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Topic: Drivechain critiques by gmaxwell revisited, maybe you changed your mind? - page 2. (Read 1110 times)

legendary
Activity: 2898
Merit: 1823
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"Adam Back, Co-Founder and CEO of Blockstream
""Drivechains...are pretty cool...and arguably could have been more important or useful than let’s say Taproot.""
""props to @Truthcoin and team for implementing and validating drivechain design.”"

"Olaoluwa Osuntokun, CTO of Lightning Labs
""In the past year, the drivechain specs seem to have come a long way."""

"Sergio Demian Lerner, Chief of Innovation at IOV Labs and Designer of the RSK Rootstock Bitcoin sidechain
""[...] migrate Rootstock to a drivechain when it is softforked into Bitcoin [...] the destiny is to become fully decentralized.""
""[...] sidechains are the natural extension of the Bitcoin finance stack [...]. A sidechain is a blockchain that is highly incentive-aligned with the Bitcoin community."""

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1m4PpNIdBKuLC6FzLOoIfvHXcnrSh6dnOqPrqKg-zJEw/edit#gid=0


There's a spreadsheet containing some quotes, with links, from people who are probably "Friends of Drivechain". Three years later from the creation of the topic, what's everyone's updated opinions about BIP-300 now that Ordinals are starting to become an inconvenience for Bitcoin users who simply want to use the blockchain for financial transactions?
legendary
Activity: 1666
Merit: 1196
STOP SNITCHIN'
Is there any recent discussion of how much JoinMarket makers can expect to earn? It's crossed my mind, but I'd like to gauge the expected gains vs. the risk of keeping private keys online.
<1%, it's very competitive. But that's a feature not a bug, users shouldn't have to pay a lot for privacy, or to move money to/from a sidechain quickly.

I assumed the margin wouldn't be high from looking at the order book. I wonder more about the volume one can expect.

The Bitcoin mainnet doesn't care. That's why it's easier -- miners can openly attack the sidechain without anybody really caring.
We'd care if there was an attack on a sidechain because then we'd lose useful functionality that makes bitcoin worth more, even if you or I don't use that feature.

Perhaps, but the fundamental value of having minimal base layer functionality is that it insulates Bitcoin from attacks on the upper layers. There is always an implicit security trade-off when you use an off-chain or sidechain mechanism because they aren't secured by the Bitcoin mainchain consensus. We should keep that in mind when considering the value these upper layers represent, especially in their early alpha/beta phases.
legendary
Activity: 2898
Merit: 1823

And FYI, from a game-theoretic perspective, it is a hell "harder" to steal a penny from sidechains compared to the mainnet. Double-spending is a covert operation and mainnet full-nodes are absolutely blind about it, but sidechain full nodes will detect the theft at the moment it is happening.


Roll Eyes

The full nodes would reject invalid transactions, and/or the blocks that contain them.

Newbies, if two transactions spend the same inputs, in the same block, then both will be rejected. If the other one makes it to a block, than the other, then the first one is accepted, the other rejected.
hero member
Activity: 950
Merit: 1001
If you're going to hodl for 6+ months anyways, then why not collect some fees on top of that like a JoinMarket maker?
Is there any recent discussion of how much JoinMarket makers can expect to earn? It's crossed my mind, but I'd like to gauge the expected gains vs. the risk of keeping private keys online.
<1%, it's very competitive. But that's a feature not a bug, users shouldn't have to pay a lot for privacy, or to move money to/from a sidechain quickly. Drivechain withdrawals don't share this hot wallet requirement so the return would be abysmal.

The Bitcoin mainnet doesn't care. That's why it's easier -- miners can openly attack the sidechain without anybody really caring.
We'd care if there was an attack on a sidechain because then we'd lose useful functionality that makes bitcoin worth more, even if you or I don't use that feature. BCH isn't pegged to BTC and it's anything but useful.
legendary
Activity: 1666
Merit: 1196
STOP SNITCHIN'
If you're going to hodl for 6+ months anyways, then why not collect some fees on top of that like a JoinMarket maker?

