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I don't think that's accurate - I know we've been here before though. The advantage of quantum processing is in the superposition, the ability to explore many paths at once - but it still resolves to a classical 0/1 outcome.
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I didn`t claim to have any knowledge or expertise on
quantum computer; I am just curious about the industry and how beautiful they are bringing technology from our current state to the future.
For Honeywell specifically, I am skeptical because of the metric they've chosen to use:
In early March 2020, Honeywell International joined the race to create a quantum computer. The company is preparing to release the most powerful system in the world.
The manufacturer of industrial equipment for the aerospace sector says its quantum computer will double the performance of the most powerful quantum machine available today. Their new system will have 64 cubic meters, while the fastest quantum computer built by IBM will have 32 cubic meters.
Whilst it's good that more companies are getting involved, I'm extremely skeptical of Honeywell's claim. Their assessment is based on the assumption that Quantum Volume is the defining metric for QC power, and that's very much open to question. Quantum Volume is the metric that IBM uses:
Quantum Volume (QV) is a hardware-agnostic metric that we defined to measure the performance of a real quantum computer. Each system we develop brings us along a path where complex problems will be more efficiently addressed by quantum computing; therefore, the need for system benchmarks is crucial, and simply counting qubits is not enough. As we have discussed in the past, Quantum Volume takes into account the number of qubits, connectivity, and gate and measurement errors. Material improvements to underlying physical hardware, such as increases in coherence times, reduction of device crosstalk, and software circuit compiler efficiency, can point to measurable progress in Quantum Volume, as long as all improvements happen at a similar pace.
The thing is... absolutely no-one else uses that metric. IBMs QC is currently the most powerful in the world, based on Quantum Volume, because
it is the only one that uses Quantum Volume as a metric.It looks like Honeywell are trying to put out a QC that is more powerful than IBM's, using Quantum Volume to determine that power... thereby becoming the "most powerful" QC in the world by improving on its only competitor on that metric.
It is great that another company is entering the space, and it will certainly be a big achievement if newcomers Honeywell can out-perform IBM... I just think that the "most powerful" claim is a little misleading.
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As I`ve do the math
in google, I found out that it can really poised risk on certain features which is underlying on blockchain technology to mostly in its minimal, to mention few are “How Private Addresses might compromised its encryption and mining capabilities”.
I've shared this a few times, and make no apology for doing so again - it's all open to discussion of course, I'm not claiming to be any authority on the subject, just an enthusiast - but here's my summary of how quantum computing can and will affect bitcoin:
Hi all
I thought I’d try to summarise Bitcoin's vulnerabilities to Quantum Computers, as well as some potential defences, and get it all in one post. Apologies for the wall of text, but hopefully it is useful...
Mining can potentially be much quicker with QCs.The current PoW difficulty system can be exploited by a Quantum Computer using
Grover’s algorithm to drastically reduce the number of computational steps required to solve the problem. The theorised advantage that a quantum computer (or parallelised QCs) have over classical computers is a couple of orders of magnitude, so ~x100 easier to mine. This isn’t necessarily a game-changer, as this QC speed advantage is likely to be some years away, by which time classical computers will surely have increased speed to reduce the QC advantage significantly. It is worth remembering that QCs aren’t going up against run-of-the-mill standard equipment here, but rather against the very fast ASICs that have been set up specifically for mining.
Re-used BTC addresses are 100% vulnerable to QCs.Address Re-Use. Simply, any address that is re-used is 100% vulnerable because a QC can use
Shor’s algorithm to break public-key cryptography. This is a quantum algorithm designed specifically to solve for prime factors. As with Grover’s algorithm, the key is in dramatically reducing the number of computational steps required to solve the problem. The upshot is that for any known public key, a QC can use Shor’s approach to derive the private key. The vulnerability cannot be overstated here.
Any re-used address is utterly insecure.Processed (accepted) transactions are theoretically somewhat vulnerable to QCs.Theoretically possible because the QC can derive private keys from used addresses. In practice however processed transactions are likely to be quite secure as QCs would need to out-hash the network to double spend.
Unprocessed (pending) transactions are extremely vulnerable to QCs.As above, a QC can derive a private key from a public key. So for any unprocessed transaction, a QC attacker can obtain the private key and then create their own transaction whilst offering a much higher fee, so that the attacker’s transaction gets onto the blockchain first, ahead of the genuine transaction. So block interval and QC speed are both crucial here – it all depends on whether or not the a QC can hack the key more quickly than the block is processed.
Possible defences...
Defences using classical computers.- Modify the PoW system such that QCs don’t have any advantage over classical computers. Defending PoW is not as important as defending signatures (as above), because PoW is less vulnerable. However various approaches that can protect PoW against QCs are under development, such as Cuckoo Cycle, Momentum and Equihash.
- Modify the signature system to prevent easy derivation of private keys. Again, various approaches are under development, which use some pretty esoteric maths. There are hash-based approaches such as XMSS and SPHINCS, but more promising (as far as I can tell) are the lattice-based approaches such as Dilithium, which I think is already used by Komodo.
Defences using quantum computers.As I’ve said a few times, I’m more of a bumbling enthusiast than an expert, but exploiting quantum properties to defend against QC attack seems to me a very good idea. In theory properties such as
entanglement and the
uncertainty principle can offer an unbreakable defence. Again, people are busy researching this area. There are some quite astonishing ideas out there, such as
this one.