Such a system is not “decentralized”, but more like a “replicated center” system, as there is an absolute necessity to gather all the existing data in a single point to make any meaningful operation.
It's decentralized in that there is no single authority determining which transactions are valid or not.
Thus, Bitcoin is only “peer-to-peer” in the sense of the British Peerage system. Bitcoin “commoners” must appeal to their “lords” who have sufficient means to judge on validity of transactions and to seal those transactions as valid, likely for a fee.
In the British Peerage system, not just anyone can declare themselves a "lord". That's the exact opposite of Bitcoin where anyone can become a "lord" by simply downloading the entire block chain.
Thus, for perfect anonymity, both sender and receiver have to split every complex transaction among separate pairs of throw-away identities. But at this point, transactions stop being technically atomic, in addition to the fact that the system becomes quite complicated and heavyweight.
That's not an argument against anonymity. That's an argument against usability which wasn't on his list of things he was going to argue against. I would say he's moving goalposts.
Here the assymetry goes the wrong way: those “honest” nodes need to burn maximum amounts of energy continuously, round the clock, 24x365, just to keep the system afloat. Not green at all!
Just to keep the system afloat? No, that's a side effect. The reason why honest nodes are consuming resources is so they can make money, either through finding blocks and gaining a bounty or eventually, transaction fees.
Meanwhile, an attacker may only mobilize his CPU power temporarily to carry out his deeds.
What deeds? What do you think can be accomplished by controlling the network for a short amount of time? I admit that I don't know but do you? I'm not sure how fearful, uncertain or doubtful I should be without any specifics. Though, I admit "deeds" doesn't sound very pleasant.
Potentially, a CPU-rich well-connected peer may delay his newly created block till a competing block is received. Then, the delayed block may be concurrently released, thus creating a tie. A sufficiently CPU-rich attacker may perpetuate this tie indefinitely, potentially making the network to flip-flop between two branches of transaction history, with somewhat unclear consequences.
The key phrase is "sufficiently CPU-rich attacker" which eventually would be infeasible for just a DDoS by a single attacker. Any attack has to include some kind of discussion about incentives. If I can make 2 billion by spending 1 billion then it makes sense. If I can piss the world off by spending 1 billion, there might be better ways to spend that money from the perspective of an attacker. Otherwise, if no profit is being made, we can just wait for the attacker to run out of money and resume business as usual.
Here and now (Netherlands, 2011) I enjoy an instant, secure, privacy-preserving payment system which charges no fees for domestic transfers.
That's a fairly huge claim with nothing to back it up. Is he saying that the same attacker able to bring down a decentralized system somehow can't bring down a centralized one? That seems implausible especially considering that he can't even audit the code he's depending on for his alleged security. He just has to take someones word for it! Either way, a data center full of GPU miners costs orders of magnitudes higher than a few exploding yellow vans. Also, if he's not paying any fees, who is paying for the infrastructure? Most likely, he is, with his tax money or if the fees are charged to the merchants then he's paying for it through higher prices for goods and services. Few things in this world are free. Of course, "privacy-preserving" has to be false or at least qualified. Privacy from whom? If it's just from the other end of the transaction, I can do that too. I'd like privacy from everyone, including the government and all their contracting middlemen.