How do you come to a network consensus that the blockchain you are using is the correct one ? For one thing the genesis block should always be the same so you could always discard a chain which doesnt contain the same genesis block you have been using the whole time.
You could have a set of parameters that warn you when conditions are suboptimal. For instance monitoring pools on the network to see if they are being ddosed would trigger an alert.
If you can have a set of parameters and something happens which causes them to change you could refuse to accept a new blockchain untill such time as it came back to "normal". Sudden spikes or dips that go outside preset "statistical mean range" would cause certain defensive measures to happen to protect the network.
Topic: delete (Read 5097 times)
you are not understanding the concept, read it again, think about it, do the math, simulate in your head
I did. You equated trust to some combination of time connected & LTC owned. Both of those can be obtained easily (in the mathematical sense).
51% of trust nodes should roughly equate to control of the network. A lone attacker might have difficulty, but a cartel could easily form. Especially if pool operators and exchanges are involved.
You seem to be assuming that you can determine who you should trust, and that they would never betray or disagree with you and thus make the network secure. Instead, assume that some of those you trust will betray you and then examine what the consequences of that would be. If you don't believe that trusted people might betray you, please examine Bitcoinica and mybitcoin.com for evidence to the contrary.
you are not understanding the concept, read it again, think about it, do the math, simulate in your head
since the "trusted nodes" are random (these three words shouldnt even go together imo) what is stopping the same attacker that would need to have a massive amount of computing power anyway from doing a Sybil attack and just getting in as many nodes as he wants in the networks with hopes that his nodes will be selected randomly as the trusted nodes ?
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
Super nodes could be chosen randomly, but they have a means of proving themselves as a super node.
Once they are chosen, they are vulnerable to DDoS and hacking to obtain their private keys.
And do you really want a random cross-section of users holding the keys to the block chain?
If i recieve a block that thats not "fit" in my block chain I ask to my connected peers or "trusted random nodes" wich is the valid one?
so i can discard the longestone if is not from a trusted node and i do not trust new nodes when the network speed increases too much so you cannot introduce the new block chain unless you have 51% power from the very begining of the chain.
How do you determine "trusted random nodes"?
Specifically, how do you know they are trusted and how do you connect to them?
the same way litecoind trust a node that sends a new block, and the same way a REORGANIZATION could happend today, with the exception that you trust more in nodes that have more coins (in your stored blockchain) and have been in your "known nodes" list longer and you do not choose new budies or "trusted nodes" if speed is 2x last dif change speed (we can study the best factor value).
So I buy a bunch of Litecoin, set up a few nodes and hang out for a few months for them to gain trust. Now I have lots of Litecoin and trust. I convert my LTC to BTC and then immediately launch my alternate blockchain before everyone has confirmed my LTC transaction. In some parts of the network I still have LTC, and I am still trusted because of it. When people ask me about the real chain, I tell them to reject it.
Now I have BTC and LTC and the network still trusts me. That seems like a bad combination.
Plus, 51% of trusted nodes could dominate the network with no way for anyone else to either fight back or gain trust.
since the "trusted nodes" are random (these three words shouldnt even go together imo) what is stopping the same attacker that would need to have a massive amount of computing power anyway from doing a Sybil attack and just getting in as many nodes as he wants in the networks with hopes that his nodes will be selected randomly as the trusted nodes ?
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
Super nodes could be chosen randomly, but they have a means of proving themselves as a super node.
Once they are chosen, they are vulnerable to DDoS and hacking to obtain their private keys.
And do you really want a random cross-section of users holding the keys to the block chain?
If i recieve a block that thats not "fit" in my block chain I ask to my connected peers or "trusted random nodes" wich is the valid one?
so i can discard the longestone if is not from a trusted node and i do not trust new nodes when the network speed increases too much so you cannot introduce the new block chain unless you have 51% power from the very begining of the chain.
How do you determine "trusted random nodes"?
Specifically, how do you know they are trusted and how do you connect to them?
the same way litecoind trust a node that sends a new block, and the same way a REORGANIZATION could happend today, with the exception that you trust more in nodes that have more coins (in your stored blockchain) and have been in your "known nodes" list longer and you do not choose new budies or "trusted nodes" if speed is 2x last dif change speed (we can study the best factor value).
so if a new blockchain is sent by a node to you that implyes you have to drop more than one block from your blockchain you ask to your trusted nodes what to do. if 51% of your oldest buddies say discard you discard the new longest chain.
in order to select your budies or trusted nodes they have to have more than x coins or be a top x% holder (we have to think about how much to be elegible). The number should be small enough to make available for almost every honest node and big enough to make it expensive to the atacker.
since the "trusted nodes" are random (these three words shouldnt even go together imo) what is stopping the same attacker that would need to have a massive amount of computing power anyway from doing a Sybil attack and just getting in as many nodes as he wants in the networks with hopes that his nodes will be selected randomly as the trusted nodes ?
