This is exactly the case. I'm implementing an altcoin myself, and the major requirements of this bounty (length limited blockchain, recovery of lost coins, reasonably trustable zero-confirm transactions) closely resemble some of the novel features I had already intended to do anyway. So I was already planning to write some very similar code. If someone else is willing to pay a bounty for this particular set of requirements, and afterwards I still have rights to open-source, modify, and use the code produced, then doing this gets me about 80% of the way to the versions of these features I want to implement for my own system.
It's earlier in my dev plan than I had intended to do it, but the set of requirements here apply to a transaction model much simpler than mine (I'm going to be using pay-to-script-hash and several different families of addresses with different properties) so it can exist independently of the complications I'll need to integrate it with. Implementing this version will be easier and cleaner than what's going to eventually wind up in my code, but it'll still be a very good starting point for me.
FWIW, I think having the miner detect double spends is far too late for zero-confirm transactions. It ought to be possible to repudiate a doubly-spent transaction within ten seconds, or the capability becomes one that won't be practical to use (in situations like checkout lines with people waiting behind you, or vending machines where you're just grabbing something on your way somewhere and don't have extra minutes, etc). It doesn't matter if the double spend is "punished" or not; the merchant is still left holding the bag and that's _not_ okay! I say ten seconds because that's roughly the amount of time it takes for a transaction to propagate across the Bitcoin network to 90% or more of the nodes and it'll only take a couple of seconds for an online merchant to check with ten or so clients at least a few of which are likely to have heard of the other transaction.