Do you mean that the firmware can be replaced after the device was assembled? If so, what is the procedure to do that?
The official procedure is rather nicely shown here: http://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-user/updatingfirmware.html
Topic: [ESHOP launched] Trezor: Bitcoin hardware wallet - page 181. (Read 966173 times)
Do you mean that the firmware can be replaced after the device was assembled? If so, what is the procedure to do that?
The official procedure is rather nicely shown here: http://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-user/updatingfirmware.htmluntil you stray into life of the universe type probabilities it makes sense to question ... after that you are being irrationally paranoid or simply trolling.
Do you mean that the firmware can be replaced after the device was assembled? If so, what is the procedure to do that?
The official procedure is rather nicely shown here: http://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-user/updatingfirmware.html Do you mean that the firmware can be replaced after the device was assembled? If so, what is the procedure to do that?
The official procedure is rather nicely shown here: http://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-user/updatingfirmware.htmlyour contortions are getting a little contrived ... and a bit funny too.
Hm... What if someone get holds of your Trezor without your knowledge, installs malicious firmware that saves your passphrase, returns it to you, then steals it again after you have used it, and downloads the pasphrase? Or whaterver?
The storage area is erased when you upload unofficial firmware.
Do you mean that the firmware can be replaced after the device was assembled? If so, what is the procedure to do that?
The official procedure is rather nicely shown here: http://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-user/updatingfirmware.htmlYou have to confirm that you want to run it with unsigned firmware every time you plug it in.
Do you mean that the firmware can be replaced after the device was assembled? If so, what is the procedure to do that?
The official procedure is rather nicely shown here: http://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-user/updatingfirmware.html
Do you mean that the firmware can be replaced after the device was assembled? If so, what is the procedure to do that?
The official procedure is rather nicely shown here: http://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-user/updatingfirmware.html
I'm not at home, but got a call from my dad. The trezor package arrived! 
Awesome! I wish I had ordered one during the 0.5BTC promotion. Oh well, I hope you enjoy yours! Makes some pictures and show them to us! I'm not sure whether you can verify the firmware running on the device, but you can always flash it with the latest firmware from the website or your own build. That said, there is still bootloader that might be hacked, but that would have to happen in production because it cannot be overwritten. That would be equivalent to having a fake one.
Wait, I am confused. Do you mean that the firmware can be replaced after the device was assembled? If so, what is the procedure to do that?
I'm not at home, but got a call from my dad. The trezor package arrived!
I'm not sure whether you can verify the firmware running on the device, but you can always flash it with the latest firmware from the website or your own build. That said, there is still bootloader that might be hacked, but that would have to happen in production because it cannot be overwritten. That would be equivalent to having a fake one.
Wait, I am confused. Do you mean that the firmware can be replaced after the device was assembled? If so, what is the procedure to do that?If there are hidden cameras everywhere, all hardware is NSA hacked and user is not looking at the screen before sending all his money to thief, then the user probably cannot do safe transaction with credit card either. [ ... ] So what can be done that would in your opinion make this safer than your credit card? If I have hacked computer, then thief can steal my money from my bank account. If I have cameras in my appartment, then he might steal from me as well. I have received my computer, credit cards and bank details by post and if NSA or goverment wanted they can block and empty my bank account whenever they wanted.
As I wrote, using a Trezor is surely safer than entering or storing keys in your PC or laptop, and you may even dare to use it on a random cybercafe computer (which you should never entrust with your keys).
However, users must be aware that the risk of theft is still not negligible, and they must still be very careful when using the Trezor -- even more than when using credit cards or home banking.
Consider the entire process of stealing money from your account or credit card, including what the thief needs to do to get the cash in hand once he has stolen the PIN or passwords, and what you can do once you discover the theft. Bitcoin makes the theft much simpler and safer for the thief, and he can effectively collect bicoins stolen from thousands of wallets on the same day, without even being logged in at the time. Bitcoin thefts have proven to be nearly impossible to solve; the stolen coins cannot be blocked or seized, and are easily laundered with little risk.
For those reasons, and more, bitcoin is extremely attractive to professional cybercriminals. It is no wonder that there are already more bitcoin thefts than credit card thefts, in proportion to the total e-payments.
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I think that it is important to talk about these risks and educate users. But if there is nothing what can be done, then engaging in such discussion is useless.
