I was wondering if an alternative protocol in theory could make it so that they actually could change the adress afterwards without any negative side-effects, thus creating an environment where pooled mining requires trust and will be reduced to smaller circles of people.
My point is that pooled mining should be looked upon as a flaw in the protocol, not a feature. The centralization that pools create was never intended. When pooled mining was created everyone was saying "Oh cool, this reduces variance" when they should have been like "Oh fuck, this creates unnecessary centralization while adding nothing for the end users, can we patch it somehow?" I don't know if the protocol could be changed to make pooled mining heavily disincentivized, and I think you should be very conservative with protocol changes, but it's worth some thought at least.
Why in the fuck would you do this? There wouldn't be a single set of users that would voluntarily leave the block untouched, if they could claim the reward as their own.
Yes, I already noted that problem. I'll bold the relevant parts for you.
Theoretically, could this possibly work in another way? If miners could "steal" the generated block from the pool operator, I believe the ultimate consequence will be that pools will be forced to shrink to smaller trusted circles, thus providing far more decentralization. I may very well be wrong, but I don't see why the miner reward adress needs to be hashed in the block itself, as long as it's hashed in future blocks.
EDIT: Actually I do see a very serious problem here since the winning miner needs to be sure that anyone he relays the block to doesn't simply change the reward adress to its own.
But I still think the optimal solution would be to disincentivize pooled mining within the actual bitcoin protocol, I'm just not sure how. Any suggestions of how this would be possible?
So yes, that is a very serious problem, and I'm aware of it. But the thing I have been asking about all this time is wether it's possible to disincentivize pooled mining in the bitcoin protocol
without any negative side-effects like that one. I'm leaning towards it not being possible, but I'm not actually sure.
In addition, eliminating all pools would mean that everyone is solo mining again. Why is this bad? Because at the current difficulty, CPU and slow GPU miners are certainly not going to wait around for literally months at a time waiting for a block, and they will simply stop mining, instead of getting a trickle of bit-pennies every day or so. Having the additional hash power, even if it is somewhat centralized, is going a long way towards the ultimate goal of securing the network.
Millions of people play in the lottery so I'm sure they could mine for bitcoins as well even if it's somewhat of a gamble. Bitcoin unlike the lottery would actually still have a positive expected value. If we have some weak risk averse miners, others will come in and profit from the weak miners' irrational -EV move.
Also, I don't think we could possibly lose nearly enough processing power for it to matter. The profitability of mining goes through the roof long before that ever happens. Suppose we lost something extreme like 9 tenths of the current hashing power. We would still have a substantial amount, and those left in the game would gain 10x the amount of bitcoins while their costs remain constant. If a miner recieves $10 of bitcoin for $9 of expenses now, he would get $100 of bitcoin for $9 of expenses in the new scenario with less hashing power. That kind of ROI would surely lure the quitters back in to mining, regardless of variance. Rational miners will endure the variance and gain if others quit.
So I think my point still stands. Pooled mining does nothing for the end-users except creating a potential security risk from centralization.