Topic: DASH Collapsing Monero UP - page 20. (Read 40405 times)

How is it debunked? Because Evan made a post on a forum? 

So when your argument gets debunked you begin with the personal attacks? 

For a guy who deleted his wallets illodin sure spends a lot of time defending a fraud instamine shitcoin 

Are you paid in Dash or Bitcoin for your shill service?

Looks like also that aspect of the FUD has just been obsoleted:

And ones that had protocol level privacy already...

If there only were cryptocurrencies that have mnemonic seeds to restore deleted wallets...

Ah, that can happen, I feel for you... But for some comfort, these wallets would have become worthless anyway 

For the record, I may have had some Dash in the past but I accidentally deleted my wallets. All of them. Shit happens.

If he knew 'the troll' would be there he should have taken more time to prepare his answers... They are weak, with lots of open ends and speculation on his behalf...

• Masternodes: no problem, no one has enough money to do it...
• Instamine: no problem, i asked people and the distributionw as fair, because I say so

Both of the answers are extremely weak, especially if one's trustworthiness is already questionable...

@Illodin: I understand you are invested in this coin, but you've lost your critical thinking on it... Everyone that watches the same Q&A can objectively state that Evan didn't come out well, especially not if he knew 'the troll' would be there and he would have to answer these questions. If that's the only reasoning Evan can come up with, it's a bit pathetic...

Good luck on you though,
best regards

What if I told you he actually knew the troll would be there, and was simply amused about it actually happening?

What I find funny is that the troll was sitting there in the conference listening to the presentation about Evolution where the anonymity is on the protocol level, and then proceeds to ask about NSA and masternodes without realizing his carefully planned FUD just became obsolete 10 minutes ago. Painfully awkward.



Actually it looks like the troll walked away by himself without the moderator stepping in, but please spin it the way you want if that helps you sleep at night.

"But maybe you had like hundreds of miners..."

"No, sorry, didn't happen."

Walks away...

Watch it again. He looks like a weasel who got caught with his hand in the cookie jar.. trying desperately to brush it off and failing miserably.  I really wonder what would have happened if the session moderator had not stepped in at that point, defusing a very tense and awkward moment for Evan, to reiterate how criticism was a good thing and welcomed.

I can't imagine anyone involved with DASH was pleased coming back from that meeting. In typical fashion they spun it as a huge success here on the forums  

Maybe the Dash bagholders will be interested in sponsering some acting classes for him so he can be more convincing in Miami

But it's made even easier when you cram algos together like X11:

"If any one of the hashes in the chain of 11 hashes has a lower entropy then the entire chain does. Say you found this vulnerability and didn't announce it. Instead you could use it to amplify your hashrate. With that you could take unfair levels of mining rewards, or potentially launch double-spend attacks.

Fixing it after the fact also probably means the inability to unwind the damage already done if it had gone on a long time undetected.
So 11 hashes is 11 times more likely to have a vulnerability than 1 hash." Anonymint

And from noted cryptographers:

"The Sum Can Be Weaker Than Each Part"

Gaëtan Leurent and Lei Wang

"Abstract: In this paper we study the security of summing the outputs of two independent hash functions, in an effort to increase the security of the resulting design, or to hedge against the failure of one of the hash functions. The exclusive-or (XOR) combiner H1(M)+H2(M) is one of the two most classical combiners, together with the concatenation combiner H1(M)||H2(M). While the security of the concatenation of two hash functions is well understood since Joux's seminal work on multicollisions, the security of the sum of two hash functions has been much less studied.

The XOR combiner is well known as a good PRF and MAC combiner, and is used in practice in TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1. In a hash function setting, Hoch and Shamir have shown that if the compression functions are modeled as random oracles, or even weak random oracles (i.e. they can easily be inverted -- in particular H1 and H2 offer no security), H1+H2 is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to the birthday bound.

In this work, we focus on the preimage resistance of the sum of two narrow-pipe n-bit hash functions, following the Merkle-Damgård or HAIFA structure (the internal state size and the output size are both n bits). We show a rather surprising result: the sum of two such hash functions, e.g. SHA-512+Whirlpool, can never provide n-bit security for preimage resistance. More precisely, we present a generic preimage attack with a complexity of O(2^5n/6). While it is already known that the XOR combiner is not preserving for preimage resistance (i.e. there might be some instantiations where the hash functions are secure but the sum is not), our result is much stronger: for any narrow-pipe functions, the sum is not preimage resistant.

Besides, we also provide concrete preimage attacks on the XOR combiner (and the concatenation combiner) when one or both of the compression functions are weak; this complements Hoch and Shamir's proof by showing its tightness for preimage resistance.

Of independent interests, one of our main technical contributions is a novel structure to control simultaneously the behavior of independent hash computations which share the same input message. We hope that breaking the pairwise relationship between their internal states will have applications in related settings."

https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/070

https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/070.pdf

Attack is always possible against everything if you have infinite resources and motivation. Not admitting that would be delusional and should be concerning to investors.

Hah,

this is funny, Evan admitting masternode-system sucks and is not anonymous while all his minions are defending it here on the forum...

And he is sure distribution of the coin is fine, because he asked... LOL

Here's the link for the Q&A btw: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5sNx7SMTP8
good luck to the Dash-holders, you're gonna need it... Evan's answers on the question about overtaking more than half of the masternodes is exremely weak I think... He argues it's difficult to attack it like that because one would drive up the price too much, thus admitting an attack is possible, albeit difficult... but possible nonetheless... This would be a major concern to me as an investor...

best regards,

Based on your stance and how you carry yourself on this forum I can't take anything you say seriously.

Dash is no different than Solidcoin with CoinHunter/RealSolid as its developer.

Dash is essentially Solidcoin 2.0 and a much more successful Solidcoin version.

After a very careful and thorough inspection of the said video footage a conclusion was made that he looked more like he was amused for finally seeing a real forum troll in real life.

I came to the same conclusion he seemed very uncomfortable answering those questions.

Just watched the videos of Evan answering questions about the instamine at Bitcoin Wednesday... his body language is looking quite uncomfortable. How unfortunate for him that there will only be more and more scrutiny into his fraudulent instamine. Should have thought about that before scamming  

Props to the guy who showed up and asked the tough questions.. well done