Of course it is very important to discuss these issues. I don't know the details of the hardware & software, but I am sure that its safety can be improved in many ways.
For example, it is still not clear to me whether there is any practical way to check that the firmware that is loaded in a particular Trezor device is the official one. (This is the fundamental fatal flaw of every all-digital voting machine design, and there is still no known solution for it.)
The problems you describe (like the anonymity, etc.) are the features of BTC and these are thus inherent to all BTC wallets. Once you are robbed, you can do nothing about it. I agree with you. That is not a bug, that is the feature. I know that this makes BTC attractive to the criminals, but I disagree that this makes this device less secure.
I'm not sure whether you can verify the firmware running on the device, but you can always flash it with the latest firmware from the website or your own build. That said, there is still bootloader that might be hacked, but that would have to happen in production because it cannot be overwritten. That would be equivalent to having a fake one.
Thought someone had sent me some 'safe payment system' condoms!
Thanks Trezor
Thanks Trezor
If there are hidden cameras everywhere, all hardware is NSA hacked and user is not looking at the screen before sending all his money to thief, then the user probably cannot do safe transaction with credit card either. [ ... ] So what can be done that would in your opinion make this safer than your credit card? If I have hacked computer, then thief can steal my money from my bank account. If I have cameras in my appartment, then he might steal from me as well. I have received my computer, credit cards and bank details by post and if NSA or goverment wanted they can block and empty my bank account whenever they wanted.
As I wrote, using a Trezor is surely safer than entering or storing keys in your PC or laptop, and you may even dare to use it on a random cybercafe computer (which you should never entrust with your keys).
However, users must be aware that the risk of theft is still not negligible, and they must still be very careful when using the Trezor -- even more than when using credit cards or home banking.
Consider the entire process of stealing money from your account or credit card, including what the thief needs to do to get the cash in hand once he has stolen the PIN or passwords, and what you can do once you discover the theft. Bitcoin makes the theft much simpler and safer for the thief, and he can effectively collect bicoins stolen from thousands of wallets on the same day, without even being logged in at the time. Bitcoin thefts have proven to be nearly impossible to solve; the stolen coins cannot be blocked or seized, and are easily laundered with little risk.
For those reasons, and more, bitcoin is extremely attractive to professional cybercriminals. It is no wonder that there are already more bitcoin thefts than credit card thefts, in proportion to the total e-payments.
Quote
I think that it is important to talk about these risks and educate users. But if there is nothing what can be done, then engaging in such discussion is useless.
Of course it is very important to discuss these issues. I don't know the details of the hardware & software, but I am sure that its safety can be improved in many ways.
For example, it is still not clear to me whether there is any practical way to check that the firmware that is loaded in a particular Trezor device is the official one. (This is the fundamental fatal flaw of every all-digital voting machine design, and there is still no known solution for it.)
Your bitcoin keys will be safer if stored in a Trezor than in your PC or smartphone, for sure. However the risk will still be significant.
Even with Trezor, stealing your bitcoins may still be easier than stealing money from your bank account or credit card, and it will certainly be much safer for the thief. Thus we can be sure that legions of black-hat hackers and criminals will turn their attention to methods of stealing bitcoins from Trezor users.
Even with Trezor, stealing your bitcoins may still be easier than stealing money from your bank account or credit card, and it will certainly be much safer for the thief. Thus we can be sure that legions of black-hat hackers and criminals will turn their attention to methods of stealing bitcoins from Trezor users.
If there are hidden cameras everywhere, all hardware is NSA hacked and user is not looking at the screen before sending all his money to thief, then the user probably cannot do safe transaction with credit card either.
Don't get me wrong. I think that it is important to talk about these risks and educate users. But if there is nothing what can be done, then engaging in such discussion is useless.
So what can be done that would in your opinion make this safer than your credit card? If I have hacked computer, then thief can steal my money from my bank account. If I have cameras in my appartment, then he might steal from me as well. I have received my computer, credit cards and bank details by post and if NSA or goverment wanted they can block and empty my bank account whenever they wanted.
The added security of this device is that it has to be either bugged or fake or malitious to steal from you and even if it is, then it still needs your computer cooperation, i.e., your computer being hacked, to do it. It is much higher security compared to just storing your keys on your computer. Especially for lumberjack Jack, who never saw linux before.
