Right, but it's difficult for me to forget how recently this was broken...
aptitude package manager (Debian, Ubuntu & derivatives thereof use aptitude) had an issue in springtime 2019 where an attacker could bypass the signature checking on packages. Combine that expolit with subversion of DNS resolution for an aptitude repo and then an attacker could serve bogus software updates and packages to all Debian based boxes (not hard as aptitude was still recommending configuring http links because signing packages is infallible!)
fixed now of course, but does anyone really know whether a malicious actor knew this beforehand, and now every Debian based machine has the latest greatest rootkit installed? fixing aptitude doesn't matter in that worst case scenario.
That situation immediately got me looking for alternative models; source based package managers, such as those in Gentoo, FreeBSD, Crux, Nix, Guix etc are looking very attractive. Nothing stops bugs in these package managers either, but the situation with aptitude demonstrates that having a limited number of repo mirrors serving package binaries is a more fragile model than I'd previously considered. At least a similar such bug in source based package managers would also require a simultaneous attack against dozens of different source code repos too (although targeting e.g. gnu git servers would be simple but effective in those circumstances, all easier said than done of course)
And is the Tor Browser even available through Linux software repos? It's available through the torporject repo... but we're coming onto the topic of Tor Browser itself further down...
yeah, these people would be very easy to manipulate (hence the internal Electrum popup, which alot of people just assumed they could trust, because they didn't understand that popups could be coming from someone who is not the Electrum devs).
"unsolicited" popups literally haven't happened to me in years, it's possible I might be easier to trick because of that, provided the trick was clever enough.
Well, it's true that Tor Browser is little different than the regular Firefox browser. But even for users who don't use the tor network daemon from the Tor Browser Bundle (such as me), configuring Firefox to use Tor Browser's settings and plugins is not to be taken lightly... a large part of the Tor Browser set of presets is to make the browser difficult to fingerprint, which is a vast topic (which extends beyond the browser into the OS and the underlying hardware), so any small mistakes or oversights in a self-configured Firefox are guaranteed to weaken your anonymity.
As for satoshi... I get the feeling that maybe Windows was a way for satoshi to help obscure his/their identity further. It's pretty common for *nix users to also be proficient Windows users, or just capable of quickly learning the Windows way of doing something. What you're saying only underlines this point more: if satoshi really was using Windows the whole time while developing Bitcoin and communicating here on Bitcointalk.org, the chances that he was being surveilled by intelligence agencies are pretty high. It seems more likely that either being a Windows user was an elaborate smokescreen, or that satoshi was working with or for intelligence agencies all along. whether that's good or bad depends on what the objective of the Bitcoin project was
Yep, the Unix fundamentals and the C language are still incredibly relevant today. Android phones, all Apple devices and your home router are running and relying on those Unix basic components, and are reliable and secure in a large part because of Unix. And it's fundamentally the same as it was in the 1970's.
Microsoft are (and always were) a bunch of lazy crooks that won initially because they were well-connected in business, not because they had good products. Even if they produced some decent software since then (and I emphasize the "some"), both the foundations of their OS and their basic business ethics are irreparably rotten.