Topic: Coin mixing vs coin joining vs Monero converting - page 2. (Read 571 times)

Also, not sure that garlonicon's concept takes 'time' into account. If I need to do this whole 3-transactions-deal, and do it quickly, it will be more obvious that it's fake.
Just as opening and closing a channel immediately, is very unlikely.

To OP: I believe all the 3 options have been summarized well already; but I do think that using Lightning is a pretty good fourth alternative to consider. Especially for smaller purchases, if you run a Lightning node, you can basically just spend some sats without worrying about labeling change, mixing it, consolidating it and all this annoying stuff.
You can also use Lightning as a mixer; by swapping on-chain funds into a Lightning wallet and from there, send the funds to a fresh address (or preferably, multiple addresses, in smaller chunks).

Maybe they don't, because they believe it's too obvious to be true.

I think this is missing the point. I can spend an entire UTXO A to create UTXO B, and by the same reasoning nobody can tell if I sent money to a merchant or to myself. Of course nobody can tell that for sure, but privacy isn't about being sure where the money is. It's to be as close to the truth as possible. In my example, you might not know where I've sent the money, but you know that I have either happened to pay someone with the exact amount of the output (which is very rare), or sent them back to myself. You can safely make this assertion, it'll be true. But the moment the money start moving later on, the analysis moves forward with the given input data. Whatever happen to that money later can bring us closer to the answer.

Could you have a look at my method below and tell me if what you're saying applies? Also, the transactions would be done over different devices at different times.

1) Send KYCed BTC to a new address from Etherum Electrum wallet operating in Tails on public computer #1 at location A.

2) Create Kucoin account without KYC through the same Tails on the same USB stick as the above but from another public computer (computer #2) and a different location (location B) using different ip (ip #2).

3) Exchange BTC to XMR

4) Send XMR to a newly created cold wallet running on a Live Linux USB on public computer #3 at location C using ip #3.

5) Send %30 of the XMR to a new Hodlhodl account created throught the Live Linux USB on public computer #4 with ip #4 at location D

6) Send the remaining %70 of XMR to a new Bisq account created throught the Live Linux USB on public computer #5 using ip #5 at location E

7) Convert XMRs in both the exchanges into BTC.

8 ) Send the BTC from Hodlhodl to a new Etherum address from a new Etherum wallet on the same device as step 1.

9) Send the BTC from Bisq to a new Etherum Electrum address from the same wallet and device as step 9.

It is surprising, how often such transaction is marked as a CoinJoin transaction. There was even a case, when people thought that another bitcointalk user did it. Also, it is surprising, how often people think that the round amount is the payment, many services did it wrong, and thought that 14 was a payment, and 5.99 was a change, where in practice, there is a higher chance to see prices like 5.99 in many shops (because of that .99 ending that has a psychological impact on many customers).

So far, I can't find a single page that tracked my UTXOs correctly. For example, blockchair always did it wrong. It was funny they assigned low or critical privacy score, and then gave a totally wrong results about what really happened.

By following that logic, someone can conclude that all LN channels on Taproot addresses are always owned by a single person. Because if you combine deniability and Taproot, then you don't know, how many parties there are. Also note that the same trick can be used on legacy addresses to some extent, because of homomorphic encryption: https://duo.com/labs/tech-notes/2p-ecdsa-explained

So, how do you know that Tx1 is not a channel opening transaction, Tx2 is not a channel closing transaction, and Tx3 is not owned by someone else, who received coins after swap? Also, for some LN wallets, this is the default, for example when you open a channel in the Phoenix wallet, then after going on-chain, your channel will stay opened, and you will receive completely different coins from a swap.

More examples: https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/deniability/#c-example

This thread is outdated - it was created before Wasabi started cooperating with blockchain analysis and spying on all their users. Wasabi can no longer be recommended as a good option.

Yeah, this doesn't work at all. You can split up an UTXO as many time as you want, but as soon as you use multiple inputs together in one transaction, then all those inputs are linked together as most probably belonging to the same entity. If all those inputs can be traced back to the same entity in the last 5 or 10 parent transactions, then you've achieved absolutely nothing except wasting money on fees.

Doesn't really matter. If a server sees your device fingerprint and IP query all the addresses from wallet 1, and the minutes later sees the same device fingerprint and IP query all the addresses from wallet 2, it is trivial to deduce that wallet 1 and wallet 2 are owned by the same person.

That blockchain analysis companies have admitted that they run multiple servers for such wallets with the sole purpose of collecting data. If you are serious about privacy, then you must run your own node. It is not a difficult thing to do.

So KYCed btc > to Electrum 1/address 1

By "again" do you mean the same Electrum wallet (Electrum 1)? Because I wouldn't use the same wallet. I'd use a new Electeum wallet and, of course, new address - Electrum 2/address 2.

Wouldn't using a different wallet (even a diffrent provider) solve this issue? Seems like a much simpler solution than running your own full node. What am i missing?