Is there any recent discussion of how much JoinMarket makers can expect to earn? It's crossed my mind, but I'd like to gauge the expected gains vs. the risk of keeping private keys online.

Paul Sztorc admits it is true here... increasing the withdrawal requirement to 13,150 ACKs.
No, he doesn't and it wouldn't matter if he does. But you are misreading his faq comment.  I'm not discussing Drivechain project or its devs' opinions, anyway. As of 13,150 ACKs, they became poisoned by the "51% theft security whole" hoax and ruined their project by such stupid decisions. My proposal: let's put it on 200 ACKs and observe that there will be no theft for the next couple of decades.

I would love to see that. Chances are that the sidechain would end up holding very little value, commensurate with the mining security. There's no point attacking a worthless chain.

Nobody really cares about the viability of sidechains. Unlike Bitcoin, miners don't have strong incentives against attacking them.

And FYI, from a game-theoretic perspective, it is a hell "harder" to steal a penny from sidechains compared to the mainnet. Double-spending is a covert operation and mainnet full-nodes are absolutely blind about it, but sidechain full nodes will detect the theft at the moment it is happening.

Just like merge-mined altcoins, the only people who would care are holders of the altcoin. The Bitcoin mainnet doesn't care. That's why it's easier -- miners can openly attack the sidechain without anybody really caring.

BTC.com colluded in a 51% attack on Bitcoin Cash last year. As one of the largest Bitcoin mining pools, their reputation doesn't seem to have suffered all that much.
hero member
Activity: 950
Merit: 1001
13,150 ACKs aren't a major problem because we have cross-chain atomic swaps. If you're going to hodl for 6+ months anyways, then why not collect some fees on top of that like a JoinMarket maker?

200 ACKs seems a little bit low. If I was betting on chain split tokens for a UASF, I would want more time to install the sidechain and verify the alleged theft.
legendary
Activity: 1456
Merit: 1175
Always remember the cause!
A 51% attack on Bitcoin only allows miners to double spend. On a drivechain, they can just steal everything.
It has been said ever and ever, still a very misleading and wrong assertion.

Paul Sztorc admits it is true here... increasing the withdrawal requirement to 13,150 ACKs.

No, he doesn't and it wouldn't matter if he does. But you are misreading his faq comment.  I'm not discussing Drivechain project or its devs' opinions, anyway. As of 13,150 ACKs, they became poisoned by the "51% theft security whole" hoax and ruined their project by such stupid decisions. My proposal: let's put it on 200 ACKs and observe that there will be no theft for the next couple of decades.

A hypothetical collusion by miners against a sidechain in the future, will make my above argument void as it proves the mere existence of a 51% that exposes bitcoin to double-spend and censorship threats.
Sidechain theft is much easier than targeted double-spend attacks. That's something you aren't accounting for.
What do you mean by "easier" Huh
Computers are doing the job Cheesy
It is easy as long as you got the magical 51% relative power!

And FYI, from a game-theoretic perspective, it is a hell "harder" to steal a penny from sidechains compared to the mainnet. Double-spending is a covert operation and mainnet full-nodes are absolutely blind about it, but sidechain full nodes will detect the theft at the moment it is happening.

Quote
What you're suggesting is just attempted censorship and is probably virtually impossible already.
It is impossible because of the game theory behind bitcoin and its network hash rate and the market cap. Taproot has nothing to do with it.

Sadly, you are not reading my comments.
legendary
Activity: 1666
Merit: 1196
STOP SNITCHIN'
BUT with the Bitcoin blockchain as the secure, censorship-resistant, base layer.

Forking a drivechain into Bitcoin's consensus makes it part of the base layer. That's the issue.

Game-theory. Why would a miner try to "win" the competition by destroying their source of income? Plus, isn't that the situation in most altcoins? What's stopping them?

Altcoins get 51% attacked all the time, and that's just to perform limited double spending attacks.