But there is no easy way to make sure that the software that they are checking is what is stored in the device, is there?
We prepared a deterministic build environment, so it's easy to compile the firmware from source and produce bit identical binary to ours and compare them (or their hashes). We'll prepare more materials about how to check this/participate in the signing on the next firmware update.
If you use your Trezor anywhere outside your home, whatever you do to unlock it (passwords, PIN, voiceprints, secret handshakes...) can be recorded and used by someone who later steals the device.
PIN - can't be logged, please search for the Trezor PIN matrix. By "recording" I do not mean just keylogging, but (e.g.) placing a hidden hi-res camera in the right spot.
Perhaps the designers left a secret backdoor
it's opensource, everybody can check and believe me they are doing that.. Quote
1. check the integrity of the package before you use the device
A criminal who sets out to physically hack a rich man's Trezor during delivery will surely be able to provide a neatly sealed package that will fool him. Quote
2. only buy it from official/trusted shops 3. the casing cannot be opened without damaging it so replacing internals won't be easy
Most devices will be bought via internet and delivered by UPS or the like. International purchases will be particularly risky since the packages may sit to weeks at customs and be opened by them.The Trezor's exterior is quite simple, so it seems relatively easy to make a fake one that looks and feels like the original. The copy can be swapped for the original, without the owner noticing, and can be designed to steal the PIN and/or passphrase and transmit it to the thief, e.g. by bluetooth. (This attack would be similar to the "chupa-cabra" that thieves attach to ATMs to steal card data and PINs).
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Perhaps someone replaced your Trezor by a compromised one, in transport or anytime after you got it.
Of all the risks mentioned, this is the most realistic one I think. The nsa has actually been caught doing this to routers. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/16/nsa-bugged-cisco-routers/ Too bad you cant create and compare a hash of hardware configurations. Do you think your aforementioned security precautions would thwart such a sophisticated attacker as this?
Even if your Trezor works as it is supposed to, you will still be vulnerable to attacks like address phishing (the hacker tricks you into sending payment to the wrong address) and man-in-the-middle (a compromised PC software displays the correct destination address on the screen, but puts the thief's address in the transaction that it gives Trezor to sign. While an alert user can notice the substitution by checking the Trezor's display, there will inevitably be users who check only the PC screen, out of laziness or because they are not aware of the risk.)
That's true. It is one of our main goals to educate our users on the few risks left after they purchase a Trezor:
- store your recovery seed in a safe place, prevent it's misusage
- don't forget your encryption passphrase if you are using this advanced option
- use a different channel to verify the payment address received through internet (phone, in person...)
Visual (dsiplay) and physical verification (button press) is one of the key security properties of Trezor. If someone is not using it for his advantage, he doesn't understand the threats. Again, education is important.
If you use your Trezor anywhere outside your home, whatever you do to unlock it (passwords, PIN, voiceprints, secret handshakes...) can be recorded and used by someone who later steals the device.
PIN - can't be logged, please search for the Trezor PIN matrix. passphrase - best practice when you need to use a public computer, just have a small spending amount without a passphrase
It may have a bug (like the classical buffer overrun)...
that is discovered by a hacker and can be exploited by a malicious software in the PC to extract the private keys.
security researchers that tested Trezor were a bit disappointed that they couldnt trick Trezor with buffer overflowthat is discovered by a hacker and can be exploited by a malicious software in the PC to extract the private keys.
Perhaps the designers left a secret backdoor
it's opensource, everybody can check and believe me they are doing that.. If Trezor uses custom chips, perhaps someone switched the tapes on the way to the foundry, or substituted the chips on the way back.
Our manufacturer is sourcing standard material with their long-time partners audited on a regular basis AND without them ever knowing the final product.Perhaps someone replaced your Trezor by a compromised one, in transport or anytime after you got it. (Ask any magician how it can be done under your nose.)
That might be risky BUT if you are not completely naive, you 1. check the integrity of the package before you use the device, 2. only buy it from official/trusted shops 3. the casing cannot be opened without damaging it so replacing internals won't be easyif you do the above and still not sure, contact our support, we might have some ways to determine further (no, no privacy breach will be done)
It seems very difficult to check whether your device is legitimate and unmodified, and that the software that it is running is the same that is posted on github.
http://satoshilabs.com/news/2014-06-22-wanted-independent-trezor-code-reviewers/ Jump to: