Call me a conspiracy theorist, but I believe this is The Powers That Be (TPTB) using their influence at Verisign to interfere with bitcoin.
A few months ago, I have had similar problems with Firefox telling me that the certificates were not valid on the Intersango, Mt Gox, and btc-e.com.
Even today, my android phone will not let me use MtGox Mobile app due to some problem with the certificate.
IMO TPTB use certificates authorities and anti-virus software like Norton to implement a casual form of website blacklisting.
Stay calm, here is the solution about the certificates problem
http://perspectives-project.org/how does one know they can trust the 'network notary' server? It seems like one more point of potential breach to me to bypass the CA's and then rely on yet another place for verification of SSL certs. Granted I did not read through to see how they address the trust issue.
I think this quote clears it out...
Perspectives takes a different approach to how the web browser determines if an SSL certificate is valid. Instead of requiring browser users to trust an anointed group of certificate authorities, Perspectives gives users the ability to pick a group they trust (e.g., the EFF, Google, their company, their university, their group of friends, etc.) and trust no one else.
How is this possible? Perspectives has a decentralized model that let’s anyone run one or more “network notary servers”. A network notary server is connected to the Internet and regularly monitors websites to build a history of the SSL certificate used by each site. Notary servers or groups of notary servers may be operated by public organizations, private companies, or even individuals.
Rather than validating an SSL certificate by checking for certificate authority approval, with Perspectives the browser validates a certificate by checking for consistency with the certificates observed by the network notaries over time. With network notary servers spread around the world and keeping a history of data, it is VERY hard for an attacker to launch a man-in-the-middle attack (see our academic paper for a full security analysis).
Just like a user picks which search engine their browser will use, they user can also choose what group(s) of network notaries they will trust. The user him/herself can choose whether they trust Comodo, the U.S government, the Chinese government, or not. And because all notary data is public, the quality of different network notaries can be measured and evaluated by anyone, creating a market for better security.