Why don't we fully trust SPV wallets? Because they trust miners to be honest. The same logic applies in this case, since Bitcoin nodes only SPV validate drivechains.

Such an attack would only destroy faith in drivechains, not Bitcoin, so the "Miners won't 51% attack because of long term incentives" argument doesn't apply. Presumably, transaction activity would not only return to Bitcoin, but at even higher fee rates.

A 51% attack on Bitcoin only allows miners to double spend. On a drivechain, they can just steal everything.
It has been said ever and ever, still a very misleading and wrong assertion.

Paul Sztorc admits it is true here.

I didn't realize that he later addressed this by increasing the withdrawal requirement to 13,150 ACKs.

That's one way of sidestepping the whole problem -- nobody will be interested in using this sidechain since it takes 3-6 months to withdraw your bitcoins! Therefore, there will never be enough value to on the drivechain for any of this to matter. Cheesy

A hypothetical collusion by miners against a sidechain in the future, will make my above argument void as it proves the mere existence of a 51% that exposes bitcoin to double-spend and censorship threats.

Sidechain theft is much easier than targeted double spend attacks. That's something you aren't accounting for.

Suggesting such hypothetical miner-collusions as "a security hole" or "something concerning" for sidechains is absurd too as it is applicable to every single two-way-pegged solution, the most distinguished one being LN. e.g. they could selectively censor/nullify anti-cheat punishment transactions in favor of their own fraudulent behaviors in the network and our superhero full nodes would have absolutely no clue about the existence of the problem, forget about being helpful.

The rules for sidechain withdrawals aren't enforced by Bitcoin full nodes. That's the difference. Miners can collude to steal all drivechain funds; it's simply a matter of waiting. This situation does not apply to Bitcoin or LN.

What you're suggesting is just attempted censorship and is probably virtually impossible already. It's completely impossible once we're transacting with LN via Taproot.
legendary
Activity: 1456
Merit: 1175
Always remember the cause!
A 51% attack on Bitcoin only allows miners to double spend. On a drivechain, they can just steal everything.
It has been said ever and ever, still a very misleading and wrong assertion.

Although I'm not a fan of two-way-pegged off-chain solutions being drivechain/sidechain or something like LN, It doesn't look a good criticism by any means to me. Honestly, I suspect the people who first brought up this argument, could have little if not zero good faith. No offense,  I understand you are just re-hashing the same assertion they make in any situation when it comes to discussing anything other than their stupid agenda.
Bad criticism is more concerning and dangerous, sometimes, than the original idea being criticized, as it would have worse consequences than simply accepting the idea blindly, agreed?

Ironically, the same people who proposed and advocated two-way-pegged-sidechains in the first place are the ones who are spreading FUD and fake claims about the idea. Why and how? Let's leave this for the next generation of crypto-historians and journalists and stay focused on this miner-phobic assertion you are rehashing here:

1- Resisting double-spend attack is the single privilege of bitcoin. It is merely a decentralized, trustless solution to the double-spend problem:
Quote from: Satoshi-Nakamoto-THeWhitePaper
Abstract.  A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution.  Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work.
Period.

2- At the time of this writing and for the foreseeable future there is no double-spend threat to bitcoin, and it is why in its worst days, bitcoin holds a whopping 100 billion dollars market cap.

3-I'm well known for my strong opposition to the current situation with pools and ASIC manufacturers, but it doesn't imply that I think there is any chance of double-spending in bitcoin, otherwise I wouldn't waste a minute counting on bitcoin and would have been criticizing it as a failed project.

4- A hypothetical collusion by miners against a sidechain in the future, will make my above argument void as it proves the mere existence of a 51% that exposes bitcoin to double-spend and censorship threats. This would be apocalyptic and thanks god, it is not considered feasible as far as the market and the community are concerned.

5- Suggesting such hypothetical miner-collusions as "a security hole" or "something concerning" for sidechains is absurd too as it is applicable to every single two-way-pegged solution, the most distinguished one being LN. e.g. they could selectively censor/nullify anti-cheat punishment transactions in favor of their own fraudulent behaviors in the network and our superhero full nodes would have absolutely no clue about the existence of the problem, forget about being helpful.