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
that could be possible, we could restrict the random trusted nodes to the 50% top coin holders. So you need to be in the N top holders to become a trusted node.
if someone want to buy all the coins and buy all the netpower to destroy the chaincoin go ahead, feel free to do it :-)
since the "trusted nodes" are random (these three words shouldnt even go together imo) what is stopping the same attacker that would need to have a massive amount of computing power anyway from doing a Sybil attack and just getting in as many nodes as he wants in the networks with hopes that his nodes will be selected randomly as the trusted nodes ?
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
Super nodes could be chosen randomly, but they have a means of proving themselves as a super node.
Once they are chosen, they are vulnerable to DDoS and hacking to obtain their private keys.
And do you really want a random cross-section of users holding the keys to the block chain?
If i recieve a block that thats not "fit" in my block chain I ask to my connected peers or "trusted random nodes" wich is the valid one?
so i can discard the longestone if is not from a trusted node and i do not trust new nodes when the network speed increases too much so you cannot introduce the new block chain unless you have 51% power from the very begining of the chain.
How do you determine "trusted random nodes"?
Specifically, how do you know they are trusted and how do you connect to them?
since the "trusted nodes" are random (these three words shouldnt even go together imo) what is stopping the same attacker that would need to have a massive amount of computing power anyway from doing a Sybil attack and just getting in as many nodes as he wants in the networks with hopes that his nodes will be selected randomly as the trusted nodes ?
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
Super nodes could be chosen randomly, but they have a means of proving themselves as a super node.
Once they are chosen, they are vulnerable to DDoS and hacking to obtain their private keys.
And do you really want a random cross-section of users holding the keys to the block chain?
If i recieve a block that thats not "fit" in my block chain I ask to my connected peers or "trusted random nodes" wich is the valid one?
so i can discard the longestone if is not from a trusted node and i do not trust new nodes when the network speed increases too much so you cannot introduce the new block chain unless you have 51% power from the very begining of the chain.
another way
$speed = speed at last diff change
choose n random nodes as trusted nodes the first time the software is run and write the list for next starts
if conection is lost to one or more trusted nodes and actual_network_speed < ($speed * 2)
then it conects to new random node as trusted node
oldest nodes are more trustworthy in case of 2 blockchains in the network.
you can edit the trusted nodes file when you launch the currency to prevent 51% atack at block 1.
so you have 100% decentralized control and you are not vulnerable to 51% atack anymore
$speed = speed at last diff change
choose n random nodes as trusted nodes the first time the software is run and write the list for next starts
if conection is lost to one or more trusted nodes and actual_network_speed < ($speed * 2)
then it conects to new random node as trusted node
oldest nodes are more trustworthy in case of 2 blockchains in the network.
you can edit the trusted nodes file when you launch the currency to prevent 51% atack at block 1.
so you have 100% decentralized control and you are not vulnerable to 51% atack anymore
That introduces more problems. Say I run a few hundred small virtual machines which are all nodes in your network. I can find out where the trusted nodes are much like blockchain.info finds out where transactions and blocks come from. I need only ddos the trusted nodes I don't control one at a time until I control all of them. Then I can reject all blocks other than the ones I mine or cause all sorts of other mischief.
no you cannot as every network node could be trusted node to other nodes, you need to ddos every single machine in the network as trusted nodes are choosen ramdonly.
as no new trusted nodes are selected if network speeds is > 2x $speed (to prevent atacker nodes to become trusted nodes) the atacker cannot introduce the new chain because it is automatically discarded by the network, no matter if hi/she has 51% or 99%.
to perform an atack the atacker should have 51% hash power mining the network for X time to infiltrate "trusted eveils nodes" inside the network and at the same time 101% hash power mining the fork to perform an atack and in that circunstance the forked chain can be droped by the network.
while the atacker is minig the network he/she should have to ddos everysingle "honest node" to make it disconect from its pears in order to infiltrate their own trusted nodes.
since the "trusted nodes" are random (these three words shouldnt even go together imo) what is stopping the same attacker that would need to have a massive amount of computing power anyway from doing a Sybil attack and just getting in as many nodes as he wants in the networks with hopes that his nodes will be selected randomly as the trusted nodes ?
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
Super nodes could be chosen randomly, but they have a means of proving themselves as a super node.
Once they are chosen, they are vulnerable to DDoS and hacking to obtain their private keys.
And do you really want a random cross-section of users holding the keys to the block chain?
since the "trusted nodes" are random (these three words shouldnt even go together imo) what is stopping the same attacker that would need to have a massive amount of computing power anyway from doing a Sybil attack and just getting in as many nodes as he wants in the networks with hopes that his nodes will be selected randomly as the trusted nodes ?
