, but it is close. Through Feb 2, 2012 total back payments to the minority bondholders is 772.79 btc. At $20.14 that is $15,563.99. Would you, the minority shareholders, rather have the back payments and no future payments - essentially be bought out for the price of your back payments, or have the mining income I have outlined through 2014? I know that there are people who wanted an Avalon ASIC in batch 2 and would be willing to buy my orders.
$15,563.99
ok so get a job. pay what is owed and buy the needed hardware to guarantee the continued serving of what is owed (2mh / upgrade to 12.5 mh)
to the other poster. yeah we get it mining bonds were a bad idea. the worse idea was trusting members of the community. can't even collect what is owed on a losing investment because the person running it ran
You get a better return blowing your coins on satoshidice.
GREAT IDEA!!!!
Sell those stupid ASICs and give me my money! I'm gonna be rich!
I predict the same outcome with ASIC mining in a few months time.
You get a better return blowing your coins on satoshidice.
GREAT IDEA!!!!
Sell those stupid ASICs and give me my money! I'm gonna be rich!
For the dickheads who dont get it
Thanx, but now is a bit late for such considerations. We are now trying to minimize damages for everyone.
If you cant make a profit with GPU mining what makes you think ASIC mining will be any different ? For the dickheads who dont get it, mining profitability will end up the same whether you have 160gh of GPU or 3tb of ASIC. The market should avoid mining companies like the plague because its now proven that large scale mining is just as barely profitable as small scale.
Unless you have all of the below -
1. Rent Free
2. Minimal Elecricity Cost
You will NEVER get your initial investment back, let alone make any profit. Show me one public listed mining company where this has happened.
You get a better return blowing your coins on satoshidice.
Unless you have all of the below -
1. Rent Free
2. Minimal Elecricity Cost
You will NEVER get your initial investment back, let alone make any profit. Show me one public listed mining company where this has happened.
You get a better return blowing your coins on satoshidice.
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