I suppose such criticism is political rather than game-theoretical/technical, hence strongly recommend not to follow this trend, no matter who is backing it.

On the other hand, this is meaningless to suggest any kind of proof in such systems, other than (SPV like proof of) work. Securing the "reclaiming phase" in sidechains by relying on or even having involved full nodes, would existentially nullify the off-chain idea, either it is the traditional verification or zk alternatives.
Zero-knowledge proof is decent technology, but once it becomes practical, it could be employed on the mainnet as well, causing a radical shift of concerns.
legendary
Activity: 2898
Merit: 1823
If you had a choice between a block size increase (soft or hard fork) and a drivechain, which would you choose? Why?

On the block size increase, none for now, and on Drivechain, clearly you know my answer is "I don't know", I'm still learning about it the hard way. By debating/playing devil's advocate.

Let me ask that question a different way.

What do you hope to achieve by forking a drivechain into the consensus? Offloading transaction throughput from the mainchain, cheaper fees? Altcoin interoperability?


Drivechain side-chains can be any of those. Big blocks, privacy, smart-contracts, big blocks-with-privacy-and-smart-contracts. Hahaha.

BUT with the Bitcoin blockchain as the secure, censorship-resistant, base layer.

I think economically important drivechains may skew Bitcoin's mining incentives. I'm not sure. I'd like to see more convincing game theory suggesting drivechains are a good idea before considering enforcing them at the consensus level, that much is certain.

Why? Mining on the base layer could be worth more because it supports all side-chains. Plus if a side-chain has value, wouldn't the game-theory/incentive-structure be the same as in Bitcoin?

I was thinking about this a bit more.

Consider this situation presented by Adam Back, except let's take it to the logical extreme. Say we're a couple decades down the road, the block subsidy is tiny and fees provide almost all block rewards. Mining has a 5% profit margin and drivechains provide 75% of total revenue.

This implies a super majority of transaction activity -- and probably a majority of bitcoin-denominated value -- is on drivechains. Meanwhile, a majority of miners can steal all funds held on drivechains at any time. There is nothing Bitcoin full nodes can do to stop them.

Is the incentive structure still the same as now?


Game-theory. Why would a miner try to "win" the competition by destroying their source of income? Plus, isn't that the situation in most altcoins? What's stopping them?
legendary
Activity: 1666
Merit: 1196
STOP SNITCHIN'
If you had a choice between a block size increase (soft or hard fork) and a drivechain, which would you choose? Why?

On the block size increase, none for now, and on Drivechain, clearly you know my answer is "I don't know", I'm still learning about it the hard way. By debating/playing devil's advocate.

Let me ask that question a different way.

What do you hope to achieve by forking a drivechain into the consensus? Offloading transaction throughput from the mainchain, cheaper fees? Altcoin interoperability?

I think economically important drivechains may skew Bitcoin's mining incentives. I'm not sure. I'd like to see more convincing game theory suggesting drivechains are a good idea before considering enforcing them at the consensus level, that much is certain.

Why? Mining on the base layer could be worth more because it supports all side-chains. Plus if a side-chain has value, wouldn't the game-theory/incentive-structure be the same as in Bitcoin?

I was thinking about this a bit more.

Consider this situation presented by Adam Back, except let's take it to the logical extreme. Say we're a couple decades down the road, the block subsidy is tiny and fees provide almost all block rewards. Mining has a 5% profit margin and drivechains provide 75% of total revenue.

This implies a super majority of transaction activity -- and probably a majority of bitcoin-denominated value -- is on drivechains. Meanwhile, a majority of miners can steal all funds held on drivechains at any time. There is nothing Bitcoin full nodes can do to stop them.

Is the incentive structure still the same as now?
legendary
Activity: 2898
Merit: 1823
I'm not particularly comfortable with the precedent of miners forking in sidechains, on which users blindly trust those miners.

