I'll set that aside for a moment and just comment on this:
SPV is less risky precisely because it trusts the difficultywise-longest chain regardless of transaction validity. Transaction validity is the only complicated/subtle part; judging difficultywise-length requires only SHA-256, which is about two dozen lines of easy-to-test code.
This advantage can be replicated in full-chain-validating clients by having them watch for any invalid chain which is difficultywise-longest by more than the confirmation threshold. If such a situation arises, activate safe mode: halt all activities except possibly mining. I assume that the kerfuffle over "losing money" isn't about mining revenue. Safe mode can be automatically deactivated if a valid chain once again becomes difficultywise-longest.
I suppose clients that do this are still "second class" in the sense that if you find a chain-splitting bug you can get them to pause until a human intervenes. But it's definitely a distinct security class compared to either SPV or bitcoin-qt.