I would go further and say you absolutely
should connect it to your own node. Samourai suffers from the same issue as does every light wallet, in that the entity running the server you connect to can link all your addresses together (as well as your IP, but obviously you should be running over Tor). The only way to avoid this is to interact exclusively with your own node. For Samourai, this means running a Dojo server:
https://samouraiwallet.com/dojoLike I said, the main advantage of Sparrow Wallet is that it never relies on Samourai servers, even when you are not connecting to your personal bitcoin full node. Having not configured to retrieve information from blockchain via your node, it will connect to one of the public Electrum servers as if you were using a regular Electrum wallet. However, in this case, doing mixing is kinda pointless because the Electrum server can learn all pre-mix and even post-mix transactions and learn that they belong to the same wallet.
If main Wasabi coordinator is not accepting my Bitcoin for mixing than I will consider Wasabi and main coordinator to be scam also.
I also remember Chainalysis demixed transactions made by Wasabi wallet related with DAO hack when 50 BTC was sent to Wasabi wallet, and that was published by journalist Laura Shin.
I think that Bitfinex hackers also sent coins to Wasabi wallet and they got caught... so this doesn't sound like very private to me :/
It would be even worse than scamming, it would be selective scamming in which they can doxx users they don't like while providing services to those who have access to institutional "clean" capital. Hypocritical selective scamming, censorship and privacy invasion to make more money is now their motto.
Any CJ transaction, regardless of the implementation that creates the transaction, has the potential for an observer to link each input with each output, especially long after the fact.
Blockchain analysis is ultimately a process of deduction and induction. So if one CJ participant engages in poor privacy practices long after a CJ transaction occurs, it may give a blockchain analysis company additional information about the composition of the CJ transaction.
It is because CoinJoin has never been about "breaking" the link between the past and the future, but rather the obfuscation of the said link. Definitely not an ideal approach to provide decent protection. Your privacy is now dependent on the actions of others, it is as strong as the weakest link - the stupidest participant of the CoinJoin transaction.