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
this trades one type of attack (computing power) for another (flooding the network with nodes in hopes that they will be selected as the trusted nodes by as many people as possible)
not to mention, wtf is stopping someone from ddosing the "trusted nodes", anyway? and thus introducing yet another way to attack the network....
Not to mention if the trusted nodes were ever hacked or the keys shared with someone who later turned out to be unreliable, the block chain would be at their mercy. They wouldn't need 51%, they could fork the block-chain when ever they felt like it.
not to mention, wtf is stopping someone from ddosing the "trusted nodes", anyway? and thus introducing yet another way to attack the network....
you need to ddos every computer in the network as the trusted nodes could be random
another way
$speed = speed at last diff change
choose n random nodes as trusted nodes the first time the software is run and write the list for next starts
if conection is lost to one or more trusted nodes and actual_network_speed < ($speed * 2)
then it conects to new random node as trusted node
oldest nodes are more trustworthy in case of 2 blockchains in the network.
you can edit the trusted nodes file when you launch the currency to prevent 51% atack at block 1.
so you have 100% decentralized control and you are not vulnerable to 51% atack anymore
$speed = speed at last diff change
choose n random nodes as trusted nodes the first time the software is run and write the list for next starts
if conection is lost to one or more trusted nodes and actual_network_speed < ($speed * 2)
then it conects to new random node as trusted node
oldest nodes are more trustworthy in case of 2 blockchains in the network.
you can edit the trusted nodes file when you launch the currency to prevent 51% atack at block 1.
so you have 100% decentralized control and you are not vulnerable to 51% atack anymore
That introduces more problems. Say I run a few hundred small virtual machines which are all nodes in your network. I can find out where the trusted nodes are much like blockchain.info finds out where transactions and blocks come from. I need only ddos the trusted nodes I don't control one at a time until I control all of them. Then I can reject all blocks other than the ones I mine or cause all sorts of other mischief.
not to mention, wtf is stopping someone from ddosing the "trusted nodes", anyway? and thus introducing yet another way to attack the network....
another way
$speed = speed at last diff change
choose n random nodes as trusted nodes the first time the software is run and write the list for next starts
if conection is lost to one or more trusted nodes and actual_network_speed < ($speed * 2)
then it conects to new random node as trusted node
oldest nodes are more trustworthy in case of 2 blockchains in the network.
you can edit the trusted nodes file when you launch the currency to prevent 51% atack at block 1.
so you have 100% decentralized control and you are not vulnerable to 51% atack anymore
$speed = speed at last diff change
choose n random nodes as trusted nodes the first time the software is run and write the list for next starts
if conection is lost to one or more trusted nodes and actual_network_speed < ($speed * 2)
then it conects to new random node as trusted node
oldest nodes are more trustworthy in case of 2 blockchains in the network.
you can edit the trusted nodes file when you launch the currency to prevent 51% atack at block 1.
so you have 100% decentralized control and you are not vulnerable to 51% atack anymore
SolidCoin trusted nodes are a bad idea, they introduce points of failure into the network.
There have been cases where entire countries have fallen off the Internet due to under sea cables being cut by ships anchors and suchlike. If trust nodes are involved the isolated part of the network would be unable to mine. In the current setup they could continue to mine and when reconnected the transactions from the shorter blockchain get integrated into the longer one.
Don't follow SolidCoin's bad example and come up with some design-by-committee hack.
"Connect to Trusted nodess" could be an opcional feature. Anyone can enable or disable the trusted node verification, and you can choose whatever trusted node you want, you could choose your exchanger trusted node, or Coblee's trusted node, or your own trusted node, or disable the trusted node verificacion completely.
So you have 51% atack protection and still decentralized control, you should be able to choose 1, 5 or more trusted nodes, if you have more than 1 they vote.
so besides 51% power, atacker needs to take control of trusted nodes to perform an atack, and everyone can choose their own trusted nodes combination making an atack even more difficult. The atacker wolud need 51% power and control over 51% of your "specific", "trusted nodes combination".
So you have 51% atack protection and still decentralized control, you should be able to choose 1, 5 or more trusted nodes, if you have more than 1 they vote.
so besides 51% power, atacker needs to take control of trusted nodes to perform an atack, and everyone can choose their own trusted nodes combination making an atack even more difficult. The atacker wolud need 51% power and control over 51% of your "specific", "trusted nodes combination".
Is the point to move closer to centralization and put the power in the hands of the wealthy? We already have that system. It’s global.
I cannot agree. Cause the power is already in the hands of the wealthy. There's quite a few individuals who are running +10% of the network. Nothing is stopping them from working together. Like bankers.
I have +500 GPU's in stock, nothing would stop me from unboxing the cards and use all that power with other "corrupt" individuals to attack the chain.
Of course, I'd never hurt my investments.
I would rather trust rich LTC holders (trusted nodes) than "Mining-Power Leaders" with no Litecoins.
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