Let's say you bought Bitcoin with KYC and withdrew. And let's say you use Electrum with public node.
Let's say that you mix the coins and receive bitcoin to address2. You open Electrum again.
The second Electrum server operator (if he wants to check the data) will know that address1 and address2 are from same wallet. If he sells this info to a chain analysis company that works together with the KYC exchange, they will know that's still you and your money, so your mixing was pointless.
And this happens no matter you've used clear net, VPN or Tor.

The only proper way to handle this is not not use public SPV servers nor blockchain explorers, instead install your own on top of your own bitcoin core.

Does it matter if they're public ips or using vpn?

If MixingAmont < 1 BTC
  use some CoinJoin wallet

If 10 BTC > MixingAmont > 1 BTC
  use DASH/XMR on some non-KYC exchange

If 100 BTC > MixingAmont > 10 BTC
  use centralized mixing service

If MixingAmont > 100 BTC
  split it into multiple i/p below 100 BTC before mixing and use any of the methods above as per MixingAmont

Either way, if he doesnt have any BTC, he has to rely on a third party to buy bitcoin first then he can mix them or convert to xmr. I suggest OP to send BTC to his own  wallet (if he have them on an exchange), then mix them twice and send back to other self-owned wallets. This will help reduce traceability.

What's the point, garlonicon? If you create Tx3, in which you spend all inputs of Tx2 and the change input of Tx1, then you make it clear that the owner of Tx2's and Tx1's inputs is the same. Before making Tx3, spectators can assume that you sent money to somebody else, but the moment you publish Tx3, they can be sure that this isn't the case.

Just use deniability. I saw that when I sent my own coins to myself in a proper way, many pages thought that coins are now owned by someone else. Also, using LN as a mixer is an option, but probably using deniability will be cheaper than making swaps.

Because of fingerprints like IP addresses or browser data, when you use a regular browser for posting transactions. Also, SPV nodes usually ask about many addresses, and it is possible for some SPV server operator to track users in that way.

If you don't run your own full node, you need to rely to someone else to serve you the balance of your wallet. But, to do that, you need to give it either some addresses or your master public key. Therefore, if the server is a honeypot, it can link your mixed outputs together. And that's true for both bitcoin and monero, even though it's significantly more private to use SPV in the latter due to the usage of ring signatures and stealth addresses.

Why do I have to have my own full node for it to be effective? How is it not effective otherwise?

There are no privacy solutions. Only tradeoffs. That's my list:

CoinJoin
Pros:

• You don't lose custody of your coins.
• It can be very cheap.
• It can be effective, provided there's a lot of liquidity.

Cons:

• You might get some privacy, but it's comparably easy to trace, by following the outputs.
• It might take time to find some partners.
• Authorities can buy up a lot of liquidity, and coinjoin. As a result, it's a lot easier to trace later.

Reputable mixers
Pros:

• Mixing can be free.
• There's a lot more liquidity.
• It's more effective than coinjoin, because the coins have no input-output connection.
• It's easy to do.

Cons:

• You forfeit the ownership of your coins.
• You need to trust that the mixer isn't a honeypot.
• Central points of failure can be shut down by authorities.

BTC <-> XMR
Pros:

• It's very effective if used properly.
• You don't lose custody.
• You don't trust any entity, nor can it be stopped by authorities (if trading peer-to-peer).

Cons:

• You need to hold XMR for undefined time, which is a different asset, and can therefore result in unexpected price fluctuations.
• You're charged highly if using a peer-to-peer decentralized exchange.
• Liquidity isn't the best, compared to the other two.

Note that the above assumes you're running and connecting to your own Bitcoin full node (and Monero full node for the last part), and that you're aware of coin control. It is very easy to screw it up with privacy.

I will go with coin joining and monero converting but as DaveF said it's hard to trust anything. If you are in bitcoin then only risk the amount you want to sell instead of doing all at once. Take x portion and convert them in monero using any swap site. Then sell the monero for cash.

That link he is still has wasabi. Read here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.0;all  and here: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/any-new-news-on-wasabi-wallet-coinjoins-5419000
There are other places but depending on your opinion they can no longer be fully trusted.

It also depends on the amounts and how much time and effort you want to put in and so on.
Ignoring that fact that I am wearing a chip mixer signature and they do a fairly good job of protecting your identity a good way is.

BTC -> a non KYC exchange use a free / disposable email -> convert to XMR -> withdraw -> send to another non KYC exchange with a different free / disposable email -> convert to BTC -> withdraw. And you can go to places that offer free wi-fi for every step so you are even more difficult to track.

Or use another coinjoin service or JoinMarket

Many options.
Or just don't worry about it and spend you BTC

-Dave

You can include a P2P exchange for this which I believed it's safe and effective to cover your anonymity.  
As long as you're using a decentralized exchange no one can track your identity.

theymos created this thread [Guide] Decent mixing methods which I think will give you an insight into anonymity comparison between monero and coinjoin or mixing coin.

However, not only a single transaction will make your transactions becomes anonymous which is my choice IMO in Monero converting.
Just sell your Bitcoin to Monero multiple times using different amounts or split your Bitcoin into different transactions with different (x) amounts and buy Monero and when you have Monero, just sell it for Bitcoin.  It might that would be solved the anonymity case, IMO.

Which method is the most effective?