But full nodes secure the network, not miners.

Bitcoin nodes only SPV validate the drivechain. That's the security model. Full nodes may enforce the drivechain rules at the Bitcoin consensus level, but that can't stop miners from stealing drivechain funds. 51% of miners can always steal all drivechain funds, no matter what. The only thing Bitcoin nodes can do to stop them is a UASF after the fact that reverses the theft.

Mining on the base layer could be worth more because it supports all side-chains.

Drivechains, extension blocks, and similar mechanisms are block size increases by another name. They offload transaction throughput, bringing cheaper fee costs to users. Would the base layer actually be worth more to miners? That depends if overall combined throughput increases enough to account for the cheaper fees. We simply don't know, and it's dangerous to rely on that. This is the block size and fee market debate all over again.

If you had a choice between a block size increase (soft or hard fork) and a drivechain, which would you choose? Why?


On the block size increase, none for now, and on Drivechain, clearly you know my answer is "I don't know", I'm still learning about it the hard way. By debating/playing devil's advocate.
mda
member
Activity: 144
Merit: 13
Drivechain is a nebulous structure that few can explain and almost none cares about. There is a simple working construction of multiple altcoins/shards with common PoW and unified interface. Atomic swaps between altcoins/shards can be implemented natively to bypass centralized exchanges:

https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/sharding-strategy-held-together-by-atomic-swaps-5109561
legendary
Activity: 1568
Merit: 6660
bitcoincleanup.com / bitmixlist.org
Drivechains, extension blocks, and similar mechanisms are block size increases by another name. They offload transaction throughput, bringing cheaper fee costs to users. Would the base layer actually be worth more to miners? That depends if overall combined throughput increases enough to account for the cheaper fees. We simply don't know, and it's dangerous to rely on that. This is the block size and fee market debate all over again.

Currently the transaction fee is only a small percentage of the money that miners make, the rest are from rewards from mined blocks. BIP-301 is one of the whitepapers for drivechain and the one that connects bitcoin's consensus to drivechains.  By that I mean a miner needs to pay to mine drivechain blocks.

I believe the reason the transaction fees become smaller for users is that miners won't have to validate drivechain blocks or do PoW on them. Drivechains are trying to solve a hypothetical scenario where miners are keeping track of future validated blocks. I don't think this situation is actually happening in the wild because the vast majority of miners are owned by mining companies who would have to order the employees to make the miners send extension blocks to each other. So it's motivation seems futile to me, preparing for something that may not be happening.
legendary
Activity: 1666
Merit: 1196
STOP SNITCHIN'
I'm not particularly comfortable with the precedent of miners forking in sidechains, on which users blindly trust those miners.

But full nodes secure the network, not miners.

Bitcoin nodes only SPV validate the drivechain. That's the security model. Full nodes may enforce the drivechain rules at the Bitcoin consensus level, but that can't stop miners from stealing drivechain funds. 51% of miners can always steal all drivechain funds, no matter what. The only thing Bitcoin nodes can do to stop them is a UASF after the fact that reverses the theft.

Mining on the base layer could be worth more because it supports all side-chains.

Drivechains, extension blocks, and similar mechanisms are block size increases by another name. They offload transaction throughput, bringing cheaper fee costs to users. Would the base layer actually be worth more to miners? That depends if overall combined throughput increases enough to account for the cheaper fees. We simply don't know, and it's dangerous to rely on that. This is the block size and fee market debate all over again.

If you had a choice between a block size increase (soft or hard fork) and a drivechain, which would you choose? Why?
legendary
Activity: 3472
Merit: 10611
But full nodes secure the network, not miners.

that's wrong. they both do. you can't just cut out a major part of bitcoin network just like that.
miners provide the work which makes the difficulty go up and ensure the security and immutability of bitcoin blockchain due to expensive cost of 51% attacks thanks to their work. and nodes make sure miners stay in line by enforcing the consensus rules while keeping the network decentralized.

as for side-chain and mining, maybe it could happen alongside bitcoin in a similar fashion that merge mining works. the miner could be working on main net blocks with a much higher difficulty while finding hashes with a lower difficulty that could go into the side chain.
legendary
Activity: 2898
Merit: 1823
With drivechains, Bitcoin users can't opt out. That's the difference. Drivechains are soft forked into the consensus by miners.

With consensus reached, what would be bad about that? Segwit was soft forked into consensus with the backing of full nodes behnd it.

I can see the analogy you're making, but it's not entirely accurate. Segwit didn't fork a separate protocol into the consensus. I have doubts that Core would merge something like that, especially given the security trade-offs of a drivechain. Segwit was much less contentious than that.


OK. I'm still learning/reading more about Drivechain, and why Paul Sztorc believes strongly in that the trade-offs are worth it.

Quote

I'm not particularly comfortable with the precedent of miners forking in sidechains, on which users blindly trust those miners.


But full nodes secure the network, not miners.

Quote

I think economically important drivechains may skew Bitcoin's mining incentives. I'm not sure. I'd like to see more convincing game theory suggesting drivechains are a good idea before considering enforcing them at the consensus level, that much is certain.


Why? Mining on the base layer could be worth more because it supports all side-chains. Plus if a side-chain has value, wouldn't the game-theory/incentive-structure be the same as in Bitcoin?
legendary
Activity: 1666
Merit: 1196
STOP SNITCHIN'
With drivechains, Bitcoin users can't opt out. That's the difference. Drivechains are soft forked into the consensus by miners.

With consensus reached, what would be bad about that? Segwit was soft forked into consensus with the backing of full nodes behnd it.

I can see the analogy you're making, but it's not entirely accurate. Segwit didn't fork a separate protocol into the consensus. I have doubts that Core would merge something like that, especially given the security trade-offs of a drivechain. Segwit was much less contentious than that.

I'm not particularly comfortable with the precedent of miners forking in sidechains, on which users blindly trust those miners. I think economically important drivechains may skew Bitcoin's mining incentives. I'm not sure. I'd like to see more convincing game theory suggesting drivechains are a good idea before considering enforcing them at the consensus level, that much is certain.
legendary
Activity: 2898
Merit: 1823
I'm very curious, especially after Adam Back mentioned "trade-offs" of using Lightning, or Liquid. I believe using Drivechains might also just be a matter of accepting the trade-offs.

https://twitter.com/adam3us/status/1217845788438601733

Quote
lightning makes security tradeoffs, liquid makes different security tradeoffs

These are two very different situations.

Lightning and Liquid can be thought of as off-chain or out-of-band. They have no effect on Bitcoin's consensus. The security trade-offs -- like needing to keep private keys online in LN, or trusting Liquid validators not to steal funds -- only affect LN users or Liquid users, respectively. Bitcoin users are unaffected no matter what.

With drivechains, Bitcoin users can't opt out. That's the difference. Drivechains are soft forked into the consensus by miners.


With consensus reached, what would be bad about that? Segwit was soft forked into consensus with the backing of full nodes behnd it.
legendary
Activity: 1568
Merit: 6660
bitcoincleanup.com / bitmixlist.org
With drivechains, Bitcoin users can't opt out. That's the difference. Drivechains are soft forked into the consensus by miners.

That may be one of the reasons some people are wary of them. Maybe they don't want to use drivechains since there is no way for them to opt out of it. One of the purported benefits of drivechains are for altcoins to be implemented on them, but with hundreds of alts already, I think it's too late to attempt to clean up that mess. Regarding

Quote
BTC maintains hashrate security in the long run.

what is this supposed to mean? Bitcoin already has a high hashrate without any other layers which reflects its mining difficulty, so it's pretty much impossible for anyone to manipulate the blockchain nowadays, compared to say 10 years ago. I'm not sure what drivechain is trying to solve here, unless it's trying to solve its own hashrate problem, which bitcoin is free from